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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Felix, the Depressed Student
Felix, a freshman at the age of 20, moved away from his hometown 6 months ago to 
start his study of architecture. The unfamiliar environment is a major challenge for Felix, 
and he recently started to have increasing troubles at the University. Focusing on the 
lectures is difficult, and completing the assignments takes him more time and energy 
than it does for his fellow students. He feels down, tired, restless and participates less in 
activities with his fellow students, activities which he cannot enjoy anymore. At night, 
he has difficulty falling asleep and lies awake in bed while pondering about his current 
performance, and more and more often thoughts cross his mind like ‘I am a total failure’. 
One early morning, he has to give a presentation in one of his courses, something he 
already disliked back at school. Standing in front of the class, he feels very insecure and 
incapable of properly informing his fellow-students about the assigned topic. And then, 
during the presentation, he spots one of his classmates yawning and looking out of the 
window, and he immediately thinks ‘I am boring’. Memories from school recur, and he 
remembers the one presentation for which he received a discouraging mark. Unable to 
let go of this thought, he completely loses track of his presentation and has to start all 
over again. Even though the second time it went well, he is still very disappointed and 
feels even more like a total failure. 
Major Depressive Disorder
This description of a fictive student depicts several symptoms which can be attributed 
to major depressive disorder (MDD). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), MDD is 
a highly impairing mental disorder with depressed mood and the loss of interest or 
pleasure in daily activities (i.e., anhedonia) being the most characterizing symptoms. 
However, next to these most prominent emotional symptoms, a range of other domains 
are affected by depression as well, and can include physical problems (e.g., distortion 
of motor activity, disrupted sleep patterns, changes in appetite) or cognitive deficits 
(e.g., difficulties to concentrate, feelings of guilt and worthlessness). Suicidal ideation 
in particular is a severe symptom of depression, with up to 15 percent of the patients 
actually committing suicide (Möller, 2003). At the same time, with more than 40 percent 
are mood disorders the most frequent mental disorder preceding suicide (Arsenault-
Lapierre, Kim, & Turecki, 2004). 
In addition to these burdens, depression is a highly prevalent disorder, with up to one in 
five individuals affected at least once during their lifetime, with women twice as often 
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affected as men are (de Graaf, ten Have, van Gool, & van Dorsselaer, 2012; Kessler et al., 
2005). MDD has also been found to have a major effect on disability-adjusted life years 
(DALY; A. J. Ferrari et al., 2013), and is responsible for a loss in work productivity, work-
absence, and early retirement, making it the most expensive brain disorder in Europe 
(Sobocki, Jönsson, Angst, & Rehnberg, 2006). The World Health Organization has even 
identified depression as the leading cause of disabilities worldwide (World Health 
Organization, 2017).
Biased Cognitive Processing
A better understanding of this severely disabling disorder is provided by one of the 
most influential theories about depression, which also laid the foundation for cognitive 
therapy for this disorder: the cognitive schema theory (Beck, 1967; Beck & Haigh, 2014; 
Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). This theory states that our experiences are stored in mental 
representations (schemas), which guide our perception and interpretation of our self 
and the world. In the example of the student, these schemas are leading Felix to pay 
attention to the one student yawning, while missing the other attentive students. 
Schemas are latent and can be activated either by external cues, such as stressors (e.g., 
giving a presentation), as well as by internal triggers (e.g., bodily sensations). 
In depression, these self-referential schemas are characterized by themes concerning 
loss, rejection, and failure (Beck & Haigh, 2014). When these negative schemas become 
activated they guide incoming information in a schema-congruent manner and thereby 
promote the preferential processing of negative over positive information. A similar 
mood-congruent processing style has also been described in the semantic network 
theory of Bower (1981). He states that emotions and cognitions are stored in nodes, while 
these nodes are connected to each other within a semantic network. When a negative 
or stressful event, like giving a presentation, activates such an emotion node, the 
activation can spread to related nodes and thereby trigger a whole depressive network, 
including negative thoughts and cognitions, and thereby bias information processing. 
In depression, these negative biases have been found in different levels of information 
processing, such as attention (Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013), 
approach-avoidance tendencies (Vrijsen, Van Oostrom, Speckens, Becker, & Rinck, 2013), 
interpretation (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017), and memory (Rinck & Becker, 
2005). In contrast, healthy individuals are biased to preferentially process positive over 
negative material (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Neubauer Yue, & 
Joormann, 2004; Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2015). Most importantly, biased 
processing of negative material has been found to not be a mere epiphenomenon 
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of depression, but instead to contribute to the development and maintenance of 
this disorder (Clark et al., 1999; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; 
Teasdale, 1988), due to its further strengthening of the maladaptive schemas. 
This negative cognitive cycle is summarized in Figure 1.1 (model adapted from Disner, 
Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011): The activation of latent depressive schemas, for instance 
by a stressful event (for example, in the case of the student outlined earlier, moving 
to another city or giving a presentation), guides the processing of information by 
directing attention to negative stimuli in the environment (e.g., people yawning) or 
by interpreting ambiguous information negatively (e.g., I am boring instead of They 
are tired) and by retrieving related, negative, memories more easily (e.g., a previously 
failed exam). This biased processing induces negative affect, which further strengthens 
depressive schemas via a feedback loop.
Importantly, other authors also present similar models that rely on the theory of Beck, 
and thereby emphasize the central role of cognitive biases for the maintenance of 
depression. For instance, De Raedt and Koster (2010) proposed a neurocognitive model 
that tries to explain the high relapse rates found in depression. For the remainder of 
this dissertation we will however mainly rely on the work of Disner, Beevers, Haigh, and 
Beck (2011), as this model most comprehensively discusses cognitive biases and related 
neural processes without an emphasis on the chronic course of depression as De Raedt 
and Koster (2010).
Cognitive Treatment Approaches 
The cognitive schema theory laid the foundation for therapeutic interventions, such 
as the cognitive therapy. The goal of this therapy is to alter depressive schemas, by 
detecting maladaptive thoughts (e.g., ‘I am boring’, ‘I am a total failure’) and by targeting 
this maladaptive processing style for cognitive restructuring. Thereby, maladaptive 
thoughts are challenged by alternative arguments disproving the thought, such as ‘I 
had to give the presentation early in the morning, hence the student that I saw yawning 
might have been tired and not bored’. Cognitive therapy such as this has thereby been 
found to be as effective as anti-depressant medication for moderate to severe depressed 
individuals (e.g., DeRubeis et al., 2005; DeRubeis, Gelfand, Tang, & Simons, 1999).
However, even though different forms of effective treatment are available for 
depression, a rather large portion of patients relapse after a successful treatment (e.g., 
about 40 percent as reported in Steinert, Hofmann, Kruse, & Leichsenring, 2014). This 
high recurrence rate is especially alarming, as the risk to develop a new depressive 
episode increases with each subsequent depressive episode (for a review, see Burcusa 
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& Iacono, 2007; Solomon et al., 2000). Researchers have even argued that a depressive 
episode leaves a ‘scar’, which makes individuals more vulnerable to relapse in response 
to decreasingly negative events, eventually resulting in a chronic course (e.g., De Raedt 
& Koster, 2010; Teasdale, 1988). The risk of a chronic course of depression, together 
with its high burden, clearly shows the importance of further investigation of this 
mental disorder to increase our understanding and to both improve existing treatment 
approaches as well as developing alternative approaches.
Modifying Cognitive Biases in Depression
A potentially suitable technique that aims at reducing cognitive biases are the so-called 
cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigms (for a review, see Jones & Sharpe, 2017). 
These paradigms consist of computerized training programs that target the bias on 
different levels of information processing, such as attention or interpretation. The aim 
of all these paradigms is to shift the bias towards positivity, and as a consequence to 
attenuate depressive symptoms. 
Regarding the attentional bias, the most frequently used paradigm is the Dot-probe 
task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). During this task, two stimuli (e.g., words or 
pictures) are simultaneously presented on the computer screen, usually a negative one 
and a neutral or positive one. After a short delay, these pictures are replaced by a target, 
which participants have to react to. Faster reaction times to targets that appear behind 
the negative stimuli are thereby representative of an attentional bias towards negative 
material. To modify this bias and implicitly shift the attention away from the negative 
stimuli, the contingency between stimuli and target is changed so that the target 
(almost) always appears behind the non-negative stimuli (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
The same rationale has also been implemented for the assessment and training of 
maladaptive interpretation tendencies. Hereby, ambiguous cue stimuli are presented, 
for instance in the form of homographs (i.e., identically spelled words with different 
meaning, as “patient”; e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000) or as descriptions of ambiguous 
scenarios (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). These ambiguous cue stimuli are followed 
by a probe which provides a negative or benign interpretation to the ambiguous stimuli. 
Most of the time these probes are negative or benign words. Participants either have to 
indicate whether these words are related to the ambiguous cue stimuli, or they have 
to fill in a missing letter of these probe words (e.g., hosp_tal or toler_nt). Differences 
in reaction times to these probes are again indicative of differences in interpretation 
tendencies evoked by the cues. A shift in bias towards more positive interpretations is 
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achieved by more often presenting benign word-fragments than negative fragments, 
inducing more benign solutions of ambiguous scenarios (for a review, see Menne-
Lothmann et al., 2014).
Potential of CBM for Depression
These CBM techniques, which have originally been developed for anxiety disorders 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002), have revealed promising 
results in several studies. For instance, Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, and Taylor (2008) 
found that training attention away from threatening stimuli (i.e., disgusted faces) 
resulted in reduced anxiety ratings in response to a subsequent speech task in a sample 
of socially anxious individuals. Such a dot-probe training to guide attention away from 
threatening stimuli has also shown to be effective for generalized anxiety disorder (e.g., 
Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009) or 
specific phobia (e.g., Luo et al., 2015; Reese, McNally, Najmi, & Amir, 2010). For depression, 
a dot-probe training away from negative stimuli has also revealed initial evidence for 
attenuating depressive mood (Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; 
Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015). Likewise, CBM paradigms 
that aim to modify maladaptive interpretation tendencies have also revealed some 
promising findings in reductions to a range of different anxiety symptoms (e.g., Amir 
& Taylor, 2012; Clerkin & Teachman, 2011; MacDonald, Koerner, & Antony, 2013) and 
depressive symptoms (Micco, Henin, & Hirshfeld-Becker, 2014; Williams, Blackwell, 
Mackenzie, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013). 
Even the first published meta-analyses of CBM paradigms conveyed this optimistic 
impression of their potential to modify biases and in turn to alter symptoms (Beard, 
Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Due to this initial 
success, CBM has been proposed as an add-on treatment, as this technique is relatively 
inexpensive, easy to distribute (e.g., via internet or as applications for smartphones), and 
requires little to no additional instruction or supervision by a therapist (e.g., Carlbring et 
al., 2012; Enock, Hofmann, & McNally, 2014; Williams et al., 2013). 
However, a substantial amount of studies also failed in replicating these beneficial 
effects of CMB training on bias change or symptom attenuation (e.g.; Baert, De Raedt, 
Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Beevers, Clasen, Enock, & Schnyer, 2015; Kruijt, Putman, & 
Van Der Does, 2013; Mastikhina & Dobson, 2017). In contrast to the optimistic picture 
outlined by the first meta-analyses, the more recent meta-analyses estimate CBM 
procedure for depression to be ineffective (Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Mogoaşe, 
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David, & Koster, 2014). After more than three decades of research on cognitive biases 
and CBM paradigms, doubts and criticism regarding the efficacy and suitability of these 
cognitive training procedures are growing (Emmelkamp, 2012). 
In order to better understand this ongoing debate about the efficacy, we need to take 
a closer look into those studies that fuel this discussion. Hereby it appears that all meta-
analyses provide an estimation of the overall effect (strength) of CBM paradigms to 
alter maladaptive information processing and in turn to attenuate symptoms, while 
they provide only insufficient insight into the specific conditions under which CBM 
procedures might or might not be effective (Beard et al., 2012; Cristea et al., 2015; 
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). That is, studies are included in these meta-
analyses which differ on a range of factors as for instance the targeted level of processing 
(e.g., attention and interpretation), the paradigms used for assessment and training, 
the disorder (i.e., anxiety and depression), the population (e.g., healthy individuals 
and patients), the test-environment (i.e., lab-session and internet based training), or 
the length of training (i.e., single session intervention and multiple session training). 
However, due to a limited amount of randomized controlled trials covering all these 
different factors, the current meta-analyses are not able to provide a detailed picture 
under which circumstances CBM paradigms might be effective. Instead, the estimation 
is rather based on an overarching effect size summarizing these factors, resulting in a 
potential overly negative evaluation of CBM paradigms for depression. If we want to 
reliably estimate the potential of CBM techniques we need to consider these factors 
(Jones & Sharpe, 2017).
For instance, when distinguishing between the different processing levels, it appears 
that not all CBM techniques are equally effective, but that techniques that target 
maladaptive interpretation tendencies seem to be especially promising (Eguchi et al., 
2017; Everaert, Podina, & Koster, 2017; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoaşe et al., 2014), 
in particular in reducing depressive symptoms (Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Secondly, 
concerning CBM techniques targeting attentional processing, the most frequently used 
paradigm to assess and modify attentional bias (i.e., the dot-probe task; MacLeod et 
al., 1986) was originally designed to modify attentional bias in anxiety disorders. Most 
importantly, attentional bias in anxiety is characterized by early vigilance towards the 
threatening stimulus, followed by later avoidance of this stimulus (MacLeod et al., 2002). 
In contrast, the attentional bias in depression has been found to be qualitatively different 
from the bias found in anxiety, characterized by slowed disengagement from negative 
stimuli (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). In other words, depressed individuals have difficulties 
in looking away from negative information once it has captured their attention. The 
question arises therefore in how far an instrument initially developed for a qualitatively 
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different attentional bias (i.e., early vigilance) can produce reliable effects in another 
disorder (i.e., depression). After all, Clarke, Notebaert and MacLeod (2014) have argued 
that you actually have to change the relevant bias to successfully attenuate symptoms. 
Hence, in order to attenuate depressive symptoms, more reliable CBM paradigms need 
to be developed that are specifically designed to target the slowed disengagement 
from negative material found in depression. 
Another argument to further promote the development of suitable attentional 
bias modification paradigms is based on the combined cognitive bias hypothesis 
(CCBH; Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). The CCBH states that different biases do 
not exist in isolation, but are related to each other. For example, a study by Everaert, 
Dyuk and Koster (2014) measured the attentional bias of healthy and depressed 
individuals during a scrambled sentence task (SST). The SST is an instrument to assess 
interpretation tendencies, whereby participants are asked to form a grammatically 
correct sentence with 5 out of 6 words from a scrambled sentence, while each 
sentence can either be resolved into a positive or negative context. Results showed 
that heightened attention to negative information was related to more negatively 
valenced sentences. In turn, participants that produced more negative solutions to 
the SST also retrieved more negative sentences during a subsequent free-recall task. 
Interestingly, a study investigating the relationship between different cognitive biases 
in anxiety discovered that a modification of the attentional bias resulted in changes 
in interpretation tendencies, while a training to alter interpretation biases did not 
transfer to attentional processing (Bowler et al., 2017). It remains to be seen whether the 
relationship between different biases is uni- or bi-directional. In any case, developing 
better suited instruments to modify attentional biases is an important and promising 
branch of research, as previous studies used instruments that were not sufficiently 
tailored to the relevant mechanism (i.e., disengagement from negative stimuli), and as 
the modification of attentional processes might transfer to other forms of information 
processing (e.g., interpretation, memory).
Biased Neural Activity
Researchers that investigated the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive biases often 
pointed to the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a cortical 
structure which has been shown to be involved in higher order cognitive processing 
and emotion regulation (e.g., Disner et al., 2011; Mitchell, 2011; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Phan et al., 2005). In general terms, cognitive biases point to an imbalance 
of limbic structures, including amygdala and hippocampus, that are involved in the 
detection of emotional material, and of brain regions that are involved in the subsequent 
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regulation of emotions, such as the DLPFC (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). In depression, 
this top-down control of emotional material is weakened, resulting in overly strong 
reactions to negative stimuli, which in turn further strengthens the depressive schemas 
(see Figure 1.1, Disner et al., 2011). For instance, when administering a dot-probe task 
where two emotional stimuli are presented (e.g., a negative and a positive picture) that 
both compete for neural representation, such weakened top-down regulation can 
result in heightened attention for the negative stimuli. Efficient top-down control by 
the DLPFC in contrast, could suppress such a bias by promoting the processing of the 
positive pictures (for review, see Mitchell, 2011). Support for this claim comes from a 
study by Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, and Hamer (2010), in which participants 
learned during a dot-probe training to attend to threatening or to neutral stimuli. DLPFC 
activity was highest when participants had to react to the stimulus category opposite to 
their training condition, that is, on trials where they had to exert most control in order to 
perform the desired reaction. 
Stressor
Depressive 
Schemas
Attention Bias Interpretation Bias Memory Bias
Depressive 
Symptoms
Weakened DLPFC activity reduces top-down control of negative information
Figure 1.1. Simplified model of depression. Note. Simplified figure adapted from Disner et 
al. (2011). Upon the activation of depressive schemas by a stressor (e.g., giving a presentation), 
information processing is biased towards negative material. This bias can be found on 
attentional processing, interpretation tendencies, and memory processes. On a neural level, 
lacking top-down control via weakened DLPFC activity further promotes these biases. The 
preferential processing of negative over positive material maintains negative affect and 
depressive symptoms and thereby further strengthens the depressive schemas in a feedback 
loop. 
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Cognitive control processes are also relevant when solving ambiguous situations and 
providing interpretations of equivocal stimuli (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). During the 
appraisal of such stimuli or when reinterpreting a situation, the DLPFC becomes active 
and has been found to be either involved in assigning a new meaning to the stimuli 
or in directing attention to the information relevant to provide an interpretation, even 
though the specific underlying process is not completely clear yet (Mitchell, 2011; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). To summarize, limited top-down control by 
the DLPFC has been suggested to contribute to the preferential processing of negative 
stimuli, which further strengthens depressive schemas. 
Modulating Neural Activity
Referring to the model by Disner and colleagues (2011), cognitive training procedures 
such as CBM are not the only way to modify the biased processing of information in 
depression. Instead, neural activity of the DLPFC can also be directly altered, for instance 
by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), a non-invasive brain stimulation 
technique. By means of a rapidly changing magnetic field underneath the TMS coil, an 
electric field can be induced in a rather small neural area directly below the coil, resulting 
in neural depolarization (Hallett, 2007). While low frequency (i.e., ≤ 1Hz) stimulation has 
been shown to induce long-term depression of neural activity, high frequency rTMS (i.e., 
≥ 10Hz) has been found to increase the neural activity outlasting the stimulation itself (P. 
B. Fitzgerald, Fountain, & Daskalakis, 2006). High frequency rTMS over the left DLPFC, as 
well as low frequency rTMS over the right DLPFC, have thereby been found to attenuate 
depressive symptoms with comparable effect sizes as antidepressant medication (for 
review, see Lam, Chan, Wilkins-Ho, & Yatham, 2008; Lefaucheur et al., 2014; Schutter, 
2009, 2010). Even though, the working mechanism of rTMS is largely unknown, this 
technique has already been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
for the treatment of depression. 
The idea to target the DLPFC with rTMS in order to treat depression was originally 
based on the finding that depressive patients are characterized by a neural imbalance 
of the prefrontal cortex (neural imbalance hypothesis; e.g., Grimm et al., 2008), with a 
hyperactive right DLPFC and a hypoactive left DLPFC. While studies have shown that 
rTMS over the left DLPFC does indeed result in reduced depressive symptoms (e.g., 
Schaller et al., 2011), such a stimulation protocol, however, does not function by directly 
inducing positive mood states (e.g., Baeken et al., 2014; Baeken, Leyman, De Raedt, 
Vanderhasselt, & D’haenen, 2008; Moulier et al., 2016). In line with the model by Disner 
18
Chapter 1
and colleagues, it is conceivable that rTMS over the left DLPFC affects cognitive and 
emotion regulation processes instead (e.g., Disner et al., 2011; Mitchell, 2011; Ochsner 
et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2005).
Support for this working mechanism comes from a study that showed altered attentional 
engagement to angry faces in a sample of healthy individuals after administering high 
frequency rTMS over the left DLPFC (De Raedt et al., 2010). A recent study (N. T. M. Chen, 
Basanovic, Notebaert, MacLeod, & Clarke, 2017) has also demonstrated that increasing 
the excitability of the left DLPFC by means of transcranial direct current stimulation 
reduces emotional vulnerability to a stressful video task. Interestingly, this effect was 
moderated by reduced attentional engagement towards the negative stimulus material 
presented. In summary, increasing the activity of the DLPFC seems to be a potential 
technique to alter cognitive and emotion regulation processes, and in turn to affect 
depressive symptoms. 
Aim of this Dissertation 
In line with the cognitive schema theory by Beck (1967; Beck & Haigh, 2014; Disner et 
al., 2011), maladaptive cognitive processing is a maintaining factor in depression, and 
further strengthens depressive schemas. Therefore, altering these cognitive biases in 
order to reduce depressive symptoms is a central goal for different treatment approaches, 
such as cognitive bias modification paradigms. After three decades of research into 
cognitive biases, it appears that there is actually some potential to successfully modify 
maladaptive information processing in order to attenuate depressive symptoms. The 
aim of this dissertation is to apply the cognitive model of depression as summarized 
by Disner et al. (2011) in order to develop new techniques and further improve current 
paradigms that aim to alter maladaptive cognitive processing. Importantly, the studies 
presented in this dissertation are proof-of-principle studies that test the suitability 
of new paradigms to primarily modify biased information processing as found in 
depression. Altering the maladaptive information processing is the premise to be able 
to attenuate symptoms in turn. 
As explained above, the development of paradigms suited to modify attentional 
processing is a promising avenue, though the focus so far has been mainly on 
procedures targeting attentional biases in anxiety and less in depression. Studies that 
have investigated the possibility to alter attentional processing in depression have 
revealed inconclusive results. As a result, the suitability of these training paradigms has 
been questioned. In order to overcome shortcomings inherent to these paradigms, I 
developed and tested an alternative ABM paradigm as described in chapter 2 and 3. 
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By implementing an eye-tracker into the paradigm, I tried to specifically target the 
impaired disengagement from negative stimuli, which has been suggested as the 
relevant attentional process for depression. The aim was to investigate whether this 
new paradigm 1) is suited to modify the attentional processing of valenced stimuli, 2) 
whether we can reduce the time it takes to disengage attention from negative material, 
and 3) whether this reduction in negative attentional bias results in attenuated stress 
reactions.
Based on the aforementioned meta-analyses (Everaert et al., 2017; Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), it also appears that CBM techniques that focus 
on interpretation tendencies are especially promising in reducing bias and attenuating 
symptoms. In chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis, I describe two studies that further explore 
possibilities to alter an interpretation bias. The aim of these studies was to develop 
and test an Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D), which has 
already demonstrated promising results in modifying interpretation tendencies in 
anxious individuals (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008). This paradigm is based on the Word-
Sentence Association Paradigm, where a brief, ambiguous sentence (e.g., “People laugh 
after something you said”) is combined with either a negative (e.g., “stupid”) or benign 
word (e.g., “funny”). By pressing a designated button, participants have to indicate 
whether sentence and word belong together. In order to modify these interpretation 
tendencies, feedback was provided to each reaction to promote the endorsement of 
adaptive interpretations. The aim of these studies was thereby to test the malleability 
of interpretation tendencies by means of the IMP-D, and to assess whether a change 
in bias is related to a change in emotional vulnerability in response to a subsequent 
stressful situation.
As stated in the cognitive model of depression (Disner et al., 2011), depressive schemas 
are further strengthened by the preferential processing of negative information, 
resulting in a vicious circle. On a neural level, lacking top-down control via the DLPFC 
has been related to heightened processing of negative stimuli. In chapter 6, I describe 
a study where I investigated the possibility of interrupting this vicious circle of 
maladaptive information processing in depression by directly targeting neural activity 
of the DLPFC. In this study, I tested whether high frequency rTMS over the left DLPFC 
might work as a preventive tool by increasing top-down control, and in turn weaken 
the impact of a subsequent negative mood induction procedure which aims to activate 
negative schemas. To this end, negative mood states, changes in neural activity (EEG) 
and altered attentional processing were assessed to evaluate the preventive effects of 
high frequency rTMS. 

CHAPTER 2
Can’t Look Away: An Eye-Tracking Based Attentional 
Disengagement Training for Depression
Based on Ferrari, G. R. A., Möbius, M., van Opdorp, A., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. 
(2016). Can’t look away: An eye-tracking based attentional disengagement 
training for depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 40, 672-686.
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ABSTRACT
To address shortcomings of purely reaction-time based attentional bias modification 
(ABM) paradigms, we developed an ABM task that is controlled by eye-tracking. 
This task makes it possible to assess and train both disengagement from negative 
pictures and maintained attention to positive pictures. As a proof-of-principle study 
with an unselected student sample, this positive training (PT; n = 44) was compared 
to a negative training (NT; n = 42), which reinforced the opposite attentional pattern. 
Importantly, training trials were completed only once participants performed the 
correct gaze pattern. Results showed that higher depression levels were associated with 
slower disengagement from negative stimuli at baseline. As expected, the PT induced 
longer fixations on positive pictures and faster disengagement from negative pictures. 
The NT showed no changes in attentional processes. The groups did not differ in mood 
reactivity and recovery from a stressor. Advantages of using eye-tracking in ABM and 
potential applications of the training are discussed. 
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Probably everybody recognizes the situation in which one simply cannot look away 
from a horrible movie scene or a car accident on the highway. Attending to such 
negative scenes does not make us happy, obviously, but we often cannot disengage 
our attention from it. In fact, from an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense to not 
completely ignore such potentially harmful situations or stimuli, in order to be able to 
keep a distance or to avoid them in the future (Rubenking & Lang, 2014). 
However, it would become maladaptive if we persistently attended to negative 
information at the expense of positive information - a tendency often found in individuals 
suffering from depression (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Beck (1976) postulated 
that this tendency can be explained by negative schemas which guide information 
processing in depressed individuals, leading them to selectively attend to negative, 
schema-congruent stimuli in their environment. According to Beck’s depression model 
(1976, 1987) as well as other prominent cognitive theories of depression (Teasdale, 
1988), such attentional processing biases play a causal role in the development and 
maintenance of the disorder. 
Importantly, research suggests that the nature of this bias is different from the one 
reported in anxiety disorders (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Unlike anxious individuals 
who show both an orienting bias towards threat (for reviews, see Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998), as well as delayed disengagement from threat (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2009; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Schofield, Johnson, Inhoff, & Coles, 2012), the 
depressed do not seem to be more vigilant for negative stimuli than healthy individuals 
(Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Sanchez et al., 2013). Instead, the attentional 
processing of negative stimuli in depression seems to be specifically characterized by 
the increased maintenance of eye-gaze on negative information (for a meta-analysis, see 
Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), supposedly reflecting a difficulty to disengage attention 
from it once it has become the focus of attention (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Although 
a number of eye-tracking studies provide evidence for the prolonged processing of 
negative information (Caseras et al., 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, 
& Wells, 2008; Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 2010), until recently it has remained 
speculative whether the maintained eye-gaze on negative information indeed is due to 
disengagement difficulties (Sanchez et al., 2013).
The most direct evidence for this assumption comes from research by Sanchez et al. 
(2013). In a novel engagement-disengagement assessment task employing eye-
tracking, participants had to disengage their attention from negative pictures in order 
to attend to neutral pictures. Compared to healthy controls, depressed individuals took 
longer to disengage attention from negative stimuli when prompted to. Moreover, the 
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depressed group lacked the positive attentional bias (i.e., longer sustained attention 
to positive than to neutral or negative stimuli) typically found in healthy samples 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2010; Kellough et al., 2008; Sears 
et al., 2010), indicating that processing of both negative and positive information is 
affected in depression.
Besides the disturbed disengagement from negative cues, depression has also been 
associated with a lack of inhibitory control over negative information (De Raedt & Koster, 
2010) and with the use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (e.g., rumination). 
This prevents individuals from implementing more effective strategies, such as 
redirecting attention away from negative stimuli and towards other, more benign cues, 
or reappraising emotion-eliciting situations in a less negative way (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010). This in turn may lead to prolonged negative affect 
in response to stress. In line with the assumption that difficulties in disengagement are 
associated with impaired emotion regulation, Sanchez et al. (2013) showed that it was 
specifically impaired disengagement from negative stimuli that predicted impaired 
recovery from a stressful speech task.
Supporting the causal role of an attentional bias in depression and emotional 
vulnerability, a range of attentional bias modification (ABM) studies have been 
conducted. They provide first evidence that training attention away from negative 
information and towards neutral or positive information decreases depressive mood 
and cortisol response to stress in dysphoric individuals (Tsumura, Shimada, Nomura, 
Sugaya, & Suzuki, 2012) as well as depressive symptoms in dysphoric adults, adolescents, 
and remitted depressed individuals (Browning et al., 2012; Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang 
et al., 2015).
Most of these studies applied the task most commonly used to measure and modify 
attentional bias: the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 2002). In this task, individuals are 
exposed to series of consecutively presented pairs of negative and neutral or positive 
stimuli (images or words) on a computer screen. Participants are required to respond to 
a target stimulus (i.e., a probe), which always appears in the location of one of the two 
stimuli. Shorter reaction times to probes in the location of negatively valenced stimuli 
compared to neutral (or positive) stimuli indicate an attentional bias towards negative 
information. In the training version of the task, the probe occurs in about 85–100 % of 
the trials in the location of the neutral or positive stimulus, such that participants learn to 
attend towards the relatively positive information and away from negative information.
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Despite early promising findings, an increasing number of studies failed to successfully 
modify selective attention with the dot-probe task and also failed to replicate its 
beneficial therapeutic effects (for reviews, see Cristea et al., 2015; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). 
A possible reason for the inconsistent findings might be the low reliability of the dot-
probe task, which is related to the exclusive use of reaction time data when assessing 
attentional bias (Brown et al., 2014; Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter & Stolz, 
2015). Another frequently provided explanation is that during the task, participants may 
completely ignore the emotionally valenced stimuli and only initiate their search for the 
probe once it is presented (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2010; Notebaert, Clarke, Grafton, & 
MacLeod, 2015), making it difficult to measure a possibly existing (disengagement) bias. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that for a change in bias to occur, it might be necessary 
for participants to detect the link between stimulus valence and probe location 
(Notebaert et al., 2015). Therefore, variations in the degree to which participants really 
attend to and hence process the stimuli might also explain the inconsistent training 
effects. Finally, it is important to note that the suitability of the dot-probe task has 
especially been doubted in the context of depression, as the task does not seem to 
allow for thorough conclusions about what is actually measured and targeted (Leyman, 
De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007). With longer stimulus durations, participants may 
shift their attention back and forth between the stimuli, leaving undetected which 
attentional component the task is tapping into: Heightened vigilance for negative 
stimuli or, more relevant for depression, impaired disengagement from negative stimuli.
These arguments suggest that conventional reaction-time based ABM paradigms such 
as the dot-probe task are not the most optimal procedures for measuring and modifying 
attentional bias, and particularly not so for depressed individuals (Mogoaşe et al., 
2014). Researchers in this field have therefore repetitively stressed the need to further 
refine existing ABM tasks and to develop new theory-driven approaches for modifying 
attentional bias (Clarke, Notebaert, et al., 2014; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). In a recent meta-
analysis by Mogoaşe et al., the authors concluded that such future ABM procedures 
should not only aim to reliably modify selective attention, but that they should also 
have greater ecological validity and be more captivating for participants. Despite the 
growing acknowledgement of the need to develop new improved methodologies that 
go beyond the conventional dot-probe task, there are not enough studies on novel 
ABM paradigms yet (Clarke, Notebaert, et al., 2014). A notable exception is the ‘‘person-
identity-matching’’ (PIM) task recently proposed by Notebaert et al. (2015). This ABM 
paradigm was designed to modify the attentional bias that is characteristic for anxiety, 
and it may be a promising alternative to the conventional dot-probe task. However, it 
does not allow researchers to target the attentional disengagement deficit found in 
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depression. Moreover, change in bias was again assessed with the dot-probe task, and 
no reliable alternative for measuring training effects was presented by Notebaert et al. 
(2015).
Therefore, the aim of the current study was to address limitations of previous ABM 
paradigms and to develop and evaluate a novel, eye-tracking-based ABM paradigm (ET-
ABM) to assess and target the disturbed attentional components operating in depression. 
In this proof-of-principle study, an unselected sample of students completed one of two 
training versions. In the positive training (PT), participants were trained to disengage 
attention from negative pictures and shift it towards positive pictures, and to maintain 
attention on positive pictures, despite the presence of negative pictures. In the negative 
training (NT), the opposite pattern was trained (i.e., disengagement from positive pictures 
and maintained attention on negative pictures). It should be emphasized that we aimed 
to develop a disengagement training because the findings of Sanchez et al. (2013) 
suggest that specifically the slowed disengagement from negative stimuli is associated 
with impaired mood regulation. In order to train disengagement from negative stimuli, 
it is, however, insufficient to only include disengagement trials, as this might induce a 
tendency to disengage attention from all pictures, regardless of their valence. Because 
of this, and because of the depression-specific lack of maintained attention to positive 
stimuli, trials were added where attention had to be kept on positive pictures. Notably, 
the training was completely controlled by participants’ eye-movements: Each trial could 
only be completed if the attentional pattern corresponding to the training condition 
was executed. This way, the pace of the task was perfectly tailored to each individual’s 
task performance. Changes in the two attentional components were assessed by eye-
movement recordings during a modified free-viewing task.
To confirm the validity of our bias measure, we first investigated the relation of 
attentional bias with depressive symptoms. In line with previous research (Sanchez 
et al., 2013), we expected that higher baseline levels of depression would be related 
to slowed disengagement from negative stimuli. Given the unselected nature of our 
sample, the corresponding analyses should be considered exploratory. Regarding the 
training, we hypothesized that the PT would induce a positive attentional bias (i.e., 
relatively longer fixations on positive than on negative pictures) whereas the NT would 
induce a negative attentional bias. Moreover, we expected differential changes in the 
disengagement component of attention, namely that the PT group would become 
faster in disengaging attention from negative (towards positive) information, whereas 
the NT group would become slower in this process. Previous research on cognitive bias 
modification (CBM) procedures targeting approach-avoidance tendencies shows that 
training-induced changes in bias are only found in individuals being trained to avoid 
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negative stimuli, but not in those being trained to exclusively approach positive stimuli 
(G. R. A. Ferrari, Möbius, Becker, Spijker, & Rinck, 2018). This suggests that CBM training 
with negative and positive stimuli might work specifically via increasing the avoidance 
of negative stimuli. Because of this and because our training was specifically developed 
to modify attentional disengagement, we did not have explicit expectations about 
changes in maintained attention.
Finally, to assess a causal link between attentional disengagement and mood recovery 
from stress, and to allow for validation of our training, participants completed a stress 
task at the end of the experiment. Based on previous research (Sanchez et al., 2013), we 
expected the PT group to show a higher recovery from the stressor than the NT group.
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-eight female and 17 male students (mean age = 21.79, SD = 5.15) of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, participated in return for course credit 
or a 15 Euro reward. Participants were assigned in a double-blind fashion to the PT (n = 
48) or the NT (n = 47).
Instruments and Materials
Baseline questionnaires. To assess depression levels, the revised version of Beck 
Depression Inventory was used (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The internal 
consistency of the BDI was good (α = .85). Moreover, to be able to control for possible 
differences between groups in trait anxiety and affect, two additional baseline 
questionnaires were administered. The trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1989) was administered to assess anxiety proneness, and 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was used to 
measure general levels of affect. The internal consistencies of these questionnaires in 
the current sample were excellent (STAI: α = .92) and good (PANAS subscales: PA: α = 
.86; NA: α = .89). All questionnaires were administered in the participants’ dominant 
language (German or Dutch). 
Mood ratings. To measure mood changes throughout the experiment, participants 
indicated on six items how they felt at the moment (0 = not at all to 10 = very much). 
The items happy and sad assessed general mood and were analyzed to investigate 
whether the training affected mood directly. A score for general mood was calculated 
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by mirroring scores on the happy mood item and adding them to scores on the sad 
mood item, such that higher scores were indicative of more negative mood. Stress was 
measured by the items content, relaxed, frustrated, and nervous, which were analyzed to 
assess mood reactivity and recovery from the stressor. A stress score was calculated by 
mirroring scores on the items content and relaxed and adding those to the scores on 
the items frustrated and nervous. Consequently, higher scores reflected higher levels of 
stress. 
The ET-ABM task
Stimuli. Recent research by Becker et al. (2016) showed that CBM training variants with 
a broad range of stimuli, which are not restricted to depression-relevant content (e.g., 
threatening stimuli), can effectively increase a positive processing bias and reduce 
emotional vulnerability in dysphoric students. Based on these findings, we decided 
to make use of a disorder-non-specific stimulus selection. Ninety positive and ninety 
negative pictures (14.3 cm X 10.7 cm) from different categories (e.g., people, animals, 
objects) were selected from the Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS; Marchewka, 
Zurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014). Forty-five picture sets were created, always 
containing two positive and two negative pictures matched on content and absolute 
value of emotional valence (negative: M = 3.34, SD = 0.44; positive: M = 3.23, SD = 0.44; 
t(178) = 0.21, p = .834). Negative pictures were slightly more arousing than positive 
pictures, though (negative: M = 5.92, SD = 0.4; positive: M = 5.11, SD = 0.46; t(178) = 
12.74, p < .001).The pictures were arranged in a 2 X 2 grid, separating the screen into 
four equally sized quadrants, with the picture location (upper/lower and left/right part 
of the grid) being counterbalanced across trials. The stimuli were displayed on a black 
36.5 cm X 27.5 cm computer screen (IIyama Vision Master Pro 450), with 1 cm distance 
between the pictures. Participants were seated about 60 cm away from the screen’s 
center. 
Task design. The task consisted of pre-assessment, training and post-assessment. On 
each trial, a white fixation cross appeared in the middle of one of the four quadrants 
of the grid. After fixation of the cross for 500 ms, it disappeared and a set of 4 pictures 
appeared. By placing the fixation cross into one of the quadrants (instead of the screen 
center) and making sure that it was indeed fixated, we could reliably manipulate which 
of the 4 pictures was fixated first. The training contained two different types of trials: 
negative trials and positive trials. In the PT, participants had to disengage attention from 
negative pictures and shift it to positive pictures, and to maintain attention on positive 
pictures. On negative (PT: disengagement) trials, one of the two negative pictures 
replaced the fixation cross and participants had to look away from it and fixate one of 
the two positive pictures for 1000 ms. A fixation time of 1000 ms was chosen based on 
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prior research, indicating that attentional bias in depression is only observed at longer 
stimulus durations (i.e., > 1000 ms; De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Upon a sufficiently long 
fixation of a positive picture, all pictures disappeared and a probe (i.e., an arrow pointing 
left or right, with the direction being counterbalanced across picture valence) replaced 
the previously fixated positive picture. Participants had to react to the arrow’s direction 
by pressing a computer key. The probe then disappeared and a new trial started. On 
positive (PT: maintained attention) trials, a positive picture replaced the fixation cross 
and the trial continued only if participants kept looking at this picture for 1000 ms, or if 
they fixated the other positive picture for 1000 ms. In the NT, the opposite pattern was 
trained: When a positive picture replaced the fixation cross (positive trial), participants 
had to look away from it and fixate a negative picture. When a negative picture replaced 
the fixation cross (negative trial), participants had to keep looking at this picture or fixate 
the other negative picture. Importantly, in both the PT and the NT, the participants’ 
gaze pattern controlled the appearance of the probe: As soon as a positive (PT) versus 
negative (NT) picture was fixated for 1000 ms, the probe replaced the fixated picture. 
However, participants were not told that their viewing patterns would influence the 
continuation of trials or the location of the arrows. The training contained 270 training 
trials distributed across 3 blocks, during which each of the 45 picture sets was presented 
6 times, in a new random order for each participant.
The pre- and post-assessment was introduced as a calibration procedure, and consisted 
of a free-viewing task similar to the training. However, independently of participants’ 
viewing patterns, all picture sets were presented for 3000 ms and no probe followed. 
During each assessment, the 45 picture sets were presented twice (90 trials), once as 
positive (PT: maintained attention) and once as negative (PT: disengagement) trials. 
During pre- and post-assessment, the location of the fixation cross was counterbalanced 
across valences and grid positions. The whole task took approximately 30 min. Figure 
2.1 illustrates the task design.
Eye-tracking device. Monocular gaze data of the dominant eye were obtained at a 
frequency of 500 Hz, by means of the iView X Hi Speed system from SMI, a video based 
eye-tracking system.
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Figure 2.1. Schematic overview of the task design. On each trial of the Positive Training (PT), 
a fixation cross is presented. Upon fixation (500 ms), two negative and two positive pictures 
appear. Figure 2.1a: On negative (PT: disengagement) trials, participants have to disengage their 
attention from the fixated negative picture and fixate one of the two positive pictures. Figure 2.1b: 
On positive (PT: maintained attention) trials, attention has to be maintained at the fixated positive 
picture or at the other positive picture. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b: Upon fixation of a positive picture 
for 1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow replaces the fixated picture. Participants respond 
to arrow direction by pressing a key. The arrow then disappears and a new trial starts. During the 
Negative Training (NT) not shown here, exactly the opposite attentional patterns are reinforced. 
Figure 2.1c: The free viewing task (assessment) is similar to the training, however, all trials last 3000 
ms and no probe is presented. 
Note. This figure contains sample images, which have not been used in the current study. All images were obtained from 
Flickr and were published under a Creative Commons license. The formats of the images were slightly adapted for this figure. 
Credits: top left, Joe deSousa , CC0 1.0; top right, West Point - The U.S. Military Academy, CC BY 2.0; bottom left, Steven Depolo, 
CC BY 2.0; bottom right, bettyx1138, CC BY 2.0. For license terms see, CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/
zero/1.0/); CC BY 2.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/).
Calculation of attentional indices. Fixation data recorded during the assessments 
were used to calculate the fixation time as an index of attentional processing. In 
accordance with Sanchez et al. (2013), only measurements where participants fixated 
a picture for at least 100 ms were considered. This index was used to calculate, first, 
a ‘‘sustained attention bias’’ score, reflecting the proportion of total fixation time on 
positive compared to negative pictures, and second, the two attentional components 
relevant here: disengagement from negative pictures (short: negative disengagement) 
and maintained attention for positive pictures (short: positive maintained attention), 
separately for pre- and post-assessment.
For the sustained attention bias score, two sum scores were calculated for each trial, 
reflecting the total time participants fixated positive and negative pictures. Based on 
these scores, medians were calculated, representing the median time participants 
fixated positive and negative pictures1. The bias score was then calculated as follows: 
(Median fixation time on positive pictures)/(median fixation time on positive pictures + 
median fixation time on negative pictures). Scores larger than 0.5 reflect a more positive 
sustained attention bias (relatively longer fixations on positive pictures), while scores 
smaller than 0.5 reflect a more negative sustained attention bias.
1.  As the raw gaze latencies used to calculate the three attentional indices were not normally distributed, 
median scores were calculated rather than mean scores, in order to reduce the impact of skewness and 
extreme values in the raw data. 
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For the two attentional components, a median score was calculated for each trial type, 
representing the latency of the attentional shift from the first fixated picture to a picture 
of the opposite valence (until its fixation). On negative trials, shorter latencies of first 
shifts to positive pictures reflect faster negative disengagement. On positive trials, 
longer latencies of first shifts to negative pictures reflect longer positive maintained 
attention.
Stress task. The task was adapted from Amir et al. (2008). Via the computer, participants 
were informed that they would get 1 min to prepare a 3-min-speech on the topic ‘‘nuclear 
power’’, which would be video-recorded for later evaluation by two independent 
researchers. Participants were not allowed to take notes during preparation and a clock 
on the computer screen signaled the time left. After 1 min, a ‘‘beep’’ sound occurred. 
The experimenter entered the room, started the video-recording, asked participants to 
deliver their speech into a webcam, and left. After 3 min, the experimenter entered and 
stopped the video recording. Thereafter, participants rested for 5 min.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to the PT or NT, 
and they completed the baseline questionnaires and mood measures (i.e., Likert scales; 
T0: before pre-assessment). Afterwards, they were seated in front of the eye-tracker. After 
determining participants dominant eye and running a brief calibration procedure, the 
assessment took place, followed by the training and another mood measure (T1: after 
training). Thereafter, the post-assessment followed. The calibration of the eye-tracker 
was repeated before each training block and before the post-assessment. After the 
post-assessment, participants completed the mood measures again (T2: before stress), 
and they took the stress task. Mood scales were again administered after providing 
the speech instructions (T3: anticipatory stress), as well as after speech delivery (T4: 
after stress) and the 5-min resting period (T5: recovery). To restore positive mood, a 
brief happy movie clip (Jungle book) was shown, followed by a final mood measure. 
Thereafter, participants filled in an awareness check, they were paid or received course 
credits, and they could leave behind their e-mail address for later debriefing. The 
experiment took about 90 min.
Statistical Analysis Plan
To investigate group differences in attentional processes at baseline, an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed on the sustained attention bias scores, as well as 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the two attentional components, 
negative disengagement and positive maintained attention. Moreover, Cronbach’s 
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alpha and Spearman-Brown reliability coefficients were calculated separately for the 
three eye-tracking indices at baseline, to examine the reliability of our novel ET-ABM 
task. 
To explore whether baseline depression levels would be related to late disengagement 
from negative information, exploratory correlations were computed between BDI scores 
and one of the attentional component variables, negative disengagement. Although 
we had no explicit expectation regarding the association of baseline depression levels 
with the second attentional component, positive maintained attention, we explored 
this correlation as well. 
For the evaluation of training effects on attentional processes, first a 2 (group: PT, NT) 
x 2 (time: pre-training, post-training) repeated-measures (RM) ANOVA was conducted 
on the sustained attention bias scores. Second, for the effects on the two attentional 
components, a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: pre-training, post-training) x 2 (trial type: 
negative trial, positive trial) RM ANOVA was performed. To additionally explore whether 
initial tendencies in attentional processes were related to the training effects, dependent 
on training group, two stepwise regression models were tested. In the first model, 
baseline sustained attention bias, group, and the interaction of the two factors were 
entered into the regression model to predict change scores of sustained attention bias 
(i.e., post-scores minus pre-scores). In the second model, disengagement from negative 
pictures at baseline, group, and the interaction of these factors were entered to predict 
changes in negative disengagement (i.e., post-scores minus pre-scores). 
Finally, training effects on mood were investigated in two steps. To test whether the 
training directly affected general (i.e., happy and sad) mood, a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 
(time: pre-training, post-training) RM ANOVA was conducted. Then, a similar analysis 
was conducted with scores on the stress scales (i.e., content, relaxed, frustrated and 
nervous) at the four time points during the speech task (before stress, anticipatory stress, 
after stress, recovery), to investigate whether the training affected mood reactivity and 
recovery from the stressor. 
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses and Group Characteristics
Four participants were excluded because, due to technical problems with the eye-
tracker, they completed <75 % training trials. Five additional participants were excluded 
due to extreme responses on the baseline questionnaires or outlying data on the eye-
34
Chapter 2
movement indices (i.e., data points more than 1.5 interquartile ranges below the first 
or above the third quartile). Due to skewness of the data, the BDI scores as well as two 
attentional variables (negative disengagement and positive maintained attention) were 
log-transformed. In all following analyses, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied 
when the assumption of sphericity was violated.
The groups (PT: n = 44; NT: n = 42) did not differ significantly on the demographic 
variables or baseline trait characteristics (see Table 2.1).
Attentional Processes at Baseline
Sustained attention bias. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the groups did not differ 
from each other on their sustained attention bias at baseline, F(1, 84) = 2.24, p = .138. 
For means, see Table 2.2. A subsequent one-sample t test showed that, across groups, 
the pre-existing bias score (M = 0.5, SD = 0.05) did not differ significantly from 0.5 (t(85) 
= 0.56, p = .58), indicating that there was no sustained attention bias, neither for positive 
nor for negative pictures.
Negative disengagement and positive maintained attention. A multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) of the two log-transformed attentional variables revealed that 
the groups did not differ from each other on negative disengagement and positive 
maintained attention, F(2, 83) = 0.06, p = .946. An additional paired-samples t test, 
comparing the two attentional indices across groups, showed that participants took 
longer to disengage attention from negative pictures (M = 638, SD = 195) than from 
positive pictures (M = 575, SD = 159), t(85) = 4.32, p < .001. For means, see Table 2.2. 
Reliability of the Attentional Process Measures 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated separately for all three eye-tracking indices at baseline. 
Trials with a large number of missing data (>10 %) were excluded (i.e., sustained 
attention bias: 2; negative disengagement: 8; positive maintained attention: 5). The 
resulting Cronbach’s alpha values for the three eye-tracking variables were good 
(sustained attention bias: α = .88; negative disengagement: α = .81; positive maintained 
attention: α = .79). Spearman-Brown reliability coefficients for the three indices were 
somewhat lower with .78 (sustained attention bias), .73 (negative disengagement), and 
.65 (positive maintained attention), but can still be considered acceptable.
Relation Between Negative Disengagement and Depression 
The correlational analysis revealed the expected significant correlation between BDI 
and negative disengagement latencies, r(86) = .23, p = .036, supporting that higher 
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levels of depression were associated with slower disengagement from negative stimuli. 
By contrast, there was no evidence for a relation between depression levels and positive 
maintained attention (r(86) = .17, p = .126). Given the strong correlation between 
depression levels and anxiety levels in our sample, r(86) = .72, p < .001, we additionally 
explored the correlation between BDI and negative disengagement, while controlling 
for STAI scores. The correlation between BDI and negative disengagement became 
non-significant (p = .514). Likewise, the correlation between STAI scores and negative 
disengagement was non-significant when controlling for depression scores (p > .197)2.
Table 2.1. Group differences on demographic variablesa and baseline questionnaires
PT (n = 44) NT (n = 42)
Age 21.45 (3.55) 22.44 (6.81) t (83) = 0.84, p = .401
Gender
Male
Female 
7
37
10
32
χ 2(1) = 0.85, p = .358
Nationality
Dutch
German 
28
16
30
10
χ 2(1) = 2.35, p = .309
Education
Psychology
Educational science
Other
No study
24
3
16
1
19
3
17
2
χ 2(3) = 0.84, p = .840
Year of education 2.09 (1.39) 1.73 (1.47) t(83) = 1.16, p = .250
BDI-II 5.93 (5.80) 5.29 (4.17) t(84) = 0.59, p = .556
STAI-T 38.36 (9.96) 37.52 (10.07) t(84) = 0.39, p = .698
NA 17.11 (6.67) 17.17 (6.00) t(84) = 0.04, p = .969
PA 31.86 (6.33) 30.45 (5.76) t(84) = 1.08, p = .284
Mood baseline 18.52 (7.22) 20.12 (7.07) t(84) = 1.07, p = .289
Note. PT = Positive Training; NT = Negative Training; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition; STAI-T = Spielberger 
Trait Anxiety Inventory; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect.
aDemographic information of two participants in the NT group was missing.
2.  Given the unselected nature of our sample, we additionally explored the correlations between the two log-
transformed attentional component variables and the other trait questionnaires (STAI and PANAS). While the 
correlations with PANAS were not significant (p > .133), anxiety ratings were positively related to maintained 
attention to positive stimuli, r(86) = .22, p = .046, as well as to disengagement from negative stimuli, r(86) = 
.25, p = .021, indicating that the more anxious participants were, the longer they took to disengage attention 
from the picture they had fixated first, irrespective of the picture’s valence. 
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Training Effects on Attentional Processes 
Changes in sustained attention bias. The 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: pre-training, 
post-training) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed significant main effects of time, F(1, 
84) = 32.58, p < .001, η2 = .28, and of group, F(1, 84) = 34.46, p < .001, η2 = .29, which were 
subsumed under a significant time-by-group interaction, F(1, 84) = 31.24, p < .001, η2 = 
.27. In line with the training contingency, the PT group showed an increase in positive 
sustained attention bias, t(43) = 8.16; p < .001, whereas no change was found in the 
NT group, t(41) = 0.08; p = .935. An independent samples t test showed that the PT 
group had a more positive sustained attention bias after the training than the NT (t(84) 
= 6.24, p < .001). One-sample t tests revealed the presence of a positive bias in the PT 
group after the training, that is, relatively longer fixations on positive than on negative 
pictures, t(43) = 8.28, p < .001, while no bias was present in the NT group, t(41) = 0.23, p 
= .823. For means, see Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Mean fixation times (with standard deviations) in milliseconds during the free 
viewing task, and the resulting attentional bias scores
PT NT
Pre-
training
Post-
training
Pre-
training
Post-
training
Fixation time on positive pictures 1416
(187)
1806
(444)
1377
(170)
1401
(334)
Fixation time on negative pictures
Sustained attention bias score
1353
(174)
0.51
(0.05)
936
(323)
0.65
(0.12)
1406
(170)
0.49
(0.05)
1421
(327)
0.50
(0.11)
Disengagement from negative pictures 622
(151)
542
(164)
655
(233)
706
(295)
Maintained attention for positive pictures 568
(146)
607
(216)
582
(172)
623
(262)
Note. PT = Positive Training; NT = Negative Training; Sustained attention bias score = Proportion of fixation time on positive 
pictures compared to negative pictures; Disengagement from negative pictures = Latency of the first shift from a negative 
picture until fixation of a positive picture; Maintained attention for positive pictures = Latency of the first shift from a 
positive picture until fixation of a negative picture. 
Changes in negative disengagement and positive maintained attention. To assess 
training effects on the two attentional components separately, a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 
(time: pre-training, post-training) x 2 (trial type: negative trial, positive trial) RM ANOVA 
was conducted. This analysis revealed significant main effects of trial type, F(1, 84) = 
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11.23, p = .001, η2 = .12, as well as significant interactions for group-by-trial type, F(1, 
84) = 10.62, p = .002, η2 = .11, and time-by-trial type, F(1, 84) = 7.11, p = .009, η2 = .08. 
Importantly, the analysis also revealed a significant three-way interaction of group-
by-time-by-valence, F(1, 84) = 10.83, p = .001, η2 = .11, indicating that the two groups 
showed differential changes in negative disengagement and positive maintained 
attention. No other main effects or two-way interactions were significant (all ps > .17). 
Subsequent paired samples t tests revealed that the training effects were driven by a 
significant decrease in disengagement latencies from negative pictures in the PT group, 
t(43) = 4.39, p < .001. Thus, the PT group became faster to look away from negative 
pictures and towards positive pictures. No other comparisons were significant, showing 
that the training did not change maintained attention for positive pictures in the PT 
group, t(43) = 0.9, p = .372, nor did attentional components change in the NT group 
(negative disengagement: t(41) = 0.85, p = .401; positive maintained attention: t(41) 
= 0.46, p = .646). Independent samples t tests showed that after the training, the PT 
group was faster to disengage from negative pictures than the NT group (t(84) = 2.9, p = 
.005), while the groups did not differ in their maintained attention on positive pictures 
(t(84) = 0.6, p = .949). Whereas the sample was initially faster to disengage attention 
from positive than from negative pictures, after training, this was still the case only after 
NT (t(41) = 3.49, p = .001). The pattern in the PT group reversed into relatively faster 
disengagement from negative pictures (t(43) = 2.99, p = .005).
Prediction of training effects. The first regression model was conducted to predict 
training-induced changes in sustained attention bias. The model was significant, F(2, 83) 
= 18.26, p < .001, R2 = .31, indicating that lower initial bias scores were related to a larger 
increase in bias in response to the training, β = -.188, p = .046. Moreover, the increase 
in positive sustained attention bias was higher after PT than after NT, β = .551, p < .001. 
The second regression model was conducted to predict training-induced changes 
in disengagement from negative stimuli. It was significant as well, F(2, 83) = 9.28, p < 
.001, R2 = .18. As in the first model, slower disengagement from negative pictures at 
baseline was related to a stronger decrease in disengagement latencies in response to 
the training, β = -.3, p = .003. This effect was moderated by training, indicating that 
participants with longer disengagement latencies from negative pictures at baseline in 
the PT group showed a stronger decrease in these disengagement latencies, compared 
to participants in the NT, β = -.306, p < .001. 
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Training Effects on Mood 
Direct effects on general mood. To investigate whether the training directly affected 
participants’ mood, data of those participants who completed the general mood scales 
after the training (PT: n = 31, NT: n = 36) were analyzed3. The mood data were subjected 
to a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: T0 pre-training, T1 post-training) RM ANOVA, which 
revealed a significant time effect, F(1, 65) = 21.71, p < .001, η2 = .25, which was modulated 
by a significant time-by-group interaction, F(1, 65) = 5.78, p = .019, η2 = .08. Subsequent 
independent samples t tests revealed that the groups did not differ in general mood 
before the training (T0; PT: M = 5.97; NT: M = 6.39; t(65) = 0.38, p = .706) but that the NT 
group showed a more negative mood than the PT group after the training (T1; PT: M = 
6.68; NT: M = 8.61; t(65) = 2.6, p = .012). Means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 2.3. 
Effects on mood reactivity and recovery in response to stress. To investigate whether 
the training affected participants' stress responses, data of those participants who 
completed the stress scales after the training were analyzed (PT: n = 44, NT: n = 39). The 
groups did not differ in stress levels directly before the stress task, t(81) = 0.74, p = .417. 
To test whether the training affected mood responses to stress, a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 4 
(time: T2 before stress, T3 anticipatory stress, T4 after stress, T5 recovery) RM ANOVA was 
conducted on the stress scores. The main effect of time was significant, F(2.26, 182.96) 
= 34.81, p < .001, η2 = .3. Inspection of the means showed that the stress task had its 
intended effects: stress ratings increased upon announcement of the task (T2 before 
stress: M = 14.58, T3 anticipatory stress: M = 21.22), and decreased afterwards (T4 after 
stress: M = 19.36, T5 recovery: M = 17.31). However, the crucial group-by-time interaction 
was not significant, F(2.26, 182.96) = 0.22, p = .828, indicating that the groups did not 
differentially react to or recover from the stressor4. All means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 2.3.
3.  Due to technical and experimenter errors, data from only 67 participants were available for this analysis. 
4.  As Sanchez et al. (2013) found that difficulties in disengagement specifically predicted lower recovery 
from sad mood after stress, we conducted additional exploratory MANOVAs, with the change scores of all six 
mood items as dependent variables, for the different phases of the experiment. A MANOVA on the six mood 
change-scores from before (T0) to after the training (T1), revealed no significant effect of group, F(6, 60) = 1.63, 
p = .156. A MANOVA on mood changes in response to the speech task (mood reactivity: T2–T3) revealed no 
significant group effect either, F(6, 76) = 1.23, p = .3. Also, a MANOVA on change scores of all mood items, from 
announcement of the speech task (T3) to after the recovery phase (T5; mood recovery) was not significant, 
F(6, 76) = 0.31, p = .93. 
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Table 2.3. Mean mood scores (with standard deviations) for all assessment points
T0:
Before pre-
assessment
T1:
After 
training
T2:
Before 
stress
T3:
Anticipatory 
stress
T4: 
After
stress
T5:
Recovery
PT
General
mood
5.97
(2.82)
6.68
(2.79)
7.7
(3.2)
8.11
(3.04)
8.7
(2.43)
8.5
(1.95)
Stress 11.61
(4.65)
12.94
(5.05)
14.09
(6.31)
20.82
(7.12)
19.18
(7.93)
17.3
(6.51)
NT
General
mood
6.39
(2.75)
8.61
(3.24)
8.1
(2.64)
8.33
(3.33)
8.08
(2.54)
8.25
(2.18)
Stress 14.00
(5.17)
15.44
(5.32)
15.13
(5.11)
21.67
(6.86)
19.56
(7.11)
17.33
(6.42)
Note. PT = Positive Training; NT = Negative Training; mood (items: happy, sad); stress (items: content, relaxed, frustrated, 
and nervous).
Exploratory Analyses of Awareness of Training Contingency 
The two groups did not differ in their awareness of the training contingencies (aware of 
contingency PT: n = 9, NT: n = 13, χ2 (86) = 1.24, p = .265). Additional exploratory analyses 
were conducted to investigate whether the training effects reported above depended 
on participants’ awareness of the training contingencies. For this purpose, the factor 
contingency awareness was added to all analyses, revealing that it was unrelated to 
the training effects. This was observed for the sustained attention bias score, F(1, 82) = 
1.14, p = .288, and for the training effects on the two separate attentional components, 
F(1, 82) = 2.33, p = .131. Moreover, training effects on general mood directly after the 
training did not depend on contingency awareness either (general mood: F(1, 63) = 0.14, 
p = .708). The same was true for effects on mood reactivity and recovery in response to 
the stressor (stress: F(2.3, 181.57) = 0.21, p = .84). 
DISCUSSION
This study investigated a novel ABM paradigm based on eye-tracking, designed to assess 
and target the attentional components that are disturbed in depression: disengagement 
from negative stimuli and maintained attention to positive stimuli. Eye-tracking was 
used to measure attentional changes and, more importantly, for training purposes: Only 
correct eye-movements were reinforced, such that participants could only complete 
the training trials if they showed the required attentional viewing patterns. 
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First of all, we replicated earlier research (e.g., Sanchez et al., 2013), showing that 
higher levels of depression were specifically associated with slower disengagement 
from negative information, confirming the validity of our measurement. Next and 
more importantly, our results showed that the training successfully modified selective 
attention, with the PT inducing a positive bias. No such change was found in the NT. 
Notably, these general training effects were driven specifically by faster disengagement 
from negative pictures in the PT group, indicating that our training directly taps into 
the attentional processes that are disturbed in depression. Although the PT functioned 
to induce relatively longer fixations of positive than negative pictures, the training did 
not modify the initial maintained attention for positive pictures. Again, no changes 
were found in the NT group, suggesting that the training did not induce dysfunctional 
attentional processes in our unselected sample. 
The finding that the PT worked specifically by training disengagement from negative 
pictures is consistent with earlier research (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2018), supporting the 
relevance of targeting the processing of negative stimuli in modifying cognitive biases. A 
possible explanation for why the training did not increase initial maintained attention for 
positive pictures might be the perceptual salience of negative stimuli (Rozin & Royzman, 
2001). On positive trials, the tendency to first quickly scan the remaining pictures of the 
display might have overruled the tendency to sustain attention on the already fixated 
positive picture. Although this remains speculative, of course, future research using this 
ABM training should take the determining role of the negative stimuli into account and 
investigate whether training with exclusively negative disengagement trials is equally 
or even more effective than training with both types of trials. An alternative explanation 
for the absence of training effects on maintained attention might be related to our 
temporal criteria that defined a fixation during training. In order to continue with a 
training trial, participants in the PT had to fixate a positive picture for 1000 ms. In fact, 
these 1000 ms might not be sufficient for promoting ‘‘longer’’ maintained attention for 
positive stimuli. Instead, we might have trained short maintained attention to positive 
stimuli. Our main goal was to modify attentional disengagement with this training 
paradigm, which is also a reason for why we had no specific hypothesis about changes 
in maintained attention. In future research, the maintained attention component might 
be more optimally addressed by increasing the required fixation duration on positive 
pictures. 
Regarding the above-mentioned findings, it is important to note that before training, 
our sample did not show the positive attentional bias which is supposed to be 
typical for healthy individuals. Instead, we observed equally long fixations of positive 
and negative pictures. More surprisingly, our sample even exhibited a tendency to 
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disengage attention from negative pictures more slowly than from positive pictures 
(i.e., a disengagement bias), which contradicts a large number of studies providing 
evidence for a positive bias in unselected samples (Ellis et al., 2010; Kellough et al., 
2008; Sears et al., 2010). A possible explanation for this unexpected finding might be 
related to the differences in arousal levels of positive and negative pictures used in the 
ET-ABM task. Positive stimuli are usually rated as less arousing than negative stimuli, 
independent of their emotional valence or pleasantness (see for instance, P. J. Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Although we matched the pictures on valence intensity, this 
was also the case with our selected set of pictures. Importantly, research has shown 
that attentional disengagement is slower from highly arousing stimuli than from stimuli 
low in arousal, independent of stimulus valence (Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, Van Damme, 
& Crombez, 2008). The difference in arousal levels thus might be the reason for why 
even our healthy sample showed longer initial fixations on negative than on positive 
pictures. At the same time, this pre-existing negative bias might explain why we were 
not able to further increase dysfunctional attentional patterns with the NT. The finding 
however, that the ET-ABM could not only induce a general positive bias, but even reverse 
the pre-existing disengagement bias in the PT group, has important implications for its 
potential clinical application. Together with the finding that initial disengagement from 
negative stimuli predicted greater changes in this attentional component, these results 
suggest that particularly depressed individuals might benefit from this new ET-ABM. 
The successful modification of attentional processes further allowed us to investigate 
mood changes. Although negative mood increased in both groups throughout the 
training (possibly due to monotonicity of the procedure), this increase was stronger in 
the NT group. Earlier research, which failed to find immediate training effects on mood 
state, concluded that ABM procedures may only serve to affect the way in which people 
respond to subsequent situations requiring the processing of emotional information 
(e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002). Our results suggest that mood can be directly altered as a 
function of training contingencies with, in our case, a more negative mood resulting 
from reinforcing dysfunctional attentional patterns. This discrepancy might be related to 
the fact that the NT group needed to actually attend to, and hence process, the negative 
stimuli in order to complete our task. By contrast, in the dot-probe task, it might be 
enough to peripherally process the picture’s valence. Hence, differences between the 
groups in the depth of processing of the negative stimuli might explain why we found 
differential changes in mood. 
Despite the direct effects on general mood, the training did not differentially affect mood 
changes in response to the stressor. The PT group did not show more attenuated stress 
levels or recovered more quickly from the stressor than the NT group, as suggested by 
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Sanchez et al. (2013) or by Tsumura et al. (2012). It is important to note, though, that our 
sample did not include clinically or sub-clinically depressed individuals, and therefore 
the sample should be less affected by stressful situations and hence less susceptible 
to a CBM-induced stress reduction. While some studies did find stress-attenuating 
effects in healthy samples (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002), other research suggests that 
such favorable effects are restricted to emotionally vulnerable individuals (Becker et al., 
2016). Although our study does not support the causal role of negative attentional bias, 
and specifically slowed disengagement from negative stimuli in mood reactivity and 
recovery from stress, we suggest that future research should apply this training to a 
sub-clinically depressed sample, before drawing firm conclusions about its therapeutic 
value. 
In a recent paper reflecting on the increasing number of reported ABM failures, Clarke 
et al. (2014) stated that it is highly unlikely that the first ABM task ever developed 
(i.e., the dot-probe task) will turn out to be the most successful one in modifying 
selective attention. It appears even more unlikely that this task, which has primarily 
been developed to affect anxiety vulnerability (MacLeod et al., 2002), will be equally 
effective for depression, considering the different nature of the bias in this disorder 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The few studies, which sought to modify attentional bias 
in depression have mainly tailored the dot-probe task to depressed samples by using 
longer stimulus presentation times. However, the different attentional components of 
maintained attention and disengagement of attention cannot be targeted and assessed 
unambiguously with this procedure (Mogoaşe et al., 2014). 
We assume that the strong training effects on attention found in our study are related to 
methodological advantages of the ET-ABM paradigm over conventional reaction-time 
based ABM tasks. The ET-ABM combines both trials starting with the fixation of a negative 
picture and trials starting with the fixation of a positive picture with the continuous 
measurement of eye movements. This allows for a more reliable measurement of 
attention and, more importantly, for a separate assessment of disengagement from 
negative stimuli and maintained attention on positive stimuli. Because the eye-tracker 
allows for targeted reinforcement of these specific gaze patterns, we can be sure that 
the use of alternative, undesired search strategies is discouraged and that the pace 
of the task is tailored to participants’ individual learning speed. The latter may be of 
particular importance when the training is applied in cognitively impaired, depressed 
samples. Furthermore, our paradigm addresses the demand for novel ABM tasks that 
have greater ecological validity and are more engaging (Mogoaşe et al., 2014). Contrary 
to the dot-probe task, the ET-ABM contains more than two visual stimuli per trial, 
increasing the requirement of redirecting attention away from negative stimuli and 
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towards positive stimuli. Also, we made use of an unspecific and diverse selection of 
stimuli, representative of stimuli encountered in everyday life, rather than only pictures 
of faces, for instance. Finally, controlling the task by eye-movements might increase the 
game-like character of the procedure and have beneficial effects on its acceptability, 
which is crucial when we aim to provide the training to individuals with low motivation. 
Future research should investigate whether this ET-ABM task is indeed more acceptable 
than conventional ABM paradigms, and whether it results in fewer drop-outs when 
providing more training sessions. 
Despite these promising findings, several limitations have to be noted. As a proof-
of-principle study, we conducted the experiment in an unselected student sample. 
Although our sample was characterized by a disengagement bias, the results cannot be 
generalized to a depressed population. In fact, average baseline depression levels were 
very low (M = 5.62, SD = 5.05), ranging from 0 to 28, with only 3 participants scoring 
above 13 (mild to moderate depressive characteristics). Considering that BDI scores 
lower than 14 reflect minimal levels of depression (Beck et al., 1996), this suggests 
that our sample represented a rather healthy control group instead of an unselected 
group. This limited variance in depression levels might have obscured meaningful 
relations between depression scores and measures of attentional processes. It also 
questions the interpretability of our findings regarding the association of heightened 
depression levels with slower disengagement from negative stimuli at baseline. 
Analyses involving BDI scores must therefore be interpreted with caution, as findings 
cannot easily be generalized to higher or even psychopathological levels of depression. 
The interpretability of the above-mentioned association is complicated even more by 
the high correlation of depression and anxiety levels in our sample, and by the fact 
that the association disappeared when anxiety was taken into account. Although this 
suggests that heightened levels of psychopathological traits are related to difficulties 
in disengaging attention from negative stimuli, we cannot identify the unique role of 
depression in this relationship. 
Second, the lack of a proper sham-training control group limits the interpretation of our 
findings. Future research needs to compare the PT to a placebo training condition in 
order to test its beneficial effects on attentional processes. Third, the use of an identical 
picture set in both training and assessment does not allow for any conclusions regarding 
the transfer of training effects to other stimuli. It is also possible that we in fact did not 
change the attentional processing of negative and positive stimuli in general, but that 
the observed effects are restricted to the specific stimuli we used during training. Fourth, 
to further validate our training and to test its potential superiority over existing ABM 
tasks, such as the dot-probe task, research should directly compare the two paradigms. 
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Moreover, employing an eye-tracker in the ET-ABM is obviously more expensive and 
more difficult than simply using a standard PC in conventional ABM tasks. Therefore, 
the cost-effectiveness of the ET-ABM needs to be determined and compared to simpler 
ABM tasks. Finally, as we assessed attentional processes only directly after training, it 
remains unclear how long the effects of a single training session will last. Especially 
for clinical improvement, an enduring change in attentional processes is crucial. We 
therefore recommend that future research should include multiple training sessions 
and long-term follow-up measures, to provide insight into the temporal stability of the 
modified attentional processes. 
To conclude, this is one of the first studies that developed and tested a novel ABM task, 
targeted at the attentional processes which are biased in depression. A single session of 
this new ET-ABM could induce a sustained attention bias for positive information and 
increase disengagement from negative stimuli. Although we could not find evidence for 
effects of the training on responses to stress, the association of slowed disengagement 
with higher depression levels at baseline suggests that repeated training sessions with 
this task might have therapeutic relevance. However, considering the rather healthy 
status of our sample and the strong correlation of bias scores with anxiety levels, which 
might also explain the above-mentioned relationship, this interpretation certainly has 
to be treated with caution. Future research is needed to confirm this preliminary finding, 
by replicating this study in a sample with elevated or subclinical levels of depression. 
With more research into novel ABM paradigms, we hope to get closer to finding the 
most effective way of producing enduring changes in attentional processes underlying 
depression.


CHAPTER 3
Eye-Tracking Based Attention Bias Modification 
(ET-ABM) Facilitates Disengagement from 
Negative Stimuli in Dysphoric Individuals
Based on Möbius, M., Ferrari, G. R. A., van den Bergh, R., Becker, E.S., & Rinck, 
M. (2018). Eye-Tracking based Attention Bias Modification (ET-ABM) Facilitates 
Disengagement from Negative Stimuli in Dysphoric Individuals. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 42, 408-420.
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ABSTRACT
To address shortcomings of purely reaction-time based attentional bias modification 
(ABM) paradigms, a novel eye-tracking based ABM training (ET-ABM) was developed. 
This training targets the late disengagement from negative stimuli and the lack of 
attention for positive information, which are characteristics of depression. In the present 
study, 75 dysphoric students (BDI ≥ 9) were randomly assigned to either this positive 
training (PT), or a sham-training (ST) that did not train any valence-specific gaze pattern 
(positive and negative pictures had to be disengaged from and attended to equally 
often). Results showed that the PT induced a positive attentional bias (longer fixations of 
positive than negative pictures). Although the ST group showed an increase in positive 
attentional bias as well, this increase was not as strong as in the PT group. Compared 
to the ST, the PT specifically induced faster disengagement from negative pictures. No 
differential training effects were found on stress responses or state rumination. These 
results show that the ET-ABM successfully modifies attentional processes, specifically 
late disengagement from negative stimuli, in dysphoric students, and hence might be a 
promising alternative to existing ABM paradigms.
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With more than 300 million people suffering from depression worldwide, it is amongst 
the most prevalent mental disorders and, according to the World Health Organization 
(World Health Organization, 2017), has become the leading cause of disabilities, with a 
major contribution to the overall global disease burden. Despite the variety of existing 
treatment options for depression, relapse rates are high (e.g., about 30% as reported 
in Seemüller et al., 2014), with an increasing risk of recurrent depression with each 
subsequent depressive episode (Steinert et al., 2014). This suggests that the underlying 
mechanisms which maintain depression are not very well understood yet, and hence 
may not be targeted sufficiently by current treatment programs. 
A potential cognitive vulnerability factor which is thought to maintain depressive 
symptoms and predispose individuals to repeatedly develop new episodes, is the 
heightened attention to depression-relevant, negative information compared to 
positive information, commonly found in depressed individuals (e.g., Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012). Research making use of eye-tracking technology suggests that in 
depression, this so-called negative attentional bias is specifically characterized by 
difficulties with disengaging attention from negative stimuli once they have become 
the focus of attention (Sanchez et al., 2013). At the same time, depressed individuals 
show reduced maintained attention to positive stimuli, compared to healthy individuals 
(Ellis et al., 2010; Kellough et al., 2008; Sears et al., 2010). 
According to cognitive theories of depression, attentional biases play a causal role in 
both development and maintenance of this disorder (Beck, 1976; Teasdale, 1988). As 
a consequence, computerized training paradigms have been developed, aiming at 
reducing depressive symptoms through altering maladaptive information processing 
tendencies; the so-called cognitive bias modification techniques (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005). The most frequently used paradigm for modifying (and measuring) attentional 
processes is the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 2002). On each trial of this task, two 
stimuli are presented simultaneously on the computer screen, usually a negative 
picture and a positive (or neutral) picture (or word). After a short delay, both stimuli 
disappear and a target replaces one of the two stimuli, which participants have to react 
to. Faster reactions to targets replacing negative compared to positive stimuli indicate a 
negative attentional bias. In the training version of this task, the targets replace mostly 
the positive (or neutral) stimuli, such that participants’ attention is selectively trained 
away from the negative stimuli.
To date, the dot-probe task has mainly been used to assess and modify attentional 
bias in anxious populations (for a review, see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Only a few studies 
have tried to modify attentional processes in depressed individuals, with inconsistent 
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findings so far. While some studies managed to reduce the bias toward negative 
stimuli and accordingly the depressive symptoms, many other studies failed to modify 
an attentional bias and to replicate the beneficial therapeutic effects on depressed 
mood or symptoms, questioning the efficacy of attentional bias modification (ABM) 
procedures for depression (for reviews, see Cristea et al., 2015; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). 
In a paper reflecting on the increasing number of ABM failures, Clarke, Notebaert, and 
MacLeod (2014), however, cautioned against taking the absence of evidence in some 
studies as evidence against the theoretical basis of ABM in general. The authors drew 
attention to the fact that most studies that succeeded in modifying an attentional 
bias also induced emotional change. By contrast, those studies that failed to modify 
an attentional bias also failed to find beneficial effects on mood. This suggests that 
conventional ABM paradigms may not be optimal for reliably modifying and measuring 
attentional bias, and that more research is needed into the task conditions under 
which ABM actually changes attentional processes. According to this argument, more 
promising clinical applications of ABM depend on the development of more effective 
attention modification procedures.
One of the most frequently mentioned limitations of the dot-probe and other reaction 
time (RT) based ABM paradigms is the low reliability of these tasks (e.g., Schmukle, 
2005; Waechter & Stolz, 2015). More importantly, however, the suitability of the dot-
probe task has especially been doubted in the context of depression, as it is not clear 
which component of attention is measured and trained (Leyman et al., 2007). It has 
been argued that with the longer stimulus durations commonly used in depressed 
populations (Beevers et al., 2015; Wells & Beevers, 2010), participants may shift their 
attention back and forth between stimuli before the target appears. This in turn leaves 
undetected whether the task is tapping into heightened vigilance for negative stimuli or 
the depression-characteristic slowed disengagement from negative stimuli (for a more 
thorough discussion, see G. R. A. Ferrari, Möbius, van Opdorp, Becker, & Rinck, 2016). 
Based on the limitations of the dot-probe task and other RT-based ABM paradigms, 
G. R. A. Ferrari and colleagues (2016) developed a new ABM paradigm, incorporating 
eye-tracking technology. This eye-tracking based attentional bias modification (ET-
ABM) paradigm allows for the continuous assessment of eye-movements, and hence 
for a potentially more reliable assessment and training of the specific attentional 
components that are biased in depression. During this ET-ABM task, participants are 
trained to disengage their attention from negative pictures and to keep their attention 
on positive pictures. On each trial of the task, participants first have to fixate a cross on 
a computer screen, after which two positively and two negatively valenced pictures are 
presented in a 2x2 grid. Importantly, the trial only continues after a sufficiently long 
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fixation of a positive picture (1000 ms). Hence, if a negative picture replaces the cross, 
the trial only continues when participants look away from the negative picture and 
fixate one of the positive pictures. If a positive picture replaces the cross, the pictures 
disappear when participants keep their attention on the fixated positive picture or fixate 
the other positive picture. As soon as a positive picture has been fixated for 1000 ms, all 
pictures disappear and a target stimulus is presented at the location of the last fixated 
picture. The target has to be identified by pressing a corresponding button. Different 
from previous RT-based ABM paradigms, the training trials in this task only continue 
if participants show the required viewing pattern, tailoring the pace of the task to the 
individuals´ performance.
In a first proof-of-principle study (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2016) with an unselected student 
sample, this positive training was compared to a negative training with the opposite 
training contingencies. Thus, participants were trained to direct their gaze to negatively 
valenced pictures. Results of this first study showed that this ET-ABM training is suited 
to alter attentional processes relevant in depression: The positive training induced a 
positive sustained attention bias, that is, longer sustained attention to positive than to 
negative pictures. More specifically, it trained participants to more quickly disengage 
their attention from negative stimuli and direct their attention to positive pictures. No 
such changes were found in the negative training group. Although the training affected 
mood directly, with the negative group showing a stronger increase in negative mood 
in response to the training than the positive group, the training did not differentially 
affect emotional reactions to a subsequent laboratory stressor.
Although this first study provides promising evidence that depression-relevant 
attentional processes can be altered by means of this novel ABM paradigm, several 
questions remain to be answered. First, in the previous study, the positive training 
was compared to a negative training in order to maximize group differences. Hence, 
it remains to be established whether the positive training is also superior to a placebo 
control condition in changing the attentional processes. Second, before applying this 
training in clinically depressed populations, it should first be tested whether the results 
can be replicated in a sample with subclinical levels of depression, which is assumed 
to show a stronger pre-existing negative attentional bias. Finally, training effects in the 
first study were only tested with the same set of stimuli as used during the training, 
leaving it open whether training effects are restricted to the specific stimuli being used, 
or whether the attentional processing of positive and negative stimuli in general is 
affected. 
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Hence, the primary aim of this study was to replicate the findings of the previous study 
in an emotionally vulnerable sample, with a sham training as control condition and 
different stimulus sets in training and assessment. To this end, we randomly assigned 
participants with elevated depression scores to one of two training conditions. Half of 
the participants received the positive training (PT) in which they were trained to direct 
their gaze away from negative pictures and towards positive pictures. The other half 
received a sham training (ST), where no valence-specific gaze patterns were reinforced. 
Importantly, at the beginning of the experiment, a negative mood was induced by means 
of a sad movie. This allows for re-activation of otherwise latent depressogenic structures 
in emotionally vulnerable individuals (e.g., Beck, 1967) and hence may serve to elicit a 
negative attentional bias in our sample (for a detailed description of the procedure, see 
Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). We expected that, compared to participants in the ST, 1) 
participants in the PT would show an increase in positive attentional bias (i.e., relatively 
longer fixations on positive than on negative pictures), and that 2) participants in the 
PT would specifically learn to faster disengage their attention from negative pictures. 
To get a first indication of the potential therapeutic effects of the training, we additionally 
explored participants’ mood reactivity and recovery in response to a laboratory stressor 
at the end of the experiment. In their eye-tracking experiment, Sanchez and colleagues 
(2013) showed that specifically the slowed disengagement from negative information is 
related to impaired mood recovery after stress in depressed individuals. In accordance 
with these findings, we expected that participants in the PT would show better stress 
recovery than participants in the ST.  
Methods
Participants 
Eighty-four female and 12 male undergraduate students (mean age = 21.67, SD = 
4.66), of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, with elevated scores on Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996; M = 15.57, SD = 7.13) participated in 
return for course credit or 20€. In order to test participants with at least mild depressive 
symptoms, we only invited students with BDI-II scores higher than 8, which is in line 
with previous studies (Mastikhina & Dobson, 2017; Wells & Beevers, 2010). This low 
cutoff score was chosen to maximize sensitivity of the BDI-II (Sprinkle et al., 2002). Of 
841 students who signed up, 96 were invited to the experiment and participated. They 
were randomly allocated to either the PT (n = 50) or the ST (n = 46).
53
Eye-Tracking Based Attention Bias Modification Facilitates Disengagement from Negative Stimuli 
3
Instruments and Materials 
Baseline questionnaires. All of the following questionnaires were administered in 
the participants' dominant language (i.e., German or Dutch). Depression levels were 
assessed with the revised version of Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996). 
The internal consistency of the BDI in the current sample was excellent (α = .97). To 
be able to control for possible baseline differences in trait anxiety, the trait subscale 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1989) was administered. The 
internal consistency of the STAI was excellent (α = .97). Moreover, individual differences 
in ruminative thinking were assessed with the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). As the German and the Dutch version slightly differ 
in the number of items, we calculated a mean score instead of a sum score. Both, the 
Dutch and the German version of the RRS showed a good internal consistency (Dutch: 
α = .89; German: α = .86). 
Mood state. Throughout the experiment, participants were asked to rate their current 
general mood state (i.e., “How is your mood at this moment?”) on a 100 mm Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS), ranging from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good). In order to assess 
changes in mood state in response to the stress task, we additionally presented Likert 
scales as used by Sanchez and colleagues (2013). Each Likert scale measured mood with 
three items: happy mood (happy, optimistic, joyful), anxious mood (nervous, tense, 
anxious), and sad mood (depressed, upset, sad). All items were rated on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). One extra item was added to assess the tiredness of 
participants (0 = not at all; 10 = very much).
State rumination. To assess state rumination in response to the stress task, the 
Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013) 
was administered. The MRSI contains six items, measuring momentary self-focused 
rumination (e.g., “Right now, I am thinking about the possible meaning of the way I 
feel”). Items are rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from “totally not agree” to “totally 
agree”. 
Negative mood induction. Negative mood was induced by means of two sequences 
(i.e., 20 minutes in total) of the movie “Sophie´s choice”. The two sequences have been 
shown to effectively induce negative mood in previous studies (e.g., Randall & Cox, 
2001), and they have been used before to elicit a negative mood state in healthy and 
dysphoric individuals prior to CBM training (Becker et al., 2016). 
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ET-ABM task
Stimuli. In line with the study of G. R. A. Ferrari et al. (2016), a broad range of disorder-
nonspecific picture stimuli representing different categories (e.g., people, animals, 
objects; Nencki Affective Picture System; Marchewka et al., 2014) was selected. Ninety 
positive and ninety negative pictures (14.3cm x 10.7cm) were used during the training 
phase. A further set of 90 positive and 90 negative pictures was used exclusively during 
the assessment phases, to allow for testing generalization of training effects to untrained 
pictures.
For each phase, training and assessment, 45 picture sets were created, always containing 
two positive and two negative pictures matched on content. The pictures were arranged 
in a 2x2 grid, which separated the screen into four quadrants. The location at which each 
picture appeared (upper/lower and left/right part of the grid) was counterbalanced 
across trials. The stimuli were displayed on a black 53.2cm x 29.9cm computer screen 
(BenQ XL2420Z), with 1cm distance between the pictures. Participants were seated 
about 60 cm away from the screens´ center.
Task design. The eye-tracking task was adapted from G. R. A. Ferrari et al. (2016) and 
consisted of pre-assessment, training and post-assessment. For a graphic illustration of 
the task design, see Figure 3.1. On each trial of the task, a white fixation-cross appeared 
in the middle of one of the four quadrants of the grid. As soon as the participant had 
fixated the cross for 500 ms, it disappeared and a set of four pictures was presented. 
Placing the fixation cross into one of the quadrants (instead of the screen center) and 
making sure that it was actually fixated, allowed for reliably manipulating which picture 
was fixated first.
The training contained two different types of trials: trials on which a negative picture 
replaced the cross (i.e., negative trials) and trials on which a positive picture replaced 
the cross (i.e., positive trials). Participants in the positive training (PT) had to disengage 
attention from negative pictures and shift it to positive pictures, and to maintain 
attention to positive pictures. On negative trials, participants had to look away from 
the fixated negative picture and fixate one of the two positive pictures for 1000 ms. 
Upon a sufficiently long fixation of a positive picture, all pictures disappeared and 
this previously fixated picture was replaced by a probe (i.e., an arrow pointing left or 
right, with the direction of the arrow being counterbalanced across picture valence). 
Participants had to identify the direction the arrow was pointing to by pressing a 
computer key, upon which the probe disappeared and a new trial started. On positive 
trials, the trial continued only if participants kept looking at the fixated positive picture 
for 1000 ms, or if they fixated the other positive picture in the picture set for 1000 ms. 
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In the sham training (ST), a different attentional pattern was trained, which was 
independent of the valence of the stimuli, such that neither disengagement from 
negative stimuli nor maintained attention to positive stimuli was selectively reinforced. 
Instead, participants were trained to show a clockwise viewing pattern of the presented 
picture sets. This means that, if on the first trial, the picture in the upper left part of 
the grid had to be fixated, the picture in the upper right part had to be fixated on the 
next trial, and the picture in the lower right part had to be fixated afterwards, and so 
on. The location of fixation cross, positive and negative pictures was counterbalanced, 
such that on negative (positive) trials, attention had to be disengaged from negative 
(positive) pictures as often as it had to be maintained to negative (positive) pictures. As 
in the PT, after a sufficiently long fixation of the correct picture, all pictures disappeared 
and a probe replaced the previously fixated picture. In both groups, the participants' 
gaze pattern thus controlled the appearance of the probe. The training contained 270 
training trials distributed across 3 blocks, during which each of the 45 picture sets was 
presented 6 times, in a new random order for each participant. 
The pre- and post-assessment consisted of a free viewing task similar to the training and 
was introduced to participants as a calibration procedure. Different from the training, 
all picture sets were presented for 3000 ms, independently of participants' viewing 
patterns, and no probe followed. During assessment, the 45 picture assessment sets 
were presented twice (90 trials), once as positive and once as negative trials. During 
each assessment-phase, the location of the fixation cross was counterbalanced across 
valences and grid positions. The entire task took approximately 45 minutes, depending 
on how quickly participants learned the required viewing patterns. 
Eye-tracking device. Monocular gaze data of the dominant eye were obtained at a 
frequency of 500Hz, by means of the iView X Hi Speed system by SMI, a video based 
eye-tracking system.
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Figure 3.1. Schematic overview of the task design. On each trial of the Positive Training (PT), 
a fixation cross is presented. Upon fixation (500 ms), two negative and two positive pictures 
appear. Figure 3.1a: The free viewing task (assessment) is similar to the training, however, all 
trials last 3000 ms and no probe is presented. Figure 3.1b and 3.1c display a sample trial of the 
PT. 3.1b: On negative (PT: disengagement) trials, participants have to disengage their attention 
from the fixated negative picture and fixate one of the two positive pictures. 3.1c: On positive 
(PT: maintained attention) trials, attention has to be maintained at the fixated positive picture 
or at the other positive picture. Figure 3.1b and 3.1c: Upon fixation of a positive picture for 
1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow replaces the fixated picture. Participants respond 
to arrow direction by pressing a key. The arrow then disappears and a new trial starts. Figure 
3.1d shows an example of four consecutive trials in the sham training (ST), with the first trial 
requiring a fixation of a picture in the upper right corner. On each consecutive trial participants 
have to fixate a picture in a different corner, while the relevant corner changes in clockwise 
order (2nd trial: lower right corner; 3rd trial: lower left corner; 4th trial: upper left corner). Upon 
58
Chapter 3
fixation of the picture in the correct corner for 1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow 
replaces the fixated picture. Participants respond to arrow direction by pressing a key. The 
arrow then disappears and a new trial starts.
Note. This figure contains sample images, which have not been used in the current study. All images were obtained from 
Flickr and were published under a Creative Commons license. The formats of the images were slightly adapted for this 
figure. Credits: top left, Joe deSousa, CC0 1.0; top right, West Point—The U.S. Military Academy, CC BY 2.0; bottom left, 
Steven Depolo, CC BY 2.0; bottom right, bettyx1138, CC BY 2.0. For license terms see, CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.
org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/); CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)
Calculation of attentional indices. In line with previous studies (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2016; 
Sanchez et al., 2013), only fixation durations of at least 100 ms were considered. About 
1.5 percent of all trials at pre- and post-assessment were deleted, due to poor tracking 
quality or fixation durations shorter than 100 ms. The remaining trials were used to 
calculate three attentional indices separately for pre- and post-assessment:  A “sustained 
attention bias” score, reflecting the proportion of the total fixation time on positive 
compared to negative pictures, as well as the two relevant attentional components, 
that is “disengagement from negative pictures” (short: negative disengagement) and 
“maintained attention to positive pictures” (short: positive maintained attention). 
The sustained attention bias score was calculated in line with G. R. A. Ferrari et al. 
(2016): In the first step, we calculated two sum scores per trial, reflecting the total time 
participants fixated positive and negative pictures. Based on these scores, medians were 
calculated for each participant, representing the median fixation time on positive and 
negative pictures. In the last step, we calculated the bias score: (Median fixation time 
on positive pictures)/(median fixation time on positive pictures + median fixation time 
on negative pictures). Scores larger than 0.5 are indicative of a more positive sustained 
attention bias (relatively longer fixations on positive pictures), while scores smaller than 
0.5 are indicative of a more negative sustained attention bias.
Negative disengagement scores and positive maintained attention scores were derived 
from negative and positive trials respectively. We calculated the median fixation 
duration on the first (positive or negative) picture until the first attentional shift to 
(and fixation of ) one of the pictures of the opposite valence. Hence, on negative trials, 
longer fixation durations on negative pictures reflect a slower negative disengagement, 
while on positive trials, longer fixation durations on positive pictures reflect prolonged 
positive maintained attention.
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Stress task. In line with the study by G. R. A. Ferrari and colleagues (2016), we used 
an adapted speech task by Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, and Taylor (2008), in order to 
investigate training effects on emotional reactivity in response to a laboratory stressor. 
Via the computer, participants were informed that they would get one minute to prepare 
a three-minute-speech on the topic “Why am I a good friend”. This topic has previously 
been used to assess the association between negative mood recovery after stress 
and attentional bias in depressed individuals (Sanchez et al., 2013). Participants were 
informed that their speech would be video-recorded so that it later can be evaluated 
on its quality by two independent researchers. To increase stress levels, participants 
were not allowed to take any notes during preparation and a clock on the computer 
screen signaled how much time was left. After one minute, a “beep” sound occurred. The 
experimenter then entered the room, started the video-recording, asked participants 
to deliver their speech into a webcam, and left. After three minutes, the experimenter 
entered the room, stopped the video recording and left again for a five-minute resting 
phase. Participants were instructed to sit down quietly and relax. A clock on the screen 
again signaled the time left of the resting phase.
Procedure 
Prior to the experimental procedure, potential participants were pre-screened by 
means of the BDI via an online screening system of Radboud University Nijmegen. Only 
individuals with a score higher than 8 were invited for participation in the experiment, 
which took place within one week after pre-screening. These participants were tested 
individually in a cubicle of the Behavioural Science Institute of the University. After 
providing informed consent, they were randomly assigned in a double-blind fashion 
to one of the two training conditions (i.e., PT or ST). The experimenter then determined 
the participants´ dominant eye and subsequently calibrated the eye-tracker. Next, 
participants were seated in front of a computer, where they filled in the baseline 
questionnaires and mood state measures (T0: baseline). These measures were followed 
by a negative mood induction to re-activate the latent depressogenic schemas of the 
dysphoric sample (e.g., Beck, 1967), before we assessed mood state a second time (T1: 
pre-training). Participants were then seated in front of the eye-tracker, where a brief 
calibration procedure was started, which was followed by pre-assessment, training 
and post-assessment of the ET-ABM task. If necessary, the calibration procedure was 
repeated before each training block and post-assessment. Afterwards, participants 
were again seated in front of the other computer, where the stress task was presented. 
Throughout this task, participants were asked to rate their mood state on the VAS scales: 
at the beginning of the task (T2: pre-stress), after the speech instructions were provided 
(T3: anticipatory stress), retrospectively during the speech (T4: during stress), after 
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speech delivery (T5: post-stress), and after the 5-minute resting period (T6: recovery). In 
addition to the VAS scales, we presented the Likert mood-scales at T2 (pre-stress), at T3 
(anticipatory stress), and at T5 (post-stress). To assess possible training effects on state 
rumination, the MRSI was administered directly after the resting period. After having 
filled in the questionnaire, a sequence of a happy movie (Jungle book) was shown to 
elevate participants’ mood, followed by a final mood rating (VAS scale; T7). At the end 
of the experiment, participants filled in an awareness check, where we asked them to 
indicate on a 100 mm VAS scale, in how far they felt able to exert control on the eye-
tracking task. Finally, participants were compensated for participation and debriefed. 
The entire procedure took about 120 minutes.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses and Group Characteristics 
In the analyses, we included only participants for whom both pre-assessment and post-
assessment data of the eye-tracking task were available (n = 96). Of those, 13 participants 
had to be excluded from the analyses because of a BDI score lower than 9. Another 
3 participants were excluded due to a lack of task adherence, and another 5 due to 
extreme values on the eye-tracking indices (i.e., data points more than 1.5 interquartile 
ranges below the first or above the third quartile). Due to skewness of the data, the 
attentional indices "negative disengagement" and "positive maintained attention" were 
log-transformed. Due to missing data of 23 participants on a single item of the Likert 
mood scales, we calculated mean scores per participant instead of sum scores. The 
resulting groups (PT: n = 40, ST: n = 35), did not differ on any of the trait variables (ps > 
.6) or mood state (p = .95) at baseline. Moreover, the groups did not differ on any of the 
demographic variables besides gender, with significantly more men in the PT (8 males) 
than in the ST (1 male), χ2(75) = 5.2, p = .023 (see Table 3.1). A manipulation check of 
the mood induction showed that VAS scores dropped from before to after the negative 
mood induction procedure, F(1, 72) = 140.04, p < .001, η2 = .66, similarly for both groups, 
F(1, 72) = .04, p = .839. 
Attentional Processes at Baseline
Sustained attention bias. A univariate ANOVA of the sustained attention bias at the 
pre-assessment revealed no significant group difference, F(1, 73) = .54, p = .466. A 
subsequent one-sample t test indicated that the bias score did not deviate significantly 
from 0.5, indicating that before the training, participants had neither a tendency to 
attend towards positive nor towards negative pictures, t(74) = 1.11, p = .271.
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Table 3.1. Group differences on demographic variablesa and baseline questionnaires
PT (n= 40) ST (n= 35)
Age (M, SD) 21.18 (2.36) 21 (2.76) t(73) = 0.3, p = .771
Gender
     Male
     Female 
8
32
1
34
χ 2(1) = 5.2, p = .023
Nationality
     Dutch
     German 
20
20
19
16
χ 2(1) = 0.14, p = .711
BDI-II (M, SD) 17.53 (6.44) 16.64 (6.25) t(73) = 0.73, p = .654
STAI-T (M, SD) 49.40 (9.33) 51.29 (9.82) t(73) = 0.85, p = .952
RRS (M, SD)  2.30 (0.56) 2.14 (0.53) t(71) = 1.29, p = .762
Note. PT = Positive Training; ST = Sham Training; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition; STAI-T = Spielberger 
Trait Anxiety Inventory; RRS = Ruminative Response Scale.
aRRS scores of two participants were missing.
Positive maintained attention and negative disengagement. Two separate ANOVAs 
comparing the log-transformed attentional indices between the two groups, showed 
that PT and ST did not differ from each other regarding the attentional components at 
baseline (positive maintained attention: F(1, 74) = 0.26, p = .612; negative disengagement: 
F(1, 74) = 1.71, p = .195). A subsequent paired-samples t test revealed that at baseline, 
participants showed slower disengagement from negative pictures than from positive 
pictures, t(74) = 3.09, p = .003, d = .33. For descriptives, see Table 3.2. 
Training Effects on Attentional Processes
Changes in sustained attention bias. A 2 (group: PT, ST) x 2 (time: pre, post) repeated-
measures (RM) ANOVA of the sustained attention bias scores revealed a main effect of 
time, F(1, 73) = 92.18, p < .001, η2= .56, which was moderated by the training, F(1, 73) = 
14.64, p < .001, η2 = .17. As indicated by subsequent paired-samples t tests, both groups 
showed an increase in sustained attention bias for positive pictures (PT: t(39) = 9.46, 
p < .001, d = 1.54; ST: t (34) = 4.21, p < .001, d = .76), resulting in a positive sustained 
attention bias after the training (PT: t(39) = 7.12, p < .001; ST: t (34) = 3.68, p = .001). The 
PT, however, showed a stronger bias after the training than the ST, t(73) = 2.83, p = .041, 
d = .48. For means, see Table 3.2.
Changes in maintained attention and negative disengagement. A 2 (group: PT, ST) 
x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) RM ANOVA on the log-transformed 
attentional indices revealed a marginally significant effect of time, F(1, 73) = 3.12, p 
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= .081, η2 = .04, which was moderated by valence, F(1, 73) = 27.17, p < .001, η2 = .27, 
as well as by group, F(1, 73) = 8.14, p = .005, η2 = .10. Importantly, the crucial 3-way 
interaction was significant as well, F(1, 73) = 8.94, p = .004, η2 = .11 indicating that the 
two groups showed differential changes in positive maintained attention and negative 
disengagement. Subsequent paired-samples t tests revealed that participants in the PT 
learned to disengage more quickly from negative pictures, t(39) = 4.78, p < .001, d = .73, 
and to longer fixate positive pictures, t(39) = 2.11, p = .041, d = .36. Participants in the 
ST became generally slower with disengaging attention from both types of pictures 
(positive maintained attention: t(34) = 3.56, p = .001, d = .69; negative disengagement: 
t(34) = 2.13, p = .041, d = .36). While at pre-assessment, participants had the tendency 
to disengage from negative pictures more slowly than from positive pictures, this bias 
disappeared at post-assessment in the ST, t(34) = 0.47, p = .639, and was even reversed 
in the PT, t(39) = 3.48, p = .001, d = .57. See Table 3.2 for untransformed scores of the 
eye-tracking indices.
Table 3.2. Mean fixation times (with standard deviations) in milliseconds during the Free 
Viewing Task, and the resulting attentional bias scores.
PT ST
Pre- Training Post-training Pre- Training Post-training
Fixation time on 
positive pictures
1434
(270)
1797
(400)
1499
(273)
1658
(402)
Fixation time on 
negative pictures
1413
(301)
1000
(373)
1378
(281)
1189
(372)
Sustained attention 
bias score
0.51
(0.1)
0.64
(0.13)
0.52
(0.1)
0.58
(0.13)
Disengagement from 
negative pictures
711
(217)
555
(169)
643
(178)
745
(342)
Maintained attention 
for positive pictures
624
(202)
802
(531)
595
(160)
801
(408)
Note. PT = Positive Training; ST = Sham Training; Sustained attention bias score = Proportion of fixation time on positive 
pictures compared to negative pictures; Disengagement from negative pictures = Latency of the first shift from a negative 
picture until fixation of a positive picture; Maintained attention for positive pictures = Latency of the first shift from a 
positive picture until fixation of a negative picture.
Training Effects on Mood
Direct effects on mood. An independent-samples t test on the VAS revealed that PT 
and ST did not differ in mood state right before the training, t(73) = 0.18, p = .859. A 
subsequent 2 (group: PT, ST) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) RM ANOVA of 
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the VAS revealed a recovery from the negative mood induction procedure during the 
training, F (1, 72) = 106.96, p < .001, η2 = .60, which was not significantly different for the 
two groups, F (1, 72) = 1.3, p = .257. For means and SDs, see Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Mean mood scores (with standard deviations) for all assessment points.
T0:
Base-
line
T1:
Pre- 
training
T2:
Pre-
stress
T3:
Anti-cipatory 
stress
T4:
During 
stress
T5:
Post-
stress
T6:
Re-
covery
T7:
Mood in-
duction
PT
   VAS 6.85
(19.6)
27.95
(17.14)
56.63
(14.92)
48.24
(23.41)
46.76
(24.72)
56.42
(22.37)
55.71
(17.69)
68.18
(17.27)
   Likert
Happy -- -- 6.26
(1.48)
6.00
(1.84)
-- 5.89
(1.62)
-- --
Anxious -- -- 3.64
(1.47)
4.66
(2.36)
-- 3.88
(2.2)
-- --
Sad -- -- 3.58
(1.54)
3.86
(1.84)
-- 3.40
(1.88)
-- --
ST
   VAS 57.15
(21.33)
27.24
(17.13)
48.53
(16.87)
44.56
(22.71)
39.81
(25.95)
49.06
(20.06)
50.84
(16.34)
65.28
(18.86)
   Likert
Happy -- -- 5.42
(1.89)
5.39
(2.14)
-- 5.41
(2.05)
-- --
Anxious -- -- 4.07
(2.14)
5.25
(2.36)
-- 4.24
(2.47)
-- --
Sad -- -- 3.88
(1.84)
4.18
(2.28)
-- 3.53
(2.11)
-- --
Note. PT = Positive Training; ST = Sham Training; VAS = Visual Analogue Scale of general mood state; Likert = Likert mood 
scales: happy mood (items: happy, optimistic, joyful), anxious mood (items: nervous, tense, anxious), sad mood (items: 
depressed, upset, sad); T1: Pre-training= directly after the negative mood induction.
Effects on mood reactivity and recovery in response to stress
VAS. A 2 (group: PT, ST) x 4 (time: pre-speech, announcement, during-speech, post-
speech) RM ANOVA on the VAS, revealed a significant time effect, F(3, 66) = 9.7, p < .001, 
η2 = .31.  Within-subject contrasts revealed that the speech task had its intended effects: 
The announcement of the task resulted in a drop in mood, F(1, 68) = 6.16, p = .016, η2 
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= .08,  which remained low during the speech task, F(1,68) = 2.61, p = .111, while mood 
increased again after the speech task, F(1, 68) = 28.78, p < .001, η2 = .3. For means, see 
Table 3.3. However, the crucial time-by-group interaction was not significant, F(3, 66) = 
0.46, p = .710, indicating that PT and ST did not differentially affect mood reactivity or 
recovery in response to the stress task. 
Likert scales. The 2 (group: PT, ST) x 3 (time: pre-speech, announcement, post-speech) 
RM ANOVA was repeated for each of the three Likert scales (i.e., happiness, anxiety and 
sadness). While happiness ratings remained unaffected by the speech task, F(2, 67) = 0.7 
p = .449, anxiety and sadness ratings changed throughout the speech task (Anxiety: F(2, 
67) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .3; Sadness: F(2, 67) = 10.03, p < .001, η2 = .23). Inspection of the 
means suggests that anxiety and sadness increased in response to the announcement 
(Anxiety: T2 M = 3.84 (SD = 1.8), T3 M = 4.93 (SD = 2.36); Sadness: T2 M = 3.72 (SD = 1.68), 
T3 M = 4.01 (SD = 2.05), and dropped again after the speech task (Anxiety: T5 M = 4.05 
(SD = 2.32); Sadness T5 M = 3.46 (SD = 1.97)). However, in line with the analysis of the 
VAS, the crucial interaction effect was not significant, suggesting that changes in mood 
in response to the speech task did not differ between groups (Anxiety: F(2, 67) = 0.19, p 
= .827; Sadness: F(2, 67) = 0.32, p = .73).
Training Effects on State-Rumination
We compared MRSI scores after the stress task between the two groups by means of an 
independent-samples t test. This analysis revealed no significant training effect on state 
rumination (PT: M = 20.32 (SD = 6.85); ST: M = 21.91 (SD = 6.69); t(86)= 0.98, p = .332).
Contingency Awareness
The awareness check revealed that relatively more participants in the PT became 
aware of the training contingency than in the ST, 55% vs. 12%; χ2(74) = 15.07, p < .001. 
Moreover, participants in the PT reported more perceived control over the eye-tracking 
task than participants in the ST, t(73) = 3.98, p <.001. Therefore, we repeated the main 
analysis with awareness as an additional between-subjects factor. The 2 (group: PT, ST) 
x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (contingency awareness: yes, no) RM ANOVA of the sustained 
attention bias revealed no 3-way interaction effect involving awareness, F(1, 70) = 2.66, 
p = .107. The 2 (group: PT, ST) x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) x 
2 (contingency awareness: yes, no) RM ANOVA on the log-transformed attention bias 
indices did not indicate a significant 4-way interaction with awareness either, F(1, 70) = 
3.36, p = .071.
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DISCUSSION
To address the limitations of previously used RT-based ABM paradigms, a novel ABM 
paradigm based on eye-tracking was recently developed (i.e., ET-ABM; G. R. A. Ferrari et 
al., 2016). This paradigm was specifically designed to assess and target the attentional 
components that are biased in depression: the disengagement from negative stimuli 
and the maintained attention to positive stimuli. A first proof-of-principle study with 
healthy students showed that, compared to a negative training version, the ET-ABM 
can induce a positive sustained attention bias as well as faster disengagement from 
negative stimuli. The aim of the present study was to replicate these promising findings 
in an emotionally vulnerable sample of dysphoric students, with a placebo sham-
training as control condition. 
In line with the findings of G. R. A. Ferrari et al. (2016), the PT induced a positive sustained 
attention bias (i.e., longer fixations on positive than on negative stimuli). Notably, 
both PT and ST showed an increase in positive sustained attention bias. However, this 
increase was stronger in the PT group, supporting the effectiveness of the training in 
modifying attentional processes in dysphoric individuals. As in the previous study, these 
general training effects were again driven by reduced disengagement latencies from 
negative stimuli in the PT group. Beyond that, the PT group also showed an increase in 
maintained attention to the first fixated positive pictures, suggesting that the training 
may also affect the initial processing of positive stimuli. In contrast, the ST did not 
induce any valence-specific attentional viewing patterns. Instead, participants in this 
group became generally slower with directing their gaze away from the initially fixated 
pictures, resulting in slower disengagement from both negative and positive pictures. 
Summarizing, while the PT was effective in reversing an initially negative attentional bias 
into a positive attentional bias, characterized by relatively longer fixations on positive 
pictures and by relatively quicker disengagement from negative pictures, the ST resulted 
in a decline of the negative bias. A potential explanation for the observed effect in the 
ST group might be that the ST was possibly more difficult than the PT. Remarkably, more 
participants in the PT became aware of the reinforced training pattern, and the PT group 
experienced a stronger feeling of control over the task. It is likely that the ST therefore 
was more tiring than the PT, resulting in slower latencies in general.  
In a previous study (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2016), the PT did not modify initial maintained 
attention to positive pictures. It had been suggested that the temporal criteria defining 
a fixation as sufficiently long to continue a training trial (i.e., 1000 ms) might not be 
appropriate to induce “longer” maintained attention to positive stimuli. As our main 
goal was to replicate the earlier training effects on general sustained attention and 
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attentional disengagement from negative stimuli, we did not increase the required 
fixation duration on positive pictures. Nevertheless, in the current study, training effects 
were partially driven by the increased initial maintained attention to positive stimuli. 
This might be explained by the different stimulus sets used in the two studies. In the 
previous study, negative and positive pictures were matched on their valence ratings, 
whereas this was not done in the current study. As a result, more extreme positive 
and negative pictures might have been presented during the training, which possibly 
resulted in a stronger contrast between these valences. This change in contrast might 
have helped participants to more easily identify the two different responses required 
to react to the two different picture types, resulting in the modification of both indices, 
disengagement from negative pictures and maintained attention to positive pictures. 
Although this explanation remains speculative, the current findings provide promising 
evidence that the ET-ABM may actually directly tap into both components of attention 
that are relevant in depression. Importantly, as different picture sets were used during 
training and assessments, we may further conclude that the observed training effects 
are not merely the result of stimulus-specific response patterns, but reflect a modified 
attentional processing of emotionally valenced information in general.
To get a first indication of the potential therapeutic effects of the ET-ABM, we 
additionally explored changes in mood. In contrast to the first study, the PT and ST did 
not differentially affect participants’ mood state. In general, positive mood increased 
indistinguishably in both groups from before to after the training, possibly pointing 
to recovery from the negative mood induction at the beginning of the experiment. 
More importantly, the training did not affect mood changes during the stress task 
either. In line with the previous study (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2016), PT and ST groups 
did not differ in their mood reactivity or recovery from the speech challenge. It was 
therefore speculated that stress-attenuating effects of the training may be restricted 
to emotionally vulnerable samples, as suggested by previous CBM research (Becker et 
al., 2016). Our sample did consist of individuals with elevated depression scores. Hence, 
one possible interpretation of our results may be that in depression, the modification of 
attentional processes does not affect mood reactivity or recovery.
In the context of anxiety, the link between attentional bias and emotional vulnerability 
has been investigated in a range of studies (for a review, see Clarke, Notebaert, et al., 
2014), whereas only a few studies have addressed this topic in depression. Although 
Sanchez et al. (2013) did not experimentally manipulate attentional processes, they 
found that slower disengagement from negative stimuli predicted lower mood recovery 
after stress. Together with the few studies showing that reducing a negative attentional 
bias may attenuate depressive symptoms (Browning et al., 2012; Wells & Beevers, 2010; 
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Yang et al., 2015), this provides evidence supporting a causal link between attentional 
bias and maintenance of depressed mood. It is important to note here, that the latter 
studies all made use of multiple training sessions, distributed over a longer period of 
time. However, given the limited number of studies and the contradicting conclusions 
from meta-analyses regarding number of sessions as a moderator of training effects 
(Beard et al., 2012; Cristea et al., 2015; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoaşe et al., 2014), it 
remains to be investigated whether training effects on stress reactivity and recovery, 
or even depressive symptoms, can be achieved by increasing the number of training 
sessions. 
Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the stress task employed in this study may 
not be optimal for measuring transfer effects of the training to mood responses, which 
might be the reason why we found no relation between attentional processing and 
emotional reactivity. Although Sanchez et al. (2013) found a significant association of 
slow disengagement from negative stimuli with lower mood recovery after a speech 
challenge as used in our study, one may question whether a performance-related 
speech-challenge can be considered a relevant stressor in the context of depression. In 
fact, the link with attentional processes was exclusively found for “sad” mood recovery. 
Hence, before drawing firm conclusions about the causal role of attentional bias in 
depressed mood, future research should consider to increase the number of training 
sessions and investigate its effect on mood recovery after a depression-relevant stressor. 
Such a stressor could for instance involve a video-clip that induces sad mood, as used at 
the beginning of our experiment.
Subsequent studies using this paradigm might also want to include other measurement 
instruments that can detect far transfer effects. Even though this study administered 
a free-viewing assessment task with different pictures than used during training, the 
free-viewing task shares several characteristics with the training paradigm. To rule out 
that only a single task-relevant component has been trained, we recommend to make 
additional use of alternative bias measures, such as a spatial-cueing task (Baert et al., 
2010) or the engagement-disengagement eye-tracking task by Sanchez and colleagues 
(2013). Moreover, as the current study does not allow to attribute training effects to 
either of the two attentional components (i.e., negative disengagement or positive 
maintained attention), follow-up studies are required to disentangle the specific working 
mechanism of the ET-ABM. Finally, a measurement-only control condition might be a 
useful addition for future research, as sham-training procedures as implemented in this 
study may have training unspecific effects as well (e.g., Gladwin, 2017; Wells & Beevers, 
2010). 
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For these follow-up studies, we would strongly recommend to take all three attentional 
components into account (i.e., sustained attention, negative disengagement, positive 
maintained attention). The current study found no sustained attention bias at baseline, 
which might have been expected based on the extensive literature on the existence of 
negative attentional biases in depression (e.g., Peckham et al., 2010). However, the fact 
that we found a slower disengagement from negative than from positive pictures points 
to the importance of looking into the different attentional components separately, 
rather than exclusively investigating a general bias. Differentiating between negative 
disengagement and positive maintained attention may allow for a more sensitive 
measurement of attentional bias in depression. 
To summarize, this study provides further support for the effectiveness of the ET-ABM 
in modifying the specific attentional components assumed to be causally involved 
in the development and maintenance of depression. In order to investigate whether 
ABM can indeed alleviate emotional vulnerability, it has been suggested that we need 
refined or new paradigms which reliably assess and modify these processes (Clarke, 
Notebaert, et al., 2014). This study suggests that the ET-ABM task may indeed be such 
a paradigm that facilitates further progress in this field of research. Fortunately, the 
technical developments of the past decade made eye-tracking devices accessible at 
reasonable prices and suitable for the use in hospitals without requiring the expertise 
of technicians. Therefore, the next step should be to investigate the beneficial effects of 
the ET-ABM on clinically relevant measures in a patient sample.


CHAPTER 4
Refilling the Half-Empty Glass: Investigating the 
Potential Role of the Interpretation Modification 
Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D)
Based on Möbius, M., Tendolkar, I., Lohner, V., Baltussen, M., & Becker, E.S. 
(2015). Refilling the half-empty glass: Investigating the potential role of the 
Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D). Journal of 
Behavioural Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 49, 37-43.
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ABSTRACT
Cognitive biases are known to cause and maintain depression. However, little 
research has been done on techniques targeting interpretation tendencies found in 
depression, despite the promising findings of anxiety studies. This paper presents two 
experiments, investigating the suitability of an Interpretation Modification Paradigm for 
Depression (IMP-D) in healthy individuals, which has already proven its effectiveness 
in anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2008). Different from other paradigms, the IMP-D aims at 
modifying an interpretation bias on response- and on a more implicit reaction time-
level, making this task less susceptible to demand effects. For the current study, the 
Word-Sentence Association Paradigm for Depression (Hindash & Amir, 2011) was 
modified and administered in healthy volunteers (experiment I: N = 81; experiment 
II: N = 105). To enhance a positive interpretation bias, endorsing benign and rejecting 
negative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios was reinforced through feedback. This 
intervention was compared to the opposite training (both experiments) and a control 
training (experiment II only). Both experiments revealed a significant increase in bias 
towards benign interpretations on the level of overt decisions, while only in the first 
experiment a change was found on a reaction time-level. These modifications are not 
reflected in group-differences in emotional vulnerability. Possible limitations regarding 
the reliability of inter-dependent response and reaction time measures are discussed. 
To conclude, the IMP-D is able to modify interpretation biases, but adaptations are 
required to maximize its beneficial effects.
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Seeing a glass as half empty instead of half-full is one of the most popular examples 
of a negative interpretation of an ambiguous scenario. This bias towards negative 
interpretations is a characteristic cognitive marker often found in depression (e.g., 
Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012). This and other cognitive 
biases in the domain of memory and attention processing (e.g., Tran, Hertel, & 
Joormann, 2011; Vrijsen et al., 2014; Wells & Beevers, 2010) are not merely a symptom of 
depression, but appear to play a causal role in the onset and maintenance of depression 
(De Raedt & Koster, 2010). In the light of limited treatment options, techniques that are 
able to modify interpretation biases and the related depressive symptoms are therefore 
essential.
Recently two meta-analytical reviews have been published, investigating the possibility 
to modify cognitive biases for interpretation (CBM-I) in anxiety and depression (Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). Menne-Lothmann and colleagues thereby 
distinguished between three CBM-I techniques: 1) homograph paradigms, 2) ambiguous 
situation (AS) paradigms, and 3) word-sentence association paradigms (WSAP). However, 
the WSAP has so far only been applied to anxious individuals (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 
2010; Amir & Taylor, 2012; Beard & Amir, 2008). In the following paragraphs, we introduce 
the homograph paradigm and the AS to highlight methodological differences to the 
WSAP, which we propose as an alternative technique to modify biases in depression.
In a homograph paradigm, single words comprising a benign and a negative meaning 
(e.g., stroke) are used to assess the strength of associations individuals have with their 
respective meaning (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000). However, as homographs are less 
frequent in other languages different from English, this paradigm is less suitable in 
other languages as Dutch or German.
In the AS paradigm, developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), initially ambiguous 
scenarios are described of which the meaning can only be resolved by the last 
word. Several sentences provide participants with a detailed context to develop an 
interpretation. This paradigm has been used to alter interpretation biases in anxiety 
(Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005) and 
depression (Micco et al., 2014). Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, and Mackintosh (2006) 
further modified this technique, by presenting scenarios on audio recordings and 
asking participants to imagine the described scenarios. This mental imagery training 
has been shown to be able to reduce depressive symptoms compared to a control 
training (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009).
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In a word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2009) a negative 
word (e.g., “threatening”) or a benign word (e.g., “funny”) is presented, followed by 
an ambiguous sentence (e.g., “People laugh after something you said.”). Participants 
indicate as fast as possible whether the word matches the sentence. Response choices 
and reaction times supply information about interpretation biases. In order to modify 
a pre-existing interpretation bias, Beard and Amir (2008) provided feedback on the 
performed reactions, reinforcing the acceptance of benign interpretations and the 
rejection of negative interpretations (i.e., “You are correct”), while punishing all other 
decisions (i.e., “You are incorrect”). This modification of the paradigm was sufficient to 
retrain initial interpretation tendencies in socially anxious individuals. Moreover, these 
effects transferred to other modalities of information processing such as attention (Amir 
et al., 2010), and reduced levels of social anxiety (Amir & Taylor, 2012; Beard & Amir, 
2008).
Compared to AS paradigms (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), in the WSAP ambiguous 
stimuli are presented briefly as they consist of shorter sentences. This reduction of 
presentation time requires participants to rely on their associations to evaluate the 
scenarios. Compared to the mental imagery training (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010), the 
WSAP asks participants to actively perform an action, which has been suggested to be a 
critical component of a cognitive training targeting interpretation tendencies (Hoppitt, 
Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010). Moreover, next to measures of response choices, 
reaction times of the WSAP provide a more implicit assessment of this associative 
processing.
A modification of the WSAP has been used to assess interpretation biases in dysphoric 
individuals (WSAP-D; Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012). Dysphoric participants tended 
to more often and more quickly endorse negative interpretations of ambiguous self-
referential sentences compared to non-dysphoric individuals. However, no study has 
been published on the modification of these tendencies in the field of depression by 
means of this paradigm so far.
The aim of the current study was to investigate the efficacy of an Interpretation 
Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D) by providing feedback on the WSAP-D, 
as in Beard and Amir (2008). In two experiments, we investigated the efficacy of the 
IMP-D in modifying initial interpretation tendencies within an unselected sample. In 
addition, we were interested in how far this modification of interpretation tendencies 
affects emotional vulnerability in response to a subsequent laboratory stressor. As this 
is the first study investigating the potential of modifying depressive interpretation 
tendencies by means of a modified WSAP, we decided to investigate this paradigm in an 
75
Investigating the Potential Role of the Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression
4
unselected sample as a proof-of-principle study first, before testing it in clinical samples. 
Hence, the aim of the first experiment was to investigate whether initial interpretation 
tendencies can be modified by means of the IMP-D. Therefore, we compared two 
training conditions, one reinforcing healthy interpretation tendencies and the other 
reinforcing maladaptive interpretation tendencies. These two training conditions were 
contrasted, as the strengthening of a healthy bias in an unselected sample might result 
only in small changes, which are difficult to detect. The second experiment aimed at 
investigating whether we can strengthen an adaptive interpretation bias. Both training 
conditions from the first study were compared to a neutral control condition, wherein 
no interpretation tendencies were strengthened at all.
EXPERIMENT I
A group of unselected participants received either a positivity training (PT), involving 
reinforcement of the rejection of negative interpretations and the acceptance of 
benign interpretations, or a negativity training (NT), in which the opposite pattern was 
reinforced. Participants were expected to more often and more quickly execute the 
reinforced response pattern after the training. The PT group was further expected to 
show attenuated levels of emotional vulnerability in response to a subsequent stress 
task, compared to the NT group.
Methods
Participants. Eighty-one Dutch and German speaking students participated in return 
for course credits or a payment of €10. All participants were randomly assigned to the PT 
group (n = 40) or the NT group (n = 41). Groups did not differ on age, gender, nationality 
or any trait questionnaires (see Table 4.1).
Materials
Zung Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS). The SDS was administered to investigate 
differences in depressive symptoms (Zung, 1965, 1973). Scores range from 20 to 80, 
with higher scores reflecting more depressive symptoms.
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T). The trait scale of the STAI has 
been applied to examine differences in trait anxiety (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Scores range from 20 to 80, 
with higher scores representing higher trait anxiety.
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NEO-FFI. The neuroticism subscale of the NEO-FFI was administered in order to assess 
individual trait differences in emotional vulnerability. Sum scores of this scale range 
from 0 to 48, while higher scores represent higher levels of neuroticism (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1993; Hoekstra, Ormel, & de Fruyt, 1996).
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). To assess individual levels of affect 
the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) was used. On two subscales, the level of positive affect 
and negative affect can be indicated, with total scores ranging between 5 and 50 for 
each scale.
Mood scales. To assess changes of mood during the experiment we repeatedly applied 
a mood scale. This scale consisted of 5 items to be rated on a 10-point Likert scale with 
two emotional descriptions at the anchor of each item, which is tensed/relaxed, sad/
cheerful, anxious/safe, frustrated/content, and unhappy/ happy. The scores on all items 
are summed to a total between 5 and 50, with higher scores reflecting more positive 
mood states.
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of both groups in experiment I.
PT 
(n = 40)
NT 
(n = 41)
RangeMean (SD) Mean (SD)
Gender
Female
Male
25
15
19
22
χ2(1) = 2.13, p = .144
Nationality
Dutch
German
21
19
24
17
χ2(1) = 0.3, p = .585
Age 22.60 (2.35) 23.49 (6.45) t(79) = .82, p = .416
SDS 36.23 (6.96) 35.49 (9.01) 23 - 55 t(79) = .41, p = .682
STAI 37.18 (9.17) 37.80 (12.15) 20 - 69 t(79) = .26, p = .793
NEO-FFI 17.15 (8.07) 16.56 (9.78) 0 - 16 t(79) = .30, p = .769
PA 33.80 (5.29) 34.37 (6.26) 18 - 47 t(79) = .44, p = .662
NA 18.60 (7.33) 19.00 (7.70) 10 - 42 t(79) = .24, p = .811
Mood Scales 35.87 (6.52) 36.17 (8.47) 12 - 48 t(79) = .18, p = .861
Note. PT = positivity training; NT = negativity training; SDS = Zung Self-rating Depression Scale; STAI = Trait measure of the 
Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; NEO-FFI = neuroticism scale of the NEO; PA = positive affect scale of the Positive 
Affect Negative Affect Schedule; NA = negative affect scale of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; Mood Scales 
administered before the training.
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Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D). The WSAP-D was 
modified as in Beard and Amir (2008). The material used by Cowden-Hindash and 
Amir (2012), kindly provided by the authors, was translated into Dutch and German. 
During the pre- and post-assessment, 32 ambiguous sentences (e.g., “Your supervisor 
is surprised by your work”) were presented and equally often combined with either 
a benign word (e.g., “competent”) or a negative word (e.g., “incompetent”). During 
the training, 58 sentence-word combinations were presented, in addition to 10 filler 
sentence-word combinations. All sentences were presented twice during the training, 
once combined with the benign and once with the negative word, resulting in 136 trials.
During each assessment trial, participants first saw a black fixation cross on a white 
screen, replaced by a sentence after 500 ms. After 2500 ms a benign or negative word 
appeared in the center of the screen. The participants' task was to indicate as fast as 
possible whether sentence and word were related by pressing a button on the keyboard. 
Both reaction times and decisions were recorded.
For training purposes, feedback was given after every response. Participants in the 
PT group received reinforcing feedback (i.e., “correct”) on trials where they accepted 
combinations with a benign word and where they rejected combinations with a 
negative word. All other reactions were punished (i.e., “incorrect”). Participants in the 
NT group received the opposite feedback, reinforcing the acceptance of negative and 
the rejection of benign interpretations.
Filler trials were added in order to prevent participants from exclusively reacting to the 
valence of the word without reading the previously presented sentence. These trials 
required the untrained response, for example, participants in the PT group received 
unambiguous filler-sentences (e.g., “You are stuck in a traffic jam“) combined with a 
negative word (e.g., “accident“) that had to be accepted, or combined with a benign 
word (e.g., “sunshine“) that had to be rejected. Before pre-assessment, 10 practice trials 
were presented, which were similar to the training trials in that feedback was given on 
the performance. The task lasted about 20 min.
Stressful memory task. In order to measure training effects on emotional vulnerability, a 
challenging memory task was administered. The sentences of the post-assessment trials 
were combined with the same words as during the post-assessment in 50 percent of the 
trials, and with new words in the remaining trials, resulting in 64 trials. Word-valence was 
counterbalanced across old and new combinations. Trials started with a black fixation-
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cross for 500 ms, replaced by the sentence-word combination. Subjects had 1500 ms to 
indicate whether the word-sentence combination was novel or repeated. In case of no 
response within 1500 ms, participants were instructed to react faster.
Mood induction. In order to restore participants' mood at the end of the experiment, a 
positive mood induction was administered after the memory task. Participants viewed 
a movie clip from the Jungle Book, lasting about 5 min.
Procedure. All participants were tested individually in a testing room. After providing 
informed consent, participants were seated in front of the computer screen, where they 
were asked to first answer all questionnaires before starting with the IMP-D procedure. 
Immediately after the training, they were asked to fill in the mood scales for the second 
time before working on the stressful memory task and filling in the mood scales for 
the final time. After the positive mood induction participants were paid. The whole 
experiment lasted about 1 hour. After finishing data collection participants were 
debriefed via email.
Design and analyses. Percentages of accepting benign and negative interpretations 
were calculated separately for each participant at both assessment points, with higher 
percentages of accepting a given combination being equivalent to lower percentages 
of rejecting the same combination. A 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) 
x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) mixed repeated measures analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on the percentage of acceptations to investigate 
effects of the intervention. SDS served as covariate for all analyses.
For reaction times (RT), the first and the last percentile of all RT during the assessment 
trials were deleted. A median score for accepting and rejecting negative and benign 
word-sentence combinations of each assessment point was calculated. The resulting 
medians were log transformed. These scores were subjected to a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 
(valence: benign, negative) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (decision: 
accept, reject) repeated measures ANCOVA.
Training effects on stress reactivity were investigated by a 2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: 
pre-stressor, post-stressor) repeated measures ANCOVA on log transformed mood 
scores, comparing group difference in mood changes before to after the stress task.
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Results
Interpretation training
Decisions. No pre-training differences between groups were found. The critical 2 (group: 
PT, NT) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) 
repeated measures ANCOVA revealed a significant 3-way interaction (F(1, 78) = 8.49, 
p = .005, η2 = .10). To further investigate this interaction effect, two separate repeated 
measures ANCOVAs were conducted for both levels of valence.
On accepted negative interpretations, there was a time by group interaction (F(1, 78) = 
8.57, p = .004, η2 = .10) mainly driven by a reduction of accepted negative interpretations 
in the PT group (t(39) = 6.62, p < .001). This was not found in the NT group (t(40) = 0.93, 
p = .358). SDS was significant as well (F(1, 78) = 12.56 p = .001, η2 = .14). The analysis was 
repeated for accepted benign interpretations. This analysis yielded no time by group 
interaction effect (F(1, 78) = 2.44, p = .122), but only a significant main effect of group 
(F(1, 78) = 6.38, p = .014, η2 = .08), indicating an overall higher level of acceptation of 
benign interpretations. SDS revealed to be marginally significant (F(1, 78) = 3.15, p = .08, 
η2 = .04). See Table 4.2 for mean percentages of acceptations.
To investigate the relation of depression and the training effect we correlated a change 
score for the acceptance of negative interpretations (i.e., pre minus post scores) with 
SDS, separately for both groups. Only in the NT group depression was marginally related 
to a change in acceptance rates (r(41) = -.27, p = .083), showing that higher scores on 
SDS were related to a stronger increase in acceptance of negative interpretations. This 
relation was not found in the PT group (p > .1), indicating that individuals with low and 
high levels of depression were trained equally well.
Table 4.2. Mean percentage of acceptance rates (SD) for benign and negative 
interpretations in experiment I
PT NT
Benign Negative Benign Negative
Pre 72.19 (13.05) 37.81 (17.16) 68.60 (17.26) 39.02 (17.39)
Post 80.47 (13.29) 21.09 (18.71) 70.58 (18.02) 35.37 (20.90)
 Note. PT = positivity training; NT = negativity training.
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Reaction times. No pre-training differences between groups were found. The critical 
2 (group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: pre- assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (valence: benign, 
negative) x 2 (decision: accept, reject) repeated measures ANCOVA revealed a marginally 
significant 4-way interaction (F(1, 62) = 3.48, p = .067, η2 = .05), which we tested per level 
of valence and decision.
Negative interpretations. A 2 (group: NT, PT) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) 
repeated measures ANCOVA on the RT of accepting negative interpretations revealed 
no significant 2-way interaction effect (F(1, 67) = 0.77, p = .382). The same analysis on 
RT for rejecting negative interpretations revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 78) = 
9.02, p = .004, η2 = .10). This interaction was mainly due to faster rejections of negative 
interpretations in the PT group (t(39) = 5.21, p < .001), while the RT in the NT group 
remained stable (t(40) = 0.27, p = .792). SDS was marginally significant (F(1, 78) = 3.86, 
p = .053, η2 = .05).
Benign interpretations. The 2 (group: NT, PT) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) 
repeated measures ANCOVA on accepting benign interpretations revealed a significant 
2-way interaction (F(1, 78) = 5.36, p = .023, η2 = .06), which was again mostly caused by 
the PT group showing faster acceptations of benign interpretations after the training 
(t(39) = 2.59, p = .013). The NT group did not show faster responses when comparing pre 
and post measures (t(40) = 0.89, p = .381). There was no 2-way interaction on rejecting 
benign interpretations (F(1, 70) = 0.17, p = .682). Only a marginal significant main effect 
of time was found, indicating a reduction of response time (F(1, 70) = 3.16, p = .08, η2 = 
.04).
We conducted a correlation analyses to investigate the relation between the depression 
rating and the change in reaction times on rejecting negative interpretations and on 
accepting benign interpretations. These analyses revealed no significant correlation 
(p > .1) for either of the groups, indicating that the training functions equally well for 
individuals scoring low and high on the depression rating.
Mood changes
Direct effects. To investigate whether the training affected mood, we conducted a 2 
(group: PT, NT) x 2 (time: before training, after training) repeated measures ANCOVA on 
log transformed mood ratings, which revealed a marginal significant time effect (F(1, 
78) = 2.87, p = .094, η2 = .04) indicating a decrease in mood during the training (see Table 
4.3 for untransformed means). The interaction effect remained non-significant (F(1, 78) 
= 2.57, p = .113).
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Emotional vulnerability. The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANCOVA comparing mood 
scores before to after the stress inducing memory task yielded no significant interaction 
effect (F(1, 78) = .02, p = .895). After controlling for variation of depression levels, the 
time effect turned out to be not significant either (F(1, 78) = .03, p = .86). Only SDS was 
significant (F(1, 78) = 31.52, p < .001, η2 = .29) and revealed to be positively correlated 
with stress reactivity (r(81) = .391, p < .001), showing that higher levels of depression 
were related to a stronger increase in stress.
Table 4.3. Mean mood ratings (SD) of both groups for all three assessment time points in 
experiment I.
PT NT
Before Training 35.88 (6.52) 36.17 (8.47)
Before Stress Task 35.70 (5.93) 33.90 (8.51)
After Stress Task 34.25 (6.27) 32.34 (9.35)
Note. PT = positivity training; NT = negativity training.
Discussion
The aim of this first experiment was to investigate whether the IMP-D is able to alter 
depressive interpretation tendencies. The PT group showed changes in accordance 
with their training condition, accepting fewer negative interpretations after the 
training compared to before the training, and becoming faster in rejecting negative 
interpretations as well as in accepting benign interpretations. In contrast to our 
expectations, individuals in the NT group showed similar training effects as participants 
in the PT group, indicated by an increase in acceptations of benign word-sentence 
combinations and by faster responses on rejecting negative interpretations.
Participants' mood decreased as a result of either training, perhaps due to the 
monotonicity of the task. Beyond that, training condition had no effect on emotional 
vulnerability in response to a laboratory stressor task. However, lower depression 
scores were related to attenuated stress reactivity, demonstrating the stress resilience 
of healthy individuals. Self-esteem might also have been an important factor. Whereas 
low self-esteem is known to be a risk factor for developing depression, high self-esteem 
might have attenuated the impact of the stressor (Orth, Robins, & Meier, 2009; Rector 
& Roger, 1997). It also might be possible that a training effect is visible in recovery from 
stress (Sanchez et al., 2013). To investigate this, we assessed mood after the positive 
mood induction subsequent to the challenging stress task in experiment II.
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EXPERIMENT II
The second experiment aimed at replicating the findings from the first experiment and 
in addition to study effects relative to a neutral control condition. This is required to 
investigate whether the PT improves interpretation tendencies. To investigate effects on 
recovery from stress, we additionally assessed mood after the positive mood induction 
phase following the challenging stress task.
Methods
Only differences between the two experiments will be described.
Participants. In this experiment 128 Dutch and German speaking students participated 
for course credits. Due to a computer error, the first 18 participants had to be excluded. 
All participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (PT: n = 36; 
NT: n = 37; control: n = 37). Groups did not differ in age, gender, nationality or trait 
questionnaires, except for the STAI and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (see Table 4.4).
Materials
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). To control for individual differences in self-
esteem, the RSES was administered (Ferring & Filipp, 1996; Franck et al., 2008). On 10 
items participants indicated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) 
to 3 (strongly agree) to what degree every item represents a proper description of 
themselves. These scores are summed up to a total score ranging between 0 and 30 
with higher scores representing higher levels of self-esteem.
IMP-D. The structure of the IMP-D was identical to the first experiment. A control training 
was added in which participants received a continued assessment task, consisting of 
the same training trials as the PT and NT, but without feedback.
Stressful memory task. The only difference to the first experiment was an extension of 
the response window to 2500 ms5. 
Procedure. The order of the tasks was replicated, with the only exception that after the 
positive mood induction, mood scales were presented again.
5.  Results of the memory task in experiment I indicate a ceiling effect regarding the response latencies to 
identify previous combinations. To be able to detect a potential transference effect from the IMP-D to a 
memory bias, we prolonged the time limit of the stressful memory task.
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Design and analyses. Data preparation followed the same steps as in experiment I, with 
the exception that the mood ratings did not have to be log transformed. Furthermore, 
five participants have been removed based on their outlying scores (values greater than 
3 times the interquartile range; Field, 2009) on RT measures and measures of decisions 
(see Table 4.4 for characteristics of the final sample).
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics of all three groups in experiment II.
PT 
(n = 36)
NT 
(n = 35)
Control
(n = 34)
RangeMean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Gender
Female
Male
23 
13 
22 
13 
20 
14 
χ2(2) = 0.21, p = .80
Nationality
Dutch
German
15 
21 
20 
15 
12 
22 
χ2(2) = 3.54, p = .17
Age 20.42 (1.99) 20.14 (2.24) 19.74 (1.85) F(2, 102) = 0.99, p = .375
SDS 36.67 (6.87) 38.6 (7.40) 35.68 (6.14) 26 – 55 F(2, 102) = 1.64, p = .199
STAI 39.78 (9.47) 43.17 (10.80) 37.15 (8.51) 23 – 67 F(2, 102) = 3.39, p = .038
RSES 22.14 (4.84) 19.89 (4.53) 23.21 (4.10) 8 – 30 F(2, 102) = 4.84, p = .010
PA 33.44 (6.63) 31.89 (6.73) 34.82 (6.19) 17 – 48 F(2, 102) = 1.75, p = .179
NA 19.69 (7.29) 20.83 (5.91) 18.56 (5.83) 10 – 37 F(2, 102) = 1.09, p = .341
Mood Scales 34.97 (8.17) 32.49 (8.18) 35.91 (5.96) 16 – 50 F(2, 102) = 1.92, p = .152
Note. PT = positivity training; NT = negativity training; Control = control group; SDS = Zung Self-rating Depression Scale; 
STAI = Trait measure of the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PA = positive 
affect scale of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; NA = negative affect scale of the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule; Mood Scales administered before the training.
This table represents the final sample after excluding five participants due to high error rates on the IMP-D.
To test for training effects on Decision level a 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-
assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) repeated measures 
ANCOVA was conducted. Changes in log transformed median RT were analyzed by 
means of a 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 
(valence: benign, negative) x 2 (decision: accept, reject) repeated measures ANCOVA. 
Finally, a 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-stressor, post-stressor) repeated 
measures ANCOVA was conducted on the mood scales to investigate differences in 
stress responsiveness between the groups. This analysis was repeated with the mood 
scales before and after the positive mood induction to test for differential recovery 
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during the positive mood induction. SDS, STAI and RSES served as covariates. As the NT 
differed significantly from the remaining groups, all planned analyses were repeated 
without this group.
Results
IMP-D
Decisions. No pre-training group-differences were found. The 3 (group: PT, NT, control) 
x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) repeated 
measures ANCOVA revealed a significant 3-way interaction (F(2, 99) = 5.52, p = .005, η2 
= .10). To understand this interaction, we conducted two separate repeated measures 
ANCOVA for both levels of valence.
The 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) repeated 
measures ANCOVA on the percentage of accepted negative interpretations revealed a 
significant interaction (F(2, 101) = 5.26, p = .007, η2 = .10), which was mostly driven by a 
decrease in percentage of acceptations within the PT group (t(35) = 5.27, p < .001), while 
the scores remained stable in the other groups (NT: (t(34) = .18, p = .86; control: (t(33) = 
.96, p = .345). The remaining effects remained non-significant (p > .05).
The same 3 x 2 repeated measures ANCOVA on the percentage of accepted benign 
interpretations revealed no significant interaction effect (F(2, 99) = .62, p = .539), or main 
effect of condition or time (p > .1) (see Table 4.5 for mean percentages of acceptance 
rates). As in the first study, a change in percentage of acceptations was correlated with 
SDS, however, this correlation was not significant in either group (p > .1).
Reaction times. No significant group differences were found on the RT level. The 
planned 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 
(valence: benign, negative) x 2 (decision: accept, reject) repeated measures ANCOVA 
revealed no effect of the training as indicated by the non-significant 4-way interaction 
(F(2, 91) = 1.82, p = .167).
Mood changes
Direct effects. Changes in mood as a result of the training were evaluated via a 3 
(group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) repeated measures 
ANCOVA, on the mood scales before and after the IMP-D, revealing an overall drop in 
mood during the training (F(1, 100) = 4.33, p = .04, η2 = .04). All other effects were not 
significant (p > .05).
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Table 4.5. Mean percentage of acceptance rates (SD) for benign and negative 
interpretations in experiment II.
Pre Post
Benign Negative Benign Negative
PT 67.01 (13.58) 38.72 (18.41) 72.4 (15.84) 22.57 (14.12)
NT 70.00 (14.44) 37.14 (17.74) 70.71 (15.52) 36.43 (21.73)
Control 69.97 (12.13) 34.56 (20.13) 72.79 (12.67) 31.25 (17.41)
Note. PT = positivity training; NT = negativity training; Control = control group.
Emotional vulnerability. The 3 (group: PT, NT, control) x 2 (time: pre-stressor, post-
stressor) repeated measures ANCOVA, revealed no significant interaction effect (F(2, 
100) = 1.23, p = .298). The main effect of time did not reveal a significant effect either 
(F(1, 100) = 0.58, p = .448), indicating the failure to generally induce heightened levels 
of stress.
Stress recovery. The 3 x 2 repeated measures ANCOVA analysis revealed no significant 
time group interaction effect either (F (2, 93) = 1.28, p = .283), or any main effect (p > 
.05)6.
Discussion
Results from the first experiment were replicated: the training strengthened tendencies 
to reject negative interpretations. Again, this change was only present in the PT group. 
The NT group remained stable, as did the control group. However, the second experiment 
did not succeed in strengthening initial tendencies regarding the acceptance of benign 
interpretations, or in modifying initial tendencies on reaction time.
As in the first study, the IMP-D did not differentially affect mood, neither during the 
training nor in response to the stress task. Note that the stress task in the second 
experiment did not induce stress at all, probably due to the decreased time pressure. 
The absence of a stress induction might further have impeded the detection of a group 
difference in mood recovery after the positive mood induction either, even though 
mood increased across all groups over this phase.
6.  As the NT group initially differed from the other two groups on trait measures of anxiety and self-esteem, all 
planned analyses on changes of response choices, reaction times and mood changes were repeated without 
the NT group. The results remained unchanged.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to test the Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression 
(IMP-D), an instrument developed to modify depressogenic interpretation tendencies. 
In two experiments, we showed that the IMP-D enhances a healthy bias favoring benign 
interpretations, by modifying interpretation tendencies on decisions (i.e., how often a 
negative or benign interpretation is rejected or accepted) as well as on RT. These results 
support the testing of the IMP-D as training technique in an emotionally vulnerable or 
depressive sample.
However, the IMP-D did not influence all bias measures. Whereas in the first experiment, 
participants displayed changes in interpretation tendencies as assessed by means of 
latencies and decisions, the second experiment only revealed a reduction in accepting 
negative interpretations in the PT group. This variation in results might be explained by 
the change in study design. Whereas in the first experiment we contrasted two extreme 
training conditions, we compared these conditions to a third, neutral condition in the 
second experiment. As this control condition was expected to deviate less from the two 
interventions, it became more difficult to detect subtle differences.
The aim of a CBM technique such as the IMP-D is to beneficially affect depression, 
either by reducing symptoms or, as during a single session intervention, to attenuate 
emotional vulnerability in response to a stressor. Both experiments revealed no effects 
on stress reactivity during a challenging memory task, which can partly be explained 
by the limited induction of stress. These results are however in line with the findings 
of Menne-Lothmann et al. (2014), demonstrating no beneficial effects of CBM-I on 
subsequent stressors. As suggested by the authors, to investigate effects on emotional 
vulnerability a stressor needs to be applied that provokes ambiguity rather than general 
distress as in the current study.
An alternative explanation for the absence of statistical group differences might 
be ascribed to the feedback of the IMP-D. The explicit feedback might have made 
participants aware of the training contingencies. As the feedback in the NT group 
probably was in strong contrast to the natural interpretation tendencies of these healthy 
individuals, it might have provoked reactance (Fulcher & Hammerl, 2005; Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993) rather than a shift in interpretation bias. Reactance would reinforce a 
healthy interpretation bias and hence explain the changes found in the NT group that 
are comparable to the PT group.
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These results further shed light on discussions concerning awareness of training 
contingencies. By providing feedback on every single decision, the purpose of such 
a training procedure might have been obvious to participants. Grafton, Mackintosh, 
Vujic, and MacLeod (2014) demonstrated that participants who are informed about the 
training contingency showed an improvement in bias while emotional vulnerability to 
a subsequent stressor remained unaffected. Hence, it might be interesting to alter the 
training procedure by reinforcing healthy interpretation patterns more implicitly.
Several limitations need to be mentioned. An inherent characteristic to the design is 
the interdependency of measures of RT and response choices. The IMP-D reinforces one 
kind of interpretation (e.g., accept benign interpretations) while punishing the opposite 
reaction (e.g., reject benign interpretations). Hence, the more effective the training 
is in reducing the unwanted reaction pattern, the fewer data points are available to 
calculate a representative median reaction time. This affects a reliable estimation of 
an interpretation bias on RT level. Increasing the number of trials without excessively 
prolonging the session might help to improve this estimation.
It remains speculative how this training affects the evaluation of an initially ambiguous 
scenario. Due to the task features, characterized by repetitively performing a decision 
within a very short period, it is conceivable that the IMP-D targets associative learning 
and as a result facilitates the access to benign interpretations when encountering an 
ambiguous situation. Increasing the number of training sessions might hereby be 
an important step to strengthen these associations and amplify beneficial effects. 
Moreover, participants might need to be confronted with ambiguous situations in their 
daily life to experience meaningful changes in their mood states. Finally, we cannot 
directly draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the IMP-D in clinical samples. 
Based on the recent meta-analysis (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014) we might expect that 
clinical samples benefit more from this intervention compared to the current sample. 
This however needs to be tested in future research.
In conclusion, this study is the first to show that the IMP-D is able to positively influence 
initial interpretation tendencies in an unselected sample, by repetitively practicing 
the acceptance of benign interpretations of ambiguous sentences and the rejection 
of negative interpretations. Such a modification of interpretation tendencies typically 
found in depressed individuals is a prerequisite to reduce emotional vulnerability and 
affect depression (Clarke, Notebaert, et al., 2014). Hence, future studies of this paradigm 
in an adapted form are justified to deploy the therapeutic potential of the IMP-D.

CHAPTER 5 
Testing an Interpretation Modification Paradigm for 
Depression (IMP-D) in a Sample of Dysphoric Individuals
Based on Möbius, M., Tendolkar, I., & Becker, E.S. (2018). Testing an Interpretation 
Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D) in a Sample of Dysphoric Individuals. 
Submitted.
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ABSTRACT
The tendency to interpret ambiguous information negatively influences the onset and 
maintenance of depression. We previously modified such a tendency in an unselected 
student sample by administering an Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression 
(IMP-D), a modified Word-Sentence Association Paradigm. In the current study, we 
extend the intervention to healthy individuals with heightened depression scores, 
whereby we administered a more implicit form of feedback. In a first step, 90 participants 
were assigned to a single-session training with either a training condition, receiving 
implicit positive feedback to reinforce adaptive interpretation tendencies, or a sham-
training condition with yoked-control feedback. As the implicit feedback procedure did 
not modify interpretation tendencies, we assigned another 30 participants to a training 
with explicit positive feedback, to explain the null-findings and to explore the impact 
of feedback modality. Only participants receiving explicit positive feedback showed 
attenuated maladaptive interpretation tendencies, but also deterioration of positive 
mood after the training. Explicit feedback might provide a more effective IMP-D training 
than implicit feedback in the context of a single session intervention, but unfavorable 
side-effects should be considered. A replication of this study with direct comparison of 
feedback modalities is strongly recommended.
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Mood disorders in general, and major depressive disorder in particular, are highly 
prevalent mental disorders, with up to one in five people suffering from a depressive 
episode at least once in their life (Kessler et al., 2005; Kessler & Bromet, 2013). The 
recurrence rates for this mental disorder are high and go up to 85 percent (Hardeveld, 
Spijker, De Graaf, Nolen, & Beekman, 2009), which is especially alarming given the fact 
that depression becomes more persistent with each subsequent episode (Steinert 
et al., 2014). Despite intensive research on the etiology of mood disorders and the 
development of promising treatment approaches, depression has become the leading 
cause of disabilities worldwide (World Health Organization, 2017). It is therefore 
important to develop alternative treatment options and to further improve existing 
therapies.
In the past decade, training programs targeting cognitive biases have drawn attention 
as a potential add-on treatment option for depression. Cognitive biases in depression 
are characterized by the preferential processing of self-relevant negative stimuli 
(Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017; Everaert et al., 2017; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), 
and can be found in different aspects of information processing, such as attention 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013), 
approach-avoidance tendencies (Vrijsen et al., 2013), interpretation (Cowden Hindash 
& Amir, 2012), and memory (Ridout, Noreen, & Johal, 2009; Rinck & Becker, 2005). 
Importantly, research suggests that these biases are causally linked to the development 
and maintenance of depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
To target these biases, different computerized training techniques have been developed, 
widely referred to as cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigms (for reviews, see Cristea 
et al., 2015; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011), targeting different levels of information processing 
as approach-avoidance (Becker et al., 2016), attention (G. R. A. Ferrari et al., 2016), or 
memory (Vrijsen et al., 2014). Among the most promising CBM techniques for depression 
are paradigms that aim at modifying interpretation tendencies (for review, see Menne-
Lothmann et al., 2014). These paradigms train the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
stimuli or scenarios in a benign rather than a negative way, and can roughly be divided 
into three different groups. First, the homograph paradigm, in which single words are 
used that carry different meanings (e.g., stroke). Second, the ambiguous scenario (AS) 
paradigm, in which ambiguous scenarios are described in a couple of sentences. These 
scenarios can be resolved by an additional word, which is either benign or negative 
and provides an interpretation of the scenario. Third, the Word-Sentence Association 
Paradigm (WSAP), where an ambiguous sentence is presented, shortly followed by a 
benign or negative word. Participants are required to indicate whether sentence and 
word belong together by pressing a corresponding button. The WSAP differs from the 
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AS paradigm in the length of the described scenarios, as they only consist of a single, 
brief sentence. As a result, it is possible to reduce the presentation time of these stimuli 
and thus to present more stimuli (for a more extended overview see, Möbius, Tendolkar, 
Lohner, Baltussen, & Becker, 2015).
The WSAP has mostly been used to assess and modify maladaptive interpretation 
tendencies in anxious individuals (Amir et al., 2010; Amir & Taylor, 2012; Beard & Amir, 
2008). In a first assessment study in individuals with heightened depressive symptoms, 
Cowden Hindash and Amir (2012) showed that dysphoric participants tend to endorse 
negative interpretations of ambiguous sentences more often compared to healthy 
controls, and tend to be quicker in endorsing these negative interpretations. Building 
on these results, we conducted a first study in an unselected student sample to 
investigate whether these interpretation tendencies can be modified by means of an 
adapted version of the WSAP, the Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression 
(IMP-D; Möbius et al., 2015). To this end, we presented negative and benign word-
sentence combinations and provided feedback to the participants’ reaction. During 
the training, reinforcing feedback (i.e., the word correct) was provided if participants 
accepted benign word-sentence combinations and rejected negative combinations, 
while punishing feedback (i.e., the word incorrect) was provided for all other reactions. 
In two experiments, we demonstrated that a single training session with the IMP-D is 
sufficient to induce healthy interpretation tendencies. In more detail, participants who 
received the training learned to accept benign interpretations of ambiguous sentences 
more often compared to participants receiving the opposite training contingencies or a 
no-feedback control group. In addition, one of two experiments revealed that they also 
became quicker in making this interpretation (Möbius et al., 2015; experiment 1). 
However, strengthening positive interpretation tendencies did not affect emotional 
reactions to a subsequent laboratory stressor (Möbius et al., 2015), possibly as the 
healthy sample of this study may not have been sufficiently affected by the stressor 
for the training to elicit differential effects on stress-responses between groups. It is 
conceivable that such effects might be found only in more emotionally vulnerable 
samples. In line with this view, Becker and colleagues (2016) demonstrated a stress 
attenuating effect of a CBM (approach-avoidance) training only in a subsample of 
dysphoric participants, while a healthy subsample did not display attenuated levels of 
stress-responses.
Another possible factor, which might be responsible for the absence of stress 
attenuating effects, is the explicit feedback used in the IMP-D consisting of a single 
word displayed after every reaction. A few CBM studies compared the effects of explicit 
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training forms, where individuals are aware of the training contingency, to more implicit 
training paradigms (Grafton et al., 2014; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Wiers, Eberl, 
Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). While these studies show that explicit training 
procedures are effective in modifying biases, and that an explicit feedback might 
even result in stronger bias changes as compared to implicit feedback (Krebs et al., 
2010), these explicit training procedures are not necessarily more effective in reducing 
symptomatology (Wiers et al., 2011), and might even be less suited in attenuating 
emotional vulnerability (Grafton et al., 2014).
Another reason to consider implicit training procedures is to reduce demand effects 
(e.g., Nichols & Maner, 2008). Explicit feedback more easily enables participants to guess 
the correct reaction pattern during the training task, so that changes in bias could rather 
reflect demand characteristics than an actual learning process. Yet another reason to 
examine less explicit feedback procedures, especially for depressed individuals, is their 
intensified reaction to punishment (Castro-Rodrigues & Oliveira-Maia, 2013) and their 
generally heightened sensitivity to negative feedback (for review, see Eshel & Roiser, 
2010). Based on these considerations, we decided to test an implicit training variant 
in the current study, instead of the explicit feedback procedure used in the previous 
experiment. 
Therefore, this study investigated whether the IMP-D is able to alter maladaptive 
interpretation tendencies in an emotionally vulnerable but otherwise healthy sample. 
By closely following the design of our previous study (Möbius et al., 2015), we aimed at 
replicating the findings in a sample of dysphoric individuals, while implementing a less 
direct form of feedback. We compared participants from the positive training (PT-group), 
who received a training to reinforce healthy interpretation tendencies, to a control 
training (i.e., valence-unrelated feedback). Participants of the PT-group were expected 
to more often and more quickly perform the reinforced reactions (i.e., accepting benign 
interpretations and rejecting negative interpretations) and less frequently and more 
slowly perform the opposite reaction pattern. We further expected that these training 
effects would be reflected in differential reactions to a subsequent laboratory stressor 
(i.e., challenging memory task), whereby a drop in mood would be attenuated in the 
PT-group as compared to the control group.
Finally, as a recent meta-analytical review has suggested that for CBM paradigms, 
which heavily rely on verbal processing to modify interpretation tendencies, mental 
imagery plays an important role (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), we wanted to further 
explore in how far these abilities are related to the performance of the IMP-D. First, we 
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investigated whether the trait tendency of participants to use visual imagery predicts 
initial interpretation tendencies. Beyond that, we also assessed whether training effects 
of the IMP-D affects the ability to imagine prospective positive and negative scenarios.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants. For this study 98 participants were invited, who had a BDI-II score between 
9 and 25 during the pre-screening (cutoff scores in line with Mastikhina & Dobson, 2017; 
Wells & Beevers, 2010). As 21 of these participants no longer met these criteria during 
the actual experiment, we excluded them from further analyses. Data from two more 
participants were unavailable due to a computer error. See Table 5.1 for an overview of 
the demographic variables.
Materials
Questionnaires. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) was administered 
as a screening instrument and in order to assess individual differences in depressive 
characteristics. This questionnaire consists of 21 items, rated on a 4-point scale. The 
resulting sum score ranges between 0 and 63, with higher scores indicating stronger 
presence of depressive symptoms. Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was good (α = .81).
The trait scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1989) 
was used to assess individual levels of trait anxiety. On 20 items, participants are asked 
to indicate their general level of anxiety on a 4-point scale, resulting in total scores 
between 20 and 80, while higher scores represent more trait anxiety. Cronbach’s alpha 
of this scale was high (α = .90).
Individual trait levels of positive and negative affect were assessed by means of the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988). The scale consists of two 
subscales (positive affect and negative affect), with sum scores ranging between 5 and 
50. Reliability values for the PANAS were acceptable to good (PA: α = .82, NA: α = .78).
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Ferring & Filipp, 1996; Franck et al., 2008) was used to 
estimate individual levels of self-esteem. This scale consists of 10 items, which are rated 
on a 4-point scale, with total scores ranging between 0 and 30. Higher scores represent 
higher levels of self-esteem. In the current sample the reliability of this scale was good 
(α = .88).
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To assess the individual tendency to use visual imagery in daily life, we administered 
the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). On 12 
items, participants are asked to indicate on a 5-point scale in how far the item applies to 
them. The higher the resulting sum score (range: 12 to 60), the stronger the tendency to 
implement visual imagery in daily life. Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable (α = .70).
To get an estimate of changes in mood state throughout the experiment, six 10-point 
Likert scales were presented. Participants were instructed to indicate on each of these 
items (i.e., frustration, happy, nervous, relaxed, sad, content) in how far they felt the 
emotion in the current moment. After mirroring negative items, a mean score was 
calculated ranging between 1 and 10, with higher scores representing a more positive 
mood state. In the mood scale after the memory task we also presented a separate item 
to assess whether participants attributed their performance during the memory task to 
themselves or to the situation.
Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D). The IMP-D was 
administered as described in Möbius et al. (2015) with a different feedback procedure. 
During the pre- and post-assessment, a black fixation-cross appeared on a white screen 
for 500 ms, followed by an ambiguous sentence. After 2500 ms, a negative or benign 
word was presented in the middle of the screen. Participants were asked to indicate 
as fast as possible whether sentence and word were related by pressing a designated 
button on the keyboard. 
To make the training more implicit, the written feedback after each training trial was 
replaced by a feedback-bar at the right side of the screen. After correct responses, the 
bar slightly increased in height and turned green, while after an incorrect response the 
bar slightly decreased in size and turned first yellow and then red. Importantly, clear 
changes of the feedback-bar required several consecutive correct/incorrect responses. 
Participants were instructed to aim at letting the bar increase by means of their reactions. 
Participants in the PT-condition received this reinforcing feedback when they accepted 
benign interpretations and rejected negative interpretations. The amount of reinforcing 
feedback of an individual participant from the control condition was matched with 
the feedback of a participant in the PT-group. Hereby, the pattern of feedback was 
unrelated to their actual reaction. This yoked-control procedure was chosen to keep the 
absolute amount of positive feedback constant across groups, while the feedback was 
only related to the responses in the PT-condition and thus only supported learning of 
the contingency in this group.
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The whole IMP-D started with 10 practice trials, followed by 32 pre-assessment trials. 
Thereafter, the training started with 136 trials in total, of which 10 were filler trials. Finally, 
the post-assessment, consisting of 32 trials, was presented. Different sentences were 
presented during the individual blocks (i.e., pre-assessment, training, post-assessment).
Stressful memory task. As in the previous study (Möbius et al., 2015) we administered 
an unannounced memory task. All sentences of the post-assessment of the IMP-D were 
presented, combined either with the same word as during the post-assessment, or 
with a different word. First, a black fixation cross was presented on the white screen, 
followed by a single sentence and a word. Participants had to indicate whether they 
have seen this combination during the previous task (i.e., during the post-assessment 
of the IMP-D) or not. Similar to the first study, a time limit to react was set to 1500 ms to 
induce stress in participants. Valence of trials (i.e., benign, negative) was kept constant 
across old and new word-sentence combinations.
Prospective Imagery Task (PIT). The PIT (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; Stöber, 
2000) was administered to investigate whether potential effects of the IMP-D transfer to 
the ability of imagining positive or negative scenarios. During this task, 10 positive and 
10 negative items were presented describing future scenarios. Participants were asked 
to imagine these scenarios and to rate the vividness of these mental images on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Sum-scores were calculated for both subscales (i.e., positive, negative) 
ranging between 5 and 50, with higher scores representing more vivid images. 
Procedure. Eligible participants were invited to the lab where they provided informed 
consent, after which they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (i.e., PT-
group, control). Participants were asked to first fill out the trait questionnaires, before 
starting with the IMP-D, consisting of the pre-assessment, the training, and the post-
assessment. Next, participants were asked to do the memory task, before the PIT was 
administered. Mood state was measured before the IMP-D, after the IMP-D, and after the 
memory task in order to investigate changes in response to the training and in response 
to the challenging memory task, respectively. At the end, participants were paid and 
fully debriefed.
Design and analyses. Data preparation followed the same steps as described in Möbius 
et al. (2015). As BDI scores were positively skewed, they were log transformed. In order 
to delete outliers, trials with latencies of the IMP-D faster than 300ms or slower than 
3500ms were removed (for a comparable procedure, see Beard & Amir, 2009). This cut-
off is roughly equivalent to the slowest and fastest 3 percent of all reaction times (RT). 
Of the remaining RT, median scores were calculated for each participant per valence 
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(i.e., benign, negative), reaction (i.e., reject, accept) and time point (i.e., pre- and post-
assessment). To test for a training effect of the IMP-D, these scores were subjected 
to a 2 (condition: PT-group, control) x 2 (valence) x 2 (reaction) x 2 (time) repeated 
measures (RM) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with BDI scores serving as covariate. 
Second, percentages of accepting benign and negative interpretations were calculated. 
Higher percentages of acceptations are thereby equivalent to the rejection of the same 
interpretation. A training effect was tested by means of a 2 (condition: PT, control) x 2 
(time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) RM ANCOVA, 
with BDI scores as covariate. Mood scores were subjected to a 2 (condition: PT-group, 
control) x 2 (time: pre-stressor, post-stressor) RM ANCOVA, with BDI as covariate, to test 
for a beneficial effect on mood in response to the challenging memory task. Finally, a 2 
(condition: PT-group, control) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) RM ANCOVA on vividness 
ratings of the PIT was conducted to test for a transference effect of the IMP-D training 
on imagery ability. The BDI was added as covariate.
Results
Sample characteristics. The two groups (PT: n = 40; control: n = 36) differed significantly 
on the BDI (t(74) = 2.46, p = .016), STAI (t(74) = 2.43, p = .018), and PANAS negative affect 
(t(74) = 3.19, p = .002), whereby participants in the PT-group scored significantly higher 
on these questionnaires. All other variables did not differ between conditions (p > .1). 
See Table 5.1 for sample characteristics.
Initial interpretation bias. Participants of the two groups did not initially differ either 
in their endorsement rates of benign and negative interpretations (all p > .65) or in their 
initial response latencies (all p > .17). Subsequent paired-sample t tests indicated that 
the sample was characterized by a positive bias before the training, as demonstrated by 
higher endorsement rates for benign interpretations as compared to the endorsement 
rates for negative interpretations, t(75) = 8.08, p < .001, d = 0.93. Beyond that participants 
were initially faster in endorsing as compared to rejecting benign interpretations, t(73) 
= 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.48, while the response latencies on negative interpretations did 
not differ, t(74) = 1.09, p = .278. See Table 5.2 for untransformed group-mean RT.
Interpretation training
Decisions. A 2 (condition: PT, control) x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) 
RM ANCOVA on the percentage of endorsements, with BDI as covariate was conducted 
to test for a training effect of the IMP-D on decisions. This analysis revealed no differential 
change in interpretation tendencies between groups, F(1, 73) = .01, p = .942. Only the 
main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 73) = 8.14, p = .006, η2 = .10,  indicating a 
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generally higher percentage of endorsements for positive interpretations as compared 
to negative interpretations in this sample. This effect was marginally significantly 
moderated by BDI, F(1, 73) = 3.51, p = .065, η2 = .05. All other main and interaction 
effects were not significant (p > .2). 
Latencies. The training effects on RT level were evaluated by a 2 (condition: PT, control) 
x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: benign, negative) x 2 (decision: endorse, reject) RM 
ANCOVA, with BDI as covariate. The critical 4-way interaction was not significant, 
indicating no differential change between the two groups on reaction time-level, F(1, 
67) = .02, p = .896. Besides a significant time by group interaction, F(1, 67) = 4.82, p 
= .032, η2 = .07, no main or interaction effect reached significance (p > .12). Post hoc 
tests indicated that participants in the PT became slower in endorsing and rejecting 
both benign and negative scenarios (endorsement of negative: t(37) = 2.62, p = .013; 
endorsement of benign: t(39) = 3.94, p < .001; rejection of negative: t(39) = 2.91, p = .006; 
rejection of benign: t(39) = 3.45, p = .001). Participants in the control group did not show 
this change in latencies.  See Table 5.2 for untransformed RTs.
Changes in mood state. Prior to the training, mood state did not differ between 
groups, t(74) = 0.51, p = .610. Changes in mood states were investigated by two separate 
RM ANCOVAs on the mood scale with BDI as covariate. The first 2 (time: pre-training, 
post-training) x 2 (condition: PT, control) RM ANCOVA did not reveal a significant main 
or interaction effect (p > .6), indicating that the two groups neither differed in mood 
state prior to training, nor did their mood state change differently during training. 
More interestingly for the current study, this analysis was repeated with the mood 
scales before and after the challenging memory task. This RM ANCOVA did not show a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 73) = 0.03, p = .868, indicating that the training did not 
affect stress responses. However, there was also no significant time effect, F(1, 73) = 0.08, 
p = .927, suggesting that the memory task did not induce stress in participants. 
Group differences in imagery. Finally, a 2 (condition: PT, control) x 2 (valence: positive, 
negative) RM ANCOVA, on the imagery ratings of the PIT was conducted. BDI was entered 
as covariate into the analysis. The critical two way interaction was not significant, F(1, 69) 
= 1.4, p = .240, showing no transference effect of the training to the vividness ratings. 
Only the effect of valence, F(1, 69) = 10.44, p = .002, η2 = .13, and the interaction of valence 
with BDI scores,  F(1, 69) = 9.31, p = .003, η2 = .12, was significant. Positive scenarios 
were rated as more vivid (M = 36.58, SD = 5.39) as compared to negative scenarios (M = 
35.07, SD = 6.69), while higher BDI scores were only related to lower vividness ratings of 
positive scenarios, r(72) = -.32, p = .006.
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Discussion
We set out to investigate whether initial interpretation tendencies of dysphoric 
individuals can be modified by means of the IMP-D, and whether this intervention 
attenuates subsequent stress responses. To this end, we repeated the design of our 
previous study (Möbius et al., 2015) in a sample with heightened levels of depressive 
symptoms. In addition, feedback on correct and incorrect responses was provided in a 
subtler way, by means of a bar diagram which constantly indicated the current amount 
of correct and incorrect reactions.
In contrast to the first study (Möbius et al., 2015), we did not succeed in modifying initial 
interpretation tendencies. The two most obvious reasons for these findings might be 
ascribed to the modifications of the previous study. Either the IMP-D is not suited to 
modify interpretation tendencies in a sample with heightened depression scores, or the 
type of feedback (i.e., implicit feedback) is not suited to induce a shift in bias. In order 
to exclude one of these two alternative explanations, we decided to additionally test a 
third group of dysphoric students, while applying the same type of direct feedback as 
used in the previous study (Möbius et al., 2015). 
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants. Thirty participants were invited, who had a BDI-II score between 9 and 25 
on the pre-screening. Of those, five participants were excluded from analyses, as they 
no longer met these criteria during the actual experiment. See Table 5.1 for an overview 
of the demographic variables.
Materials. Only differences to the first experiment will be described here. 
Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D). As described in Möbius 
et al. (2015), direct feedback of the performance of participants was given during the 
training trials. Participants received reinforcing feedback (i.e., the word ‘correct’) on 
trials where they accepted benign interpretations and where they rejected negative 
interpretations. For all other reactions punishing feedback was provided (i.e., the word 
‘incorrect’).
Procedure. The same procedure as in the first experiment was followed, besides that 
participants were only assigned to a single condition with direct feedback (i.e., PT-
explicit).
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Design and analyses. Data preparation steps were kept identical. All previous analyses 
were repeated with the third group added. A training effect was tested by means of 
a 3 (condition: PT, control, PT-explicit) x 2 (time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) x 2 
(valence: benign, negative) RM ANCOVA, with log-transformed BDI scores as covariate. 
Median RTs were subjected to a 3 (condition: PT-group, control, PT-explicit) x 2 (valence) 
x 2 (reaction) x 2 (time) RM ANOVA, to test for a training effect of the IMP-D on response 
latencies. Mood scores were subjected to a 3 (condition: PT-group, control, PT-explicit) x 
2 (time: pre-stressor, post-stressor) RM ANOVA to test for a beneficial effect on mood in 
response to the challenging memory task. Finally, a 3 (condition: PT-group, control, PT-
explicit) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) RM ANOVA on vividness ratings of the PIT was 
conducted to test for a transference effect of the IMP-D training on imagery.
Results
Sample characteristics. After adding the PT-explicit to the analyses, the three groups 
still differed on the STAI and NA, with participants in the PT-group (i.e., implicit training) 
scoring significantly higher on these questionnaires. Scores on the BDI-II did marginally 
differ between the groups, with the control group showing the lowest scores. However, 
participants from the PT-explicit additionally scored higher on RSES and negative mood 
state prior to the training. See Table 5.1 for sample characteristics.
Initial interpretation bias. Initial interpretation tendencies were comparable between 
groups regarding the endorsement rates (all p > .47), as well as regarding the response 
latencies (all p > .35). Also after adding the PT-explicit to the analysis, the initial positive 
interpretation bias characterized by higher endorsement rates for benign as compared 
to negative interpretations, t(100) = 10.17, p < .001, d = 1.01, was present in the whole 
sample. Moreover, participants were also faster in endorsing as compared to rejecting 
benign interpretations, t(97) = 5.58, p < .001, d = 0.57, and faster in rejecting as compared 
to endorsing negative interpretations, t(99) = 2.26, p = .026, d = 0.23. See Table 5.2 for 
untransformed mean RT. These initial interpretation tendencies were not correlated 
with the spontaneous use of imagery scores (all p > .29).
Interpretation training.
Decisions. A 3 (condition: PT, control, PT-explicit) x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: 
benign, negative) RM ANCOVA on the percentage of endorsements, with BDI as 
covariate revealed a significant 3-way interaction effect, F(2, 97) = 4.61, p = .012, η2 = 
.09. Interestingly, the interaction of time and valence was related to BDI scores, F(1, 97) 
= 5.86, p = .017, η2 = .06.  Subsequent paired-samples t tests showed that only the PT-
explicit group endorsed more positive interpretations, t(24) = 2.86, p = .009, d = 0.57, and 
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endorsed fewer negative interpretations, t(24) 3.51 p = .002, d = 0.71. All other paired 
comparisons were not significant (p > .24). Thereby, higher BDI ratings were related to 
greater reductions in endorsement rates of negative interpretations only, r(25) = .46, p 
= .022, but not to benign interpretations, r(25) = -.34, p = .093. See Table 5.2 for means.
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of all groups with significance testing.
PT
(n = 40)
Control
(n = 36)
PT-expl
(n = 25)
p (3way) pMean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Gender
Female
Male
31
9
28
8
20
5
.969 .977
Nationality
Dutch
German
25
15
25
11
22
3
.083 .524
Age 20.95 (2.70) 21.53 (5.74) 22.04 (4.38) .616 .570
BDI-II 16.63 (5.13) 14.06 (4.50) 16.44 (7.06) .062 .016
STAI 51.23 (7.75) 46.58 (8.93) 45.40 (11.44) .025 .018
SUIS 38.63 (6.96) 40.92 (6.27) 40.60 (7.18) .293 .138
PA 25.25 (6.41) 27.50 (5.42) 28.04 (5.93) .123 .103
NA 26.58 (6.30) 22.25 (5.43) 22.64 (7.40) .007 .002
RSES 14.40 (5.07) 14.44 (5.25) 17.36 (4.65) .045 .970
Mood Scales 5.27 (1.09) 5.42 (1.38) 4.63 (0.91) .031 .610
Note. PT = Positivity training; Control = Control group; PT-expl = Explicit form of positivity training; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory Second Edition; STAI = Trait measure of the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; SUIS = Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale; PA = positive affect scale of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; NA = negative affect scale of the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; RSES = Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; Mood Scales before the training.
Latencies. A 3 (condition: PT, control, PT-explicit) x 2 (time: pre, post) x 2 (valence: 
benign, negative) x 2 (decision: endorse, reject) RM ANCOVA with BDI as covariate was 
conducted to investigate training effects on the level of RT. A group by time interaction 
was found, F(2, 86) = 4.89, p = .01, η2 = .10, as well as a 3-way interaction of condition, 
valence and decision, F(2, 86) = 3.78, p = .027, η2 = .08. However, the crucial 4-way 
interaction was still not significant, indicating no differential changes as a function of 
training on latency level, F(2, 86) = .02, p = .977.
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Table 5.2. Mean (SD) endorsement rates and RT on the IMP-D.
PT 
(n = 40)
Control 
(n = 36)
PT-expl
(n = 25)
Decisions in mean percentage (SD)
Pre-assess Benign 62.82 (15.38) 65.66 (18.67) 65.74 (16.45)
Negative 42.59 (17.77) 41.34 (17.25) 37.38 (14.72)
Post-assess Benign 65.12 (18.56) 69.47 (15.87) 75.37 (15.22)
Negative 41.34 (25.13) 38.92 (16.19) 23.07 (18.91)
RT in mean (SD)
Pre-assess Benign Accept 948 (427) 1059 (440) 976 (414)
Reject 1166 (532) 1197 (595) 1212 (442)
Negative Accept 1142 (511) 1204 (520) 1179 (493)
Reject 1095 (491) 1143 (504) 1019 (440)
Post-assess Benign Accept 1180 (363) 1098 (346) 912 (238)
Reject 1419 (488) 1230 (418) 1093 (486)
Negative Accept 1280 (401) 1217 (513) 1101 (355)
Reject 1251 (397) 1243 (450) 947 (312)
Note. PT = Positivity training; Control = Control group; PT-expl = Positive training with explicit feedback.
Changes in mood state. Prior to the training, the mood state of the PT-explicit was 
significantly worse as compared to the control condition, F(2, 98) = 3.60, p = .031, η2 = 
.07. The subsequent 3 (condition: PT, control, PT-explicit) x 2 (time: pre-training, post-
training) RM ANCOVA on mood scores revealed a significant interaction effect, F(2, 97) 
= 3.18, p = .046, η2 = .06. Additional paired-sample t tests showed that while mood 
remained stable in the PT, t(39) = 0.46, p = .646, and control group, t(35) = 0.88, p = .381, 
it even deteriorated in the PT-explicit group, t(24) = 3.25, p = .003, d = 0.65. Subsequent 
paired-sample t tests showed that even though the mood was worse in the PT-explicit 
before the training, mood state further deteriorated during the training, t(24) = 3.25, p 
= .003, d = 0.65. In contrast, mood remained stable in the PT, t(39) = 0.46, p = .646, and 
control group, t(35) = 0.88, p = .381.
Thus, participants in the PT-explicit had significantly worse mood ratings before the 
challenging memory task as compared to the control condition, t(59) = 3.52, p = .001, 
d = 0.92, and to the PT, t(63) = 3.71, p < .001, d = 0.97. A subsequent 3 (condition: PT, 
control, PT-explicit) x 2 (time: pre-stress, post-stress) RM ANCOVA on these mood ratings 
did only reveal a main effect of condition, F(2, 97) = 7.55, p = .001, η2 = .14, while all other 
main and interaction effects did not reach the significance level (ps > .5). This indicated 
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that the mood ratings of the individual groups did not drop, with the PT-explicit still 
having worse mood scores after the task as compared to the control group, t(59) = 3.64, 
p = .001, d = 0.95, and compared to the PT, t(63) = 3.52, p = .001, d = 0.92.
Figure 5.1. Changes in mean mood scores (SE) per condition. PT = Positivity training; Control 
= Control group; PT-expl = Positive training with explicit feedback.
Group differences in imagery. Adding the third condition to the 3 (condition: PT, 
control, PT-explicit) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) RM ANCOVA on vividness ratings 
revealed identical results. While the two way interaction was not significant, F(2, 93) = 
0.66, p = .521, an effect of valence, F(1, 93) = 13.82, p < .001, η2 = .13, and an interaction 
of valence with BDI scores,  F(1, 93) = 12.31, p = .001, η2 = .12, appeared to be present. 
Positive scenarios were rated as more vivid (M = 36.24, SD = 5.85) as compared to 
negative scenarios (M = 34.77, SD = 6.99), with increasing BDI scores being related to 
lower vividness ratings of only positive scenarios, r(97) = -.34, p = .001, but not negative 
scenarios, r(97) = .06, p = .589.
104
Chapter 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate whether we can modify initial interpretation 
tendencies of dysphoric individuals by administering a single-session training with 
the IMP-D, and whether this training attenuates emotional vulnerability in response 
to a subsequent challenging memory task. A training effect was only present in the 
group receiving explicit feedback, suggesting that interpretation tendencies of 
dysphoric individuals can actually be modified by means of the IMP-D, while explicit 
feedback seems to be required to modify initial interpretation tendencies in a single 
session intervention. Participants receiving this form of training endorsed negative 
interpretations less frequently and endorsed benign interpretations more often. 
It is important to note that these changes only affected decisions, but not response 
latencies. This is in contrast to the findings from our previous study in an unselected 
sample (Möbius et al., 2015), where training effects after explicit feedback were found 
on both, decision level and response latency level. Possibly, in a dysphoric sample a 
single training session might be too brief to reliably affect the more automatic reaction 
time-level.
The current sample of dysphoric individuals started out with a positivity bias, 
characterized by 1) higher endorsement rates for benign as compared to negative 
interpretations, and 2) quicker endorsement reactions to benign interpretations and 
quicker rejections of negative interpretations. These results are in line with the study 
by Cowden Hindash and Amir (2012) where dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants 
displayed higher endorsement rates for benign interpretations compared to negative 
interpretations. However, it seems like this positivity bias is less pronounced in a sample 
with heightened BDI scores, when looking at the means of the current study and our 
previous study in an unselected student sample (Möbius et al., 2015).
In line with the first study (Möbius et al., 2015), we found a drop in positive mood in 
response to the training. Interestingly, this drop only occurred in the training group that 
received the direct form of feedback. It seems unlikely that the monotonicity of the 
training procedure accounts for the differential mood changes, as the duration of the 
training was identical in all three groups and as the more indirect feedback does not 
have a more entertaining, game-like character. It is more conceivable that the explicit, 
negative feedback on incorrect responses might have resulted in a decrease in positive 
mood, especially as depressive individuals are known to be oversensitive to explicit 
negative feedback (Eshel & Roiser, 2010).
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It is also conceivable that the deterioration of mood in response to the explicit feedback 
condition is not merely an epiphenomenon of the task, but is a relevant aspect for a 
successful change in interpretation tendencies. In analogous manner to the cognitive 
control training by Siegle, Ghinassi and Thase (2007), negative affect might be a key 
component. Mild levels of negative affect can activate the execution of cognitive 
control necessary to regulate mood, and at the same time also affect the performance 
of the task at hand. The explicit feedback in the current study might have elicited slight 
levels of frustration, which were sufficient enough to achieve changes in interpretation 
tendencies. Summarizing, in order to investigate whether slight levels of negative affect 
are required for a successful bias change to occur, alternative feedback procedures 
should be tested which induce an optimal mood state for learning. If, on the other 
hand elevated levels of negative affect are only a consequence of the training but not 
a prerequisite for the bias modification, feedback procedures should be used that do 
not induce such a drop in mood, for instance by implementing negative reinforcing 
feedback (i.e., the absence of positive feedback) instead of punishing feedback (e.g., 
presenting the word ‘incorrect’).
As in the previous study, the IMP-D did not modify emotional vulnerability in response 
to the challenging memory task, raising the question whether this procedure is suited 
to attenuate stress responses at all. However, it is conceivable that the stressor was 
not intense enough to produce any changes in mood in response to the memory task. 
Interestingly, participants receiving the explicit feedback displayed the lowest mood 
scores before and after this challenging memory task. In other words, after a drop in 
mood in response to the explicit training condition, this group did neither show an 
increase in mood indicative of a recovery process, nor a decrease in mood indicative 
of a stress induction. However, it remains to be investigated whether these sustained 
lower ratings point to an ineffective stress-task, or to the absence of stress recovery in 
this group.
Moreover, it is possible that a single training session is insufficient for a transference 
effect from a change in bias to emotional vulnerability, but that more sessions and 
training trials are required as recommended by Menne-Lothmann and colleagues 
(2014). When increasing the number of training sessions, differential effects of the 
explicit and implicit feedback procedure on the level of emotional vulnerability should 
be investigated as well. In a single session intervention Grafton et al. (2014) investigated 
the effects of an attention bias training for anxiety and showed that an explicit training 
(i.e., participants were aware of the training contingency) resulted only in a bias change, 
106
Chapter 5
but not in attenuated emotional vulnerability. It remains to be tested whether a training 
with multiple sessions will show transferences effects from bias change to emotional 
vulnerability, for explicit as well as for implicit training modalities. 
In the current study, we were also interested in the role of mental imagery abilities 
for the interpretation modification training. We found no relation between the trait of 
making use of mental imagery and initial interpretation tendencies. It is conceivable 
that the brief presentation of verbal scenarios during the IMP-D, without any explicit 
instructions to visually imagine the written scenarios, does not require mental imagery 
abilities to correctly perform this task. Moreover, the single session training with the 
IMP-D did also not differentially affect the vividness ratings on the prospective imagery 
task, which is in line with the absence of a training effect on mood ratings. We speculate 
that altering the training by increasing the number of sessions or by adding instructions 
to visually imagine the described scenarios as recommended by Menne-Lothmann 
and colleagues (2014), might be necessary to induce a change in mental imagery 
abilities, which would than probably be reflected in attenuated emotional vulnerability 
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; T. J. Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012; Pictet, 
Jermann, & Ceschi, 2016).
Finally, we want to acknowledge several limitations of the current study, which 
warrant caution when interpreting our results. First of all, participants were only 
randomly assigned to two ‘implicit’ groups, as the explicit training condition was added 
afterwards. Hence, order effects might account for the current results. The same is 
true for the confounding trait characteristics, even though no group differences were 
found on initial bias measures of the IMP-D. As already suggested above, it would be 
important to increase the number of training sessions in order to reliably assess changes 
in interpretation tendencies as well as transference effects to emotional vulnerability 
or imagery abilities. Moreover, the difference in effects of explicit and more implicit 
feedback on change in bias and symptoms provide an interesting venue to further 
investigate. These steps seem to be necessary to take before turning to patient samples. 
In that context, the potential risk of mood decline in response to direct feedback needs 
to receive specific attention.
Summarizing, this study indicates that it is possible to strengthen a healthy interpretation 
bias in dysphoric individuals by means of the IMP-D. Before investigating this paradigm 
in clinical samples, future research is warranted and should investigate alternative 
feedback procedures, which are able to reliably modify maladaptive interpretation 
tendencies.


CHAPTER 6
Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Modulates the Impact of a Negative Mood Induction
Based on Möbius, M., Lacomblé, L., Meyer, T., Schutter, D. J. L. G., Gielkens, T., 
Becker, E.S., Tendolkar, I., & van Eijndhoven, P. (2017). Repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation modulates the impact of a negative mood induction. Social 
Cognitive and Aﬀective Neuroscience, 12, 526-533.
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ABSTRACT
High frequency repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) over the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been found to alleviate depressive 
symptoms. However, the mechanisms driving these effects are still poorly understood. 
In the current study, we tested the idea that this intervention protects against negative 
mood shifts following emotional provocation. We furthermore explored changes in EEG 
activity (frontal alpha asymmetry) and effects on attentional processing (emotional 
Stroop). To this end, 23 healthy individuals participated in two sessions separated by 
one week, whereby they once received 30 min of 10Hz rTMS stimulation (3000 pulses) 
at 110% of the individual resting motor threshold, and once sham stimulation. Then, 
negative mood was induced using sad movie clips. The results revealed a significantly 
stronger mood decline following rTMS compared to sham stimulation. No changes 
were observed in frontal alpha asymmetry and attentional processing. Our findings are 
at odds with the view that high frequency rTMS over the left DLPFC directly protects 
against the induction of negative mood, but rather suggest that it enhances the effects 
of emotional provocation. Possibly, in healthy young individuals, this stimulation 
protocol heightens susceptibility to mood induction procedures in general.
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Depression is expected to become the leading cause of disabilities worldwide with 
about 20 percent of the population suffering from a mood disorder at least once in a 
lifetime (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2012; Kessler et al., 2005). Even more alarmingly, depression 
is characterized by high relapse rates, which increase steeply with every subsequent 
depressive episode, even following psychotherapy (Steinert et al., 2014). These findings 
underline the importance of improving existing treatments and emphasize the necessity 
of effective prevention instruments to interrupt this vicious circle.
One technique that has gained attention as a potential treatment adjunct for depression 
and as a tool for relapse prevention is repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). 
rTMS is a non-invasive brain stimulation technique, whereby trains of brief magnetic 
fields are generated in a coil to induce electric fields in the nerve tissue underneath the 
coil, leading to neuronal depolarization (Hallett, 2007). When applied at high frequencies 
of > 10 Hz (HF), rTMS has been shown to increase neuronal excitability of the stimulated 
site, which outlasts the stimulation itself (P. B. Fitzgerald et al., 2006). Results from 
meta-analyses have demonstrated that HF rTMS to the left frontal cortex ameliorates 
depressive symptoms with comparable effect sizes as observed in psychotherapy and 
pharmacological treatments (for review, see J. Chen et al., 2013; P. B. Fitzgerald et al., 
2003; Schutter, 2009). 
In healthy samples, early studies found an increase in negative mood after stimulation 
of the left prefrontal cortex (George et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1997; Pascual-Leone, 
Catalá, & Pascual, 1996), while more recent studies did not detect any changes in mood 
as a result of the stimulation itself (Baeken et al., 2014; Baeken, Leyman, De Raedt, 
Vanderhasselt, & D’haenen, 2006; Baeken et al., 2008; Grisaru, Bruno, & Pridmore, 2001; 
Mosimann, Rihs, Engeler, Fisch, & Schlaepfer, 2000; Moulier et al., 2016; Padberg et al., 
2001). Schaller et al. (2011) demonstrated that several sessions of HF rTMS attenuated 
only depression ratings of healthy individuals as assessed with the Beck Depression 
Inventory, while subjective mood ratings remained stable. A recent review concluded 
that a single session stimulation is not sufficient to directly alter mood states in healthy 
individuals (Remue, Baeken, & De Raedt, 2016). 
Summarizing, despite the mood enhancing effects of HF rTMS in patient samples, the 
underlying working mechanisms are not yet fully understood. Studies investigating 
the effects of DLPFC stimulation on cognitive and emotional processing found that HF 
rTMS over the left DLPFC can improve task-switching abilities of depressed individuals 
(Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Baeken, Leyman, & D’Haenen, 2009), and that the same 
protocol can alter attentional processing of emotional stimuli in healthy women (De 
Raedt et al., 2010). In the latter study, the authors used an exogenous cueing task 
112
Chapter 6
that assessed facilitated attentional engagement with angry faces, and difficulties 
disengaging attention from them. Whereas HF stimulation of the right DLPFC resulted 
in impaired disengagement from negative faces, stimulation of the left DLPFC resulted 
in reduced engagement towards these stimuli. Moreover, on the neuronal level, these 
effects were accompanied by changes in PFC activity.
This suggests that rTMS modulates a neuronal network involved in emotion regulation, 
thereby attenuating the negative impact of adverse events. Indeed, the PFC has been 
linked to the regulation of negative emotions in numerous studies (e.g., Johnstone, van 
Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2004, 2002; Phan et al., 2005). 
Summarizing, different lines of research suggest that HF rTMS over the left DLPFC 
ameliorates cognitive functions that have been found to be impaired in depressed 
individuals and have been linked to the emergence and recurrence of depression 
(Hammar & Ardal, 2009; Snyder, 2013). In light of these findings, it is conceivable that 
HF rTMS over the left DLPFC has protective effects against a subsequent negative 
event. Indeed, recent studies have found that HF rTMS over the left DLPFC prior to a 
stress-inducing task attenuates subsequent decreases in heart rate variability (Remue, 
Vanderhasselt, et al., 2016) and stress hormonal responses (Baeken et al., 2014), as 
compared to stimulation over the right DLPFC and/or sham stimulation. Based on these 
considerations, the present study aims at investigating the effects of rTMS stimulation 
over the left DLPFC on affective responses to a negative mood induction and on 
attentional processing, which are both of direct relevance to emotion regulation in 
depression. 
In order to get a better understanding of the neurophysiological effects of rTMS on 
attentional processing and emotion regulation, the electroencephalogram (EEG) is a 
non-invasive way to study electrocortical field potentials recorded over the left and 
right frontal cortex. In particular, examining hemispheric differences in alpha power 
(8-12 Hz) is a commonly used correlate of underlying cortical activity (Coan & Allen, 
2004). Stronger right-sided alpha power (conventionally interpreted as reflecting more 
left-sided brain activity; Gotlib, Ranganath, & Rosenfeld, 1998; Henriques & Davidson, 
1990) is thought to reflect stronger approach and weaker withdrawal motivation, as 
well as stronger positive affect (Nusslock, Walden, & Harmon-Jones, 2015). This marker 
has been linked to current and lifetime depression, as well as to the prospective risk 
to develop depression (for review, see Allen & Reznik, 2015). Moreover, stronger left 
lateralized alpha at rest and in response to emotional provocation has been found to 
predict stronger mood decline and hormonal stress responses (e.g., Papousek et al., 2014; 
Quaedflieg, Meyer, Smulders, & Smeets, 2015). Furthermore, increased left-lateralized 
alpha following neurofeedback attenuates subjective habituation to laboratory stress 
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induction (Quaedflieg et al., 2016). Together, these findings show striking parallels with 
the above-mentioned effects of rTMS over the left DLPFC. Therefore, the current study 
explored whether the potential effects of rTMS on affective responding are accompanied 
by changes in frontal alpha asymmetry. In addition, we also assessed asymmetries in the 
beta band (i.e., 13-30 Hz) as these might be similarly related to the attentional avoidance 
of angry faces (e.g., Schutter, de Weijer, Meuwese, Morgan, & van Honk, 2008; Schutter, 
Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 2001).
This exploratory study investigated whether mood responses to a negative event 
can be modulated by HF rTMS over the left DLPFC, using a counterbalanced within-
subject crossover design. In particular, healthy individuals received a single session of 
10 Hz rTMS, before inducing a negative mood by means of a short movie sequence. 
Compared to a session of sham rTMS, we expected HF rTMS to attenuate mood decline 
in response to the movie. Furthermore, we explored whether these potential effects are 
accompanied by changes in frontal alpha asymmetry, that is, a reduction in relative left 
lateralized alpha. Finally, as stimulation of the DLPFC affects attentional processing of 
emotional faces, an emotional Stroop task (van Honk, Schutter, D’Alfonso, Kessels, & de 
Haan, 2002) was used to assess biased processing of angry and sad faces. In particular, we 
anticipated attenuated interference of emotional (i.e., sad and angry) faces compared to 
neutral faces after HF rTMS than after sham stimulation.  
METHODS
Participants
In this exploratory study, 23 right-handed students participated (Age: M = 21.5, SD = 3.0) 
in return for 50€. Participants were screened for contra-indications to rTMS according to 
the recommendations by the TMS Consensus Group (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-
Leone, 2009, 2011). Prior to inclusion, we screened participants, using the following 
exclusion criteria: (1) metal in cranium, (2) use of psychotropic drugs (e.g., cannabis, 
XTC), (3) a history of severe neurological problems (e.g., epilepsy, head injury or head 
surgery, brain infarction), (4) history of psychiatric disorders, (5) medication use (i.e., 
benzodiazepines, antidepressants and neuroleptica), (6) severe physical illness (e.g., 
heart disease), and (7) pregnancy. Moreover, participants were excluded if they had 
heightened scores (i.e., above 13) on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et 
al., 1996), which was administered during the screening prior to the study. This study 
was conducted in accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the 
local medical ethical committee (CMO Region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands). 
Participants gave written informed consent.
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Material and Instruments
Questionnaires. In order to assess the time-course of affective responding, two 
10-point Likert scales were administered at seven different time points throughout each 
session (see Figure 6.1 for an overview). In analogy to previous studies with a similar 
mood induction procedure (e.g., Vrijsen et al., 2013) we asked participants to indicate 
how happy and how sad they currently felt (anchors: 1 = not at all; 10 = extremely). The 
scales were combined to a sum score, such that higher values represent a more positive 
mood state.
In addition, the German and the Dutch translation of the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule (Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; Watson et al., 1988) were used 
to assess changes in positive (PA) and negative affect (NA) in response to the mood 
induction procedure. These scales were administered twice during each session, first 
at baseline and second after the EEG measure that followed the first mood induction 
movie (see Figure 6.1).
rTMS procedure. Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered using 
a MagStim Rapid2 (Magstim, UK) with a figure-of-eight coil. During the active treatment, 
participants received 60 trains of 5-second 10 Hz stimulation with an inter-train interval 
of 25 seconds. The intensity was set to 110% of the resting motor threshold of the right 
abductor pollicis brevis. The site of stimulation was F3 according to the international 
10-20 system (American Electroencephalographic Society, 1994). We chose for this 
procedure, as it is the most accurate way to identify the DLPFC without using a neuro-
navigation system (P. B. Fitzgerald & Daskalakis, 2012). For the sham-stimulation, these 
parameters were held constant, while only the orientation of the coil was tilted for 45 
degrees away from the cortex. 
Mood induction. The mood induction procedure was adapted from D. A. Fitzgerald 
and colleagues (2011), selecting 3 clips from the movie ‘Sophie’s Choice’ with different 
durations (i.e., 12, 6, and 5 minutes). The first clip was used to induce negative mood, 
while the two shorter clips were presented to boost the negative mood. Participants 
were instructed to place themselves into the position of the main actor in order to allow 
them to fully perceive the negative emotion. 
Resting state EEG. At three time points throughout each session, resting state EEG was 
recorded. Each recording consisted of 4 blocks of 1 min, with alternating instructions 
to keep the eyes closed or open. EEG was measured using a standard 32-channel setup 
(BrainVision QuickAmp, Brain Products) according to the international 10-20 system, 
using 32 electrodes. The signal ground was placed on the nose, the online reference was 
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located at the left mastoid (A1) while the right mastoid (A2) was serving as additional 
recording channel. Four electrodes were placed at the eyes to control for horizontal 
and vertical eye-movement. All electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Data was 
recorded at a frequency of 500 Hz applying a band pass filter of 0.3 – 70 Hz.
For data reduction, all electrodes were re-referenced to the overall mean. Due to 
presence of excessive muscle activity over T7 and T8 in a large proportion of subjects, 
these electrodes were excluded from the average reference. An offline filter with 
1-30Hz was applied, before dividing the signal into 75% overlapping epochs of each 
2 s, and removing epochs carrying artifacts (i.e., amplitude ± 75μV; maximal voltage 
step exceeding 50μV/ms; maximal change in amplitude exceeding 100μV/500ms). A 
Fast-Fourier Transformation (Hanning window: 100% length) was conducted on the 
remaining epochs, and mean values of the FFT were calculated, separately for α (8-12 
Hz) and β (13-30 Hz) frequency bands. A lateralization score for the different frequencies 
was calculated by subtracting the summed signal from the left frontal electrodes (i.e., 
F3, F7, FC5) from the summed signal of the right frontal electrodes (i.e., F4, F8, FC6) 
and dividing this by the sum of these six electrodes. More positive values represent 
relatively stronger right-lateralized power. As previous studies (e.g.; Ben-Simon et al., 
2013; Boytsova & Danko, 2010) suggest that the EEG signal assessed with eyes closed 
represents a different attentional state from eyes open (i.e., invert directed attention 
versus outwards direct attention), eyes-open/eyes closed condition was used as an 
additional within-subjects factor in all subsequent analyses.
Emotional Stroop task. An emotional Stroop task (van Honk et al., 2002) was used to 
assess individual differences in attentional bias for emotional faces. Pictures of oval-
cut faces from 10 different characters (5 female, 5 male), each displaying 3 different 
emotional expressions (i.e., anger, sadness, neutral), were taken from Ekman and Friesen 
(1976). Two versions of each face, one colored in blue and one in yellow, were presented 
on a black background. All combinations were presented twice, resulting in 120 trials. 
Every trial started with a white fixation-cross, replaced by a single face after a random 
interval of 1500-2500ms. Participants had to indicate the color as fast as possible by 
pressing a corresponding button on the keyboard. Latencies above or below 3 SD of 
the individual mean were removed. Bias scores were calculated, separately for sad and 
angry faces, by subtracting the median reaction time on trials with neutral faces from 
the median reaction time on emotional faces. Thus, higher values indicate a stronger 
interference, which indicates an attentional bias towards the respective emotional 
expression.  
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Procedure
Participants were invited to two laboratory sessions separated by one week. The 
procedure of both sessions was nearly identical, except that they once underwent 
real rTMS and once sham TMS (order was counterbalanced across participants). After 
providing informed consent, they were given the set of questionnaires including the 
PANAS. This set of questionnaires also contained the BDI and the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), which 
are not reported here. Subsequently, the baseline EEG was administered followed by 
the (sham) rTMS stimulation. Next, the second EEG assessment took place after which 
the first mood induction movie was presented on the computer screen. Subsequently, 
the last EEG assessment took place, followed by the PANAS and one of the two mood 
boosters (counterbalanced across sessions), and finally the emotional Stroop task. During 
each session, mood scales were administered at baseline (T1), after the stimulation (T2), 
after the first EEG assessment (T3; about 10 minutes after stimulation), after the first 
mood induction movie (T4, about 30 minutes after stimulation), after the second EEG 
assessment (T5; about 40 minutes after stimulation), after the mood booster (T6; about 
50 minutes after stimulation), and after the emotional Stroop task (T7; about 60 minutes 
after stimulation). At the end of the second session, participants were fully debriefed 
and paid. One session lasted about 3 hours in total. See Figure 6.1 for an overview of 
the procedure. 
Data Analysis
To investigate changes in mood across the seven measurements (i.e., using the two Likert 
scales), we performed the following two analyses: First, immediate effects of rTMS on 
mood were tested by a 2 (stimulation: rTMS, Sham) x 2 (time: T1, T2) repeated-measures 
(RM) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Second, preventive effects of the stimulation on 
mood decline were tested in a 2 (stimulation: rTMS, Sham) x 4 (time: T3, T4, T5, T6) RM 
ANOVA. Additionally, stimulation dependent changes in positive and negative affect in 
response to the mood induction were tested in 2 (stimulation: rTMS, Sham) x 2 (time: T1, 
T6) RM ANOVAs, separately for PANAS-PA and PANAS-NA scores. 
117
RTMS Modulates the Impact of a Negative Mood Induction
6
Baseline questionnaires
/ PANAS
EEG
TMS / Sham
EEG
Negative mood induction
EEG
PANAS
Negative mood induction 
(boost)
Stroop
Randomization
Screening
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
Repetition of procedure 1 week later 
with different stimulation and 
alternative mood boost
Figure 6.1. Procedural overview. T1-T7: 7 assessment points of Likert scales
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Bias scores of the Stroop task were subjected to a 2 (stimulation: rTMS, Sham) x 2 
(valence: angry, sad) RM ANOVA. Finally, changes in alpha asymmetry were explored 
by means of a 2 (stimulation: rTMS, Sham) x 2 (condition: eyes-open, eyes-closed) x 3 
(time: baseline, post stimulation, post mood-induction) RM ANOVA. In order to assess 
potential order effects, the analyses were repeated with order (rTMS first, sham first) as 
a between-subjects factor. Where assumptions of sphericity were violated, we reported 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected statistics.
RESULTS
Effects of Stimulation on Mood
A 2 (intervention: rTMS, Sham) x 2 (time: T1, T2) RM ANOVA on mood scales revealed no 
significant interaction, F(1, 22) = 0.51, p = .484, indicating that the stimulation itself did 
not alter the mood state. There was a marginal significant overall drop in mood, F(1, 22) 
= 3.95, p = .059, η2 = .15. See Table 6.1 for an overview of the mood ratings.
Table 6.1. Mean (SD) mood ratings as assessed with the Likert scales.
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
rTMS 16.43
(1.75)
15.43
(2.48)
16.13
(2.18)
13.57
(3.13)
15.91
(1.91)
10.68
(4.35)
13.87
(3.14)
Sham 16.65
(1.90)
16.22
(2.63)
16.35
(1.90)
14.43
(2.61)
15.78
(1.93)
12.00
(3.78)
15.09
(2.52)
Note. T1-T7: 7 assessment points of mood scales. 
In order to test whether the stimulation modified mood changes in response to the 
mood induction, a 2 (intervention: TMS, Sham) x 4 (time: T3, T4, T5, T6) RM ANOVA was 
conducted. This analysis revealed a significant effect of time (F (1.42, 29.84) = 44.83, 
p < .001, η2 = .68), which was moderated by intervention (F (2.36, 49.47) = 3.32, p = 
.037, η2 = .14). Post-hoc tests indicated that the mood state was comparable between 
interventions before the mood induction, t(22) = 0.49,  p = .630, and at the subsequent 
two assessment points, T4: t(22) = 1.53,  p = .142, T5: t(22) = 0.38,  p = .710. After the 
second mood boost at T6, mood was significantly lower after the rTMS stimulation as 
compared to the sham stimulation, t(22) = 2.5,  p = .030, d = 0.51 (see Table 6.1). 
Next, changes in positive affect and negative affect as a result of the mood induction 
were investigated. A 2 (intervention: TMS, Sham) x 2 (time: T1, T5) RM ANOVA on PANAS-
119
RTMS Modulates the Impact of a Negative Mood Induction
6
PA scores did only reveal a significant main effect of time, F(1, 22) = 26.49, p < .001, η2 = 
.55, indicating an overall drop in positive affect (T1: M = 35.41, SD = 1.35; T5: M = 29.07, 
SD = 1.82). The remaining main and interaction effects were all not significant (p > .5). 
The same analysis with PANAS-NA scores also indicated a general increase in negative 
affect (T1: M = 11.74, SD = 0.56; T5: M = 13.98, SD = 0.9, F(1, 22) = 10.6, p = .004, η2 = .33), 
with no difference between intervention or moderation by intervention (p > .245).
Effects on Attentional Processing
A 2 (intervention: TMS, Sham) x 2 (valence: sad, angry) RM ANOVA revealed neither a 
significant effect of intervention, F(1, 21) = 0.15, p = .699, nor an effect of valence, F(1, 
21) = 0.44, p = .513, or an interaction of both, F(1, 21) = 0.45, p = .507. 
Changes on EEG Frequencies Bands
A 2 (intervention: TMS, Sham) x 3 (time: baseline, post TMS, post mood induction) x 
2 (EEG condition: eyes open, eyes closed) RM ANOVA on alpha asymmetry scores 
revealed no 3 way interaction effect, F(1.59, 34.92) = 0.45, p =.598, or intervention 
dependent changes over time, F(1.53, 33.63) = 0.06, p =.894. Moreover, there was no 
overall difference between the two interventions, F(1, 22) = 2.70, p = .114. Only the EEG 
conditions displayed a marginally significant difference, F(1, 22) = 4.12, p = .055, η2 = 
.16, with stronger left lateralized alpha asymmetry with open eyes. All other main and 
interaction effects were not significant either (p > .350).
A 2 (intervention: TMS, Sham) x 3 (time: baseline, post TMS, post mood-induction) x 
2 (EEG condition: eyes open, eyes closed) RM ANOVA to explore changes in beta 
asymmetry scores revealed no intervention dependent changes over time, F(2, 21) = 
0.61, p =.553, nor a 3 way interaction effect, F(2, 21) = 0.74, p =.491. All other main and 
interaction effects were not significant either (p > .391).
Order Effects
The distribution of male and female participants was equal across order of sessions χ2(1, 
N = 23) = 0.38, p = .537. Mood scores did not differ between interventions at baseline, 
t(22) = 0.59, p = .565, however, during the first session participants had higher baseline 
positive affect and higher negative affect, suggesting generally increased arousal (PA: 
session 1: M = 36.43, SD = 6.00, session 2: M = 34.39, SD = 7.60, t(22) = 2.27, p = .033; NA: 
session 1: M = 12.35, SD = 2.98, session 2: M = 11.13, SD = 2.74, t(22) = 3.03, p = .006).
Out of the 23 participants, 15 reported that this study was about the impact of TMS 
on mood, however, none of these participants made a guess about the direction of 
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this relation. The blinding was successful for the first session, with 11 out of the 23 
participants correctly guessing their condition, χ2(1, N = 23) = 0.05, p = .827. During 
the second session, 16 participants correctly guessed their condition, which is above 
chance level, χ2(1, N = 23) = 4.68, p = .031. This effect might be explained by priming, 
as they were able to use the first session as reference. However, to assure that order of 
sessions does not account for the findings, all main analyses were repeated with order 
of sessions as between-subjects factor.
Only in the analyses assessing changes in negative affect, order revealed an interaction 
with the intervention, F(1, 21) = 8.14, p =.010. This interaction was driven by marginally 
higher levels of negative affect during the first session for both orders (TMS first: session 
1: M = 13.46, SD = 1.2, session 2: M = 12.46, SD = 1.16, F(1, 10) = 3.86, p = .078, η2 = .28; 
Sham first: session 1: M = 13.42, SD = 0.92, session 2: M = 12.13, SD = 0.7, F(1, 11) = 4.47, 
p = .058, η2 = .29). In all remaining analyses, the results remained the same and order did 
not interact with the intervention.
DISCUSSION
Aim of this exploratory study was to investigate whether a single session of HF rTMS 
over the left DLPFC alters the impact of a negative mood induction procedure in healthy 
individuals. Contrary to our hypothesis, the results point to a stronger mood decline 
after the negative mood induction as a result of rTMS.
This mood decline only occurred in response to the mood induction procedure, but 
not directly after the stimulation itself, pointing to an interaction of rTMS and mood 
induction. These findings are thereby in line with recent TMS studies showing that (a 
single session of ) HF rTMS to the left prefrontal cortex does not change mood states 
in healthy individuals (Baeken et al., 2014, 2006, 2008; Grisaru et al., 2001; Mosimann et 
al., 2000; Moulier et al., 2016; Padberg et al., 2001;  for review, see Remue, Baeken, et al., 
2016). However, after presenting the mood induction, mood decline was amplified as a 
function of rTMS. In order to confirm that this change is not the result of deteriorating 
mood independent of the mood induction, as indicated by the study by George et al. 
(1996), subsequent studies may want to control for the natural course of mood state. 
It is important to note that participants received the instructions to place themselves 
in the perspective of the main character of the movie to fully perceive the negative 
emotion. Hence, this enhanced mood decline after rTMS compared to sham rTMS may 
be interpreted as improved emotion regulation. That is, participants may have been 
better able to follow the instructions after receiving the real stimulation. The role of 
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dorsal regions of the PFC in emotional regulation has been demonstrated in previous 
studies (for review, see Mitchell, 2011), showing the involvement of the left PFC during 
mood regulation in general, and during the up regulation of mood in particular (Ochsner 
et al., 2004). Hence, HF rTMS over the DLPFC may have modulated the susceptibility 
to emotional processing, while the instructions to up-regulate the negative emotion 
determined the directionality of mood change. Support for this explanation comes 
from a study by Feeser and colleagues (2014) who found a strengthening in reappraisal 
of negative emotions after transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right 
DLPFC. Furthermore, Padberg et al. (2001) also found an increase in laughing frequency 
in response to a humorous movie clip, after receiving HF rTMS to the left as compared 
to the right prefrontal cortex. These changes in facial expression point to an increase in 
positive mood and thus to a possible up-regulation of positive emotions. However, no 
changes in subjective mood ratings have been found in this study. 
Another explanation is related to the concept of homeostatic metaplasticity (Ziemann 
& Siebner, 2008). It is possible that rTMS resulted in perturbations of the neural system 
of healthy individuals, which tried to go back into its baseline homeostatic default-
state after the stimulation, and thereby amplified the mood decline. According to this 
line of thought, low frequency (e.g., 1Hz) stimulation protocol, which initially reduces 
excitability prior to a negative mood induction, might attenuate the impact of the 
negative mood induction. However, one may also argue that the perturbations due to 
rTMS may interfere with mood regulation in general, resulting in an amplified mood 
decline. 
It is important to mention that the differential effects on mood decline occurred only 
after the negative emotion-boost towards the end of the session, whereas they were not 
yet evident directly after the first mood induction clips. This pattern was also reflected 
in changes on the PANAS scale, which showed a significant mood deterioration that 
remained unaffected by the rTMS intervention. Crucially, the time point of administering 
the PANAS might not have been suited to identify such changes, since the post 
assessment took place before the booster of negative mood. At that moment, recovery 
from the negative mood might have minimized the mood differences between the 
stimulation conditions. 
In contrast to our expectations, EEG analyses did not reveal any reliable changes in 
frontal alpha (or beta) asymmetry in response to the emotional provocation. This 
suggests that the effects of left PFC stimulation on mood were not mediated by a 
change in frontal alpha asymmetry. However, this does not rule out the possibility of 
rTMS to affect frontal asymmetry at other time points during the session. Indeed, our 
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subjective mood data suggests that the critical rTMS effects may have taken place after 
the second mood induction (i.e., the mood booster) rather than directly after the first 
mood induction. Moreover, it is possible that there were more short-lived rTMS effects 
on frontal asymmetry that went undetected. For instance, Papousek et al. (2014) found 
that emotional films acutely induced more right-sided alpha activity that corresponded 
with deteriorated mood, but these effects had vanished after the movie. This pattern 
aligns with the capability model of frontal alpha asymmetry (Coan, Allen, & McKnight, 
2006), according to which this EEG marker is most sensitive to affective responding and 
to individual differences in emotional vulnerability when measured during an emotional 
challenge (for review, see Allen & Reznik, 2015). 
It is also conceivable that the effects of the stimulation are detectable at other cortical 
regions. The right parietal cortex is one potential region of interest for the effects of 
neuro-stimulation in depression. Based on the functional connectivity between left 
prefrontal and right parietal cortex (for review, see Schutter & van Honk, 2005), Schutter 
et al. demonstrated beneficial effects of 2 Hz rTMS over this region on depression ratings 
and cognitive markers of depression (e.g., Schutter, Laman, van Honk, Vergouwen, & 
Koerselman, 2009; Schutter, van Honk, Laman, Vergouwen, & Koerselman, 2010). Taken 
together, the potential effects of rTMS over the DLPFC on frontal asymmetry remain to 
be investigated. A particularly promising avenue would be to focus on effects that take 
place during the mood induction or in response to the negative mood booster, next to 
exploring rTMS effects beyond the frontal cortex. 
There are two reasons why we expected attenuations of the interference of negative 
pictures during the Stroop task, as a function of rTMS. First, we thought that a 
dampening of the mood decline would lead to weaker interference effects due to the 
mood congruent processing style (Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000). In other 
words, the less sad participants are, the weaker the impact of negative faces during the 
task, and hence, the weaker the interference effect. Second, stimulation of the DLPFC 
is expected to affect cognitive control processes (Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Baeken, 
Leyman, & D’haenen, 2006; Vanderhasselt et al., 2009) that modulate performance 
during the Stroop task. The high frequency stimulation may have resulted in a reduction 
of the interference due to an increase in cognitive control. The combination of both 
aspects might explain why no effects were found on the Stroop task, as they might have 
canceled each other out. Thus, the current stimulation protocol might have improved 
cognitive control and reduced positive mood at the same time, both leading to opposite 
Stroop effects.
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The results of this exploratory study should be carefully interpreted, taking several 
limitations into account. First of all, the crossover design allowed participants to 
experience both stimulation conditions and thereby to detect slight differences in 
scalp sensations. However, despite this factor limiting the blinding, our analyses did not 
indicate any order effects. Still, improved control procedures or study designs might 
be preferable. Second, MRI based localization might be considered as alternative to 
determine the target location (e.g., Ahdab, Ayache, Brugières, Goujon, & Lefaucheur, 
2010; Sparing, Buelte, Meister, Paus, & Fink, 2008). Third, this study was conducted 
with healthy individuals, which have been shown to differ in functional connectivity 
from depressed patients (for review, see Pizzagalli, 2010). Hence, the neural effects 
of stimulation may differ between these populations. Fourth, replication with larger 
samples is essential before drawing solid conclusions. We recommend that these 
replication studies include a positive mood induction procedure and a contrasting rTMS 
stimulation protocol (i.e., low frequency stimulation) for which opposite effects would 
be expected, to disentangle the working mechanism of the current effects. Furthermore, 
the up- and down-regulation of emotional information by means of neurostimulation 
is a promising method with potential therapeutic value, worthy of investigation. Finally, 
more narrowly tracking the time course of changes in alpha asymmetry and other neural 
correlates may help to better understand the working mechanisms relevant for the 
current study. For instance, future studies should consider assessing frontal asymmetry 
during an emotional task, rather than during rest.
In conclusion, this study indicates that rTMS can modulate the impact of a negative 
mood induction. Contrary to our expectations, HF rTMS over the left DLPFC seems to 
increase the susceptibility to mood responses in general, while the context determines 
the directionality of this change. Hence, due to the negative mood induction procedure 
in the current study, HF rTMS might have been related to a stronger mood decline. These 
findings provide a new perspective on the effects of rTMS that require subsequent 
research on possibilities to prevent depressive episodes. As pointed out, potential 
approaches could focus on low frequency stimulation to prevent a mood decline or 
on using a positive mood induction after a HF rTMS treatment, in order to target the 
absence of positive affect in depression.

CHAPTER 7
Summary and General Discussion
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Aim of this Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate techniques that are suited to modify 
maladaptive cognitive processing in order to reduce depressive symptoms. To this 
end, I applied the cognitive schema theory of Beck (1967; Beck & Haigh, 2014; Disner 
et al., 2011), which states that individuals possess cognitive structures, schemas, that 
guide the processing of information. In depression, these schemas are biased towards 
the preferential processing of negative over positive information. When activated by 
a stressor, these latent schemas affect different levels of cognitive processing, such as 
attention, interpretation, or memory (e.g., Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017; Rinck 
& Becker, 2005; Sanchez et al., 2013). Importantly, negatively-biased processing induces 
negative affect and further strengthens the depressive schemas, thereby forming a 
vicious circle. The primary goal of the studies presented in this dissertation was to derive 
applications for the treatment of depression and to test their efficacy. Importantly, the 
primary aim of these applications is to modify biased processing, which is a precondition 
in attenuating depressive symptoms in turn. The first four chapters report on proof-of-
principle studies, which all investigated newly developed cognitive bias modification 
(CBM) procedures to alter maladaptive information processing. As described in chapter 
2 and 3, a paradigm to modify attentional processes was developed and tested; the 
Eye-Tracking based Attentional Bias Modification (ET-ABM) training. The primary aim 
of the ET-ABM was to improve attentional disengagement from negative stimuli and 
to test whether this modification resulted in reduced stress reactivity. Chapter 4 and 
5 reported on two studies that tested a paradigm aimed at modifying maladaptive 
interpretation tendencies. This Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression 
(IMP-D) was designed to promote benign interpretations of ambiguous stimuli. Finally, 
in chapter 6 the possibility of using neurostimulation to modulate top-down control 
of the processing of negative material was tested, by applying repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The question here was 
whether such neural modulation can reduce the adverse effects of a negative event on 
current mood states.  
Summary of ET-ABM Studies
The studies reported in chapter 2 and 3 showed that attentional processing can 
indeed be altered. The ET-ABM training thereby specifically targeted the attentional 
process that has been linked to the development and maintenance of depression; i.e., 
attentional disengagement from negative stimuli. By including eye-tracking into the 
attentional bias modification training, the relevant gaze pattern was reinforced in a 
controlled way. The training program required participants to move their gaze away 
from one of the negative pictures towards one of the positive pictures, in order to 
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continue with the training. In chapter 2 this training procedure was compared to an 
opposite training condition, where participants were required to move their attention 
away from positive towards negative pictures, however, and importantly, in chapter 3 a 
sham-training control condition was used, where no valence dependent gaze pattern 
was reinforced. These two studies together showed that the time participants need to 
disengage attention from negative pictures can be reduced by means of the ET-ABM, 
both in an unselected student sample as well as in a sample of dysphoric individuals. 
Moreover, by reducing the time to disengage, preferential processing of positive over 
negative pictures was induced, the so-called positivity bias which is usually found in 
healthy individuals (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Kellough et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, in the study reported in chapter 3 the duration participants fixated on 
the first positive picture (i.e., positive maintained attention) also increased as a result 
of the training. While in both studies the parameters of the training (e.g., number of 
trials, required fixation duration on positive pictures) were kept identical, we did not 
find this improvement in positive maintained attention in the study reported in chapter 
2. It is possible that this disparity is due to the picture selection, as the stimuli in the 
second study were not matched on their valence ratings, in contrast to the first study, 
though this remains to be investigated. However, taken together, both studies showed 
that in depression the attentional bias can be modified, and that the ET-ABM potentially 
targets both relevant attentional components; disengagement from negative stimuli 
as well as maintained attention towards positive stimuli. This modification of the 
attentional processes is required to eventually also attenuate depressive symptoms 
(Clarke, Notebaert, et al., 2014).
One of the advantages of the ET-ABM is that this training is tailored to the reaction time 
of each individual. Hitherto, the vast majority of training studies aimed at targeting 
late disengagement from negative stimuli used the same stimulus presentation time 
for all participants, while the general consensus for these paradigms was to present 
stimuli longer than 1000 ms (for a discussion, see De Raedt & Koster, 2010). The rationale 
for these prolonged presentation durations is to allow individuals to first direct their 
attention at the negative stimuli, before we can even assess the difficulty in disengaging 
attention. At the same time, it has been argued that these prolonged presentation 
durations allow participants to switch their attention back and forth between the 
different stimuli presented (Leyman et al., 2007), giving no indication which attentional 
process is actually targeted. Currently published ABM studies on depression differ 
greatly in the duration of stimulus presentation, ranging from 1000 ms up to 4500 
ms (e.g., Beevers et al., 2015; Browning et al., 2012; Oehlberg, Revelle, & Mineka, 2012; 
Wells & Beevers, 2010). In addition to these prolonged presentation durations, these 
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training procedures do not take into account the general slowing in information 
processing speed which has been found in depression and might greatly differ between 
individuals (Tsourtos, Thompson, & Stough, 2002; White, Myerson, & Hale, 1997). Hence, 
it is conceivable that these rather large variations in presentation duration might not 
be suited equally well for all individuals. In contrast, different participants might likely 
benefit from different presentation durations, possibly depending on individual factors 
such as the severity of cognitive impairment or state factors such as tiredness. Therefore, 
if we want to target early processing of information in depressed individuals, such as 
attentional disengagement from negative stimuli, an individualized assessment and 
training procedure is preferable. These personalized paradigms are likely more effective, 
as they take deviations in early attentional processing into account, where differences 
in milliseconds are crucial. The ET-ABM is such an individualized training paradigm, as 
the trial duration is dependent on the gaze behavior of the participant and therefore 
tailored to the individual. 
Summary of IMP-D Studies
In addition to changes in attentional processing, we were also able to alter maladaptive 
interpretation tendencies, as reported in chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation. The 
Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression (IMP-D) appeared to be an 
effective paradigm to attenuate negative interpretation tendencies in an unselected 
student sample as well as in a dysphoric sample. During training, participants observed 
a range of word-sentence combinations which they had to evaluate. While participants 
were supposed to reject combinations of ambiguous sentences and negative words 
(i.e., negative interpretations), they also needed to accept combinations of ambiguous 
sentences and benign words (i.e., benign interpretations). Interestingly, the effects of 
the IMP-D seem to depend on the form of feedback used to train these interpretations. 
Only those participants who received direct feedback during the training on every 
single reaction (i.e., the word ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’), displayed altered interpretation 
tendencies. In contrast, when feedback was provided more indirectly as indicated by 
subtle changes of a feedback bar, no training effects of the IMP-D on interpretation bias 
were found. These results might point to the relevance of explicit feedback in order to 
achieve a training effect when administering a single session intervention. 
Interestingly, all previous studies that have implemented the same training paradigm 
(i.e., Word-Sentence Association Paradigm) to alter interpretation tendencies have 
provided explicit feedback (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 
2017; MacDonald et al., 2013). Therefore, it was not necessary for participants to process 
both word and sentence in order to perform well on the training task, as participants 
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could have ignored the sentence and only reacted to the valence of the target words. 
While trials with negative target words required a ‘reject’ reaction, trials with a benign 
target word required an ‘accept’ reaction. Additionally, due to the explicit feedback 
on each individual reaction (i.e., the word ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’), it was relatively easy 
for participants to infer the intended response pattern. Hence, changes in bias might 
represent demand effects (Nichols & Edlund, 2015; Nichols & Maner, 2008) rather than 
modified interpretation tendencies. 
In order to better understand the working mechanism of the IMP-D training, we 
developed a more implicit feedback procedure as reported in chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. Here, we wanted to test whether a single session with the IMP-D can modify 
the interpretation bias, while preventing participants simply developing the required 
reaction pattern in response to the target words. However, as the implicit training 
condition did not demonstrate attenuated interpretation tendencies, it remains unclear 
whether such a form of feedback is sufficient for single-session training. These results 
might indicate that this form of feedback was too subtle to allow for participants to alter 
their bias within a brief training session. In this case, more sessions would be required 
for participants to acquire adaptive interpretation tendencies. Indeed, in line with a 
recent meta-analysis on interpretation modification paradigms (Menne-Lothmann et 
al., 2014), more training sessions have been found to be related to an increase in bias 
change. Interestingly, the authors also found the feedback procedure to be an important 
predictor for a successful change in bias, and they argue that providing feedback on 
the training performance might result in a more engaging training. In line with this 
argument, the more indirect feedback as implemented in chapter 5 might also have not 
been engaging enough for participants to actually acquire the reinforced interpretation 
tendencies.
Importantly, the studies presented in this dissertation are the first to implement filler 
sentences during the training, in order to increase the engagement of participants as 
well as to reduce demand effects. As explained above, in previous studies participants 
were not required to form an interpretation by processing sentence and word together, 
as they could infer the ‘correct’ reaction from the valence of the target word alone (e.g., 
Amir & Taylor, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017; MacDonald et al., 2013). 
In contrast, the studies presented here in chapters 4 and 5 made use of filler ‘control’ 
sentences which required the opposite reaction pattern, thus ‘reject’ reactions on 
benign trials and ‘accept’ reactions on negative trials. These filler sentences thus forced 
participants to process both sentence and word in order to provide a correct response. 
It remains to be investigated whether these filler sentences are sufficient to capture the 
attention of participants and to engage them in the training task, and whether indirect 
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feedback can also be effective in attenuating maladaptive interpretation tendencies 
during a multi-session training. However, such alternative feedback procedures 
should be designed to ensure that demand effects are minimized. More importantly, 
alternative procedures might also be better suited for depressed participants, who 
have been found to be oversensitive to negative, punishing feedback (for a review, see 
Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Tavares, Drevets, & Sahakian, 2003). In a patient sample, a training 
procedure with explicit feedback as implemented during the IMP-D might provide a 
relatively large amount of punishing feedback, especially as patients most likely start 
such training with a negative interpretation bias. It is conceivable that this relatively 
large amount of punishing feedback might actually have adverse effects, such as a drop 
in positive mood as found in the studies reported in chapter 4 and 5.  
Absence of Modulation of Emotional Vulnerability
Even though the first 4 studies revealed that maladaptive cognitive processing of 
negative material can be modified, these CBM studies did not succeed in attenuating 
emotional vulnerability. That is, we did not find training-dependent effects of the two 
different CBM procedures on attenuating stress reactivity in response to a laboratory 
stressor. There are several possible explanations for this absence of a transference effect.
First of all, we might not have actually changed a bias, but instead only induced demand 
effects. As explained above, this might explain the results of the IMP-D training, where 
we only found a shift in bias when using the explicit feedback procedure, but not the 
more implicit feedback procedure, as the former allows participants to more easily 
derive the required response pattern. However, previous studies that have administered 
this paradigm showed reduced anxiety ratings in a sample of socially anxious individuals 
(e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012; Beard & Amir, 2008) while implementing an explicit feedback 
procedure. Moreover, a recently published study investigated the effects of modifying 
maladaptive interpretation tendencies by means of the WSAP in a sample of dysphoric 
individuals (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017). By implementing the same explicit 
feedback procedure as used in chapter 4 and 5 here, the authors were able to alter 
the interpretation bias. Most importantly, training effects of the WSAP were observed 
on a second measurement for interpretation tendencies. Participants that received 
training to reduce a negative interpretation bias provided fewer negative solutions 
of the scrambled sentence task as compared to participants who received a control 
training procedure. Hence, the explicit feedback procedure does seem to be effective 
in modifying an interpretation bias and in attenuating symptoms. Given these results, it 
appears unlikely that the IMP-D only trained reaction tendencies.
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Regarding the ET-ABM training, no transference effects were found either, raising 
doubts as to whether a bias has been affected at all. However, if the change in bias is due 
to the demand characteristics of the training, a change in bias should only be detected 
in those participants that became aware of the trained attentional gaze pattern. Even 
though some participants were aware of the training contingencies in both studies, the 
training effect was not dependent on the awareness of participants. Hence, it seems 
unlikely that the ET-ABM only trained reaction tendencies. Instead, this paradigm seems 
to actually target an attentional bias. 
A second possibility for the absence of training effects might be that these putatively 
trained cognitive biases are unrelated to emotional reactivity. This account challenges 
cognitive theories of depression in general, which propose the causal role of maladaptive 
information processing for the development of this disorder. Given the large body 
of research on the causal role of biases for depression (for review, see Grafton et al., 
2017; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014) this explanation seems 
unlikely as well. Moreover, Clarke, Notebaert and MacLeod (2014) demonstrated that 
the vast majority of experiments that were able to modify biases also were able to affect 
symptoms, further supporting the causal relationship. 
It is however conceivable that the laboratory stressors administered in the studies here 
were not optimal to detect subtle differences in emotional vulnerability as a result of a 
single session intervention. Most studies that investigated the effect of a single session 
CBM training for depression either made use of a stressful anagram task or of a video 
stressor (e.g., Becker et al., 2016; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017; Haeffel, Rozek, 
Hames, & Technow, 2012; Lester, Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & Yiend, 2011; Yiend et 
al., 2014). In the CBM studies presented in this dissertation, we made use of a speech 
stressor task or a memory task. Importantly, the main goal of the studies presented here 
was to develop and test CBM training procedures and not to critically evaluate different 
laboratory stressors. Our requirement for the challenging procedures was to induce 
stress. While these tasks did induce heightened levels of stress, they might have not 
made an impact on the cognitive processes that were targeted during the training. The 
latest recommendations state that laboratory stressors should ideally be self-referent 
and rely on the modality of the bias of interest. Regarding interpretation tendencies 
such a stressor should involve ambiguity to a certain degree (for recommendations, 
see Jones & Sharpe, 2017; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), while stressors that follow a 
training program to assess effects of attentional processing should ideally require a shift 
in attention, such as the dual-video stressor task by N. T. M. Chen et al. (2017). 
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Finally, it is also plausible that more training sessions are required to reliably change 
emotional processing and to induce detectable changes in mood and symptoms. 
Particularly concerning ABM procedures, most studies that have succeeded in 
attenuating symptoms have administered more than one training session (e.g., Baert 
et al., 2010; Browning et al., 2012; Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang et al., 2015). As meta-
analyses are currently inconclusive about whether increased numbers of training 
sessions are predictive of larger CBM training effects (Cristea et al., 2015; Jones & Sharpe, 
2017; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), this relationship remains to be demonstrated. In 
addition to the number of sessions, the timing of both training and assessment are 
also relevant. Wells and Beevers (2010) found that effect sizes of attention training on 
depressive symptoms were larger at the follow-up time as compared to directly after 
the training. Also, Browning and colleagues (2012) found their attentional bias training 
effects to be larger at a 1 month follow-up assessment. In line with the time course of 
pharmacological treatment (e.g., Harmer, Goodwin, & Cowen, 2009), it seems likely that 
CBM training effects on symptoms only occur after the trained cognitive schemas have 
been consolidated, and are thus more difficult to detect directly after a single session 
intervention.  
Schema Activation Before Training
The current studies also contribute to the discussion of whether it is necessary to 
activate latent depressive schemas in order to measure or modify them (for an extended 
discussion on schema activation, see Foa & Kozak, 1986; McNally, 2007). While we 
made use of a negative mood induction procedure in the attention training study 
with dysphoric individuals (Chapter 3), we did not administer a procedure to activate 
depressive schemas in the interpretation study (Chapter 5). According to the theory 
of Beck (1967; Disner et al., 2011), depressive schemas are latent constructs and only 
become detectable when activated by relevant triggers such as stressful situations. 
Hence, the activation of these schemas seems a prerequisite for a sensitive assessment 
and an effective training. Regarding the interpretation modification paradigm, we 
would like to highlight that our study procedure is in line with previous interpretation 
modification studies (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; 
Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017; Williams et al., 2013). To our knowledge, no 
study targeting maladaptive interpretation tendencies in depression has yet critically 
evaluated whether a negative mood induction or comparable procedure prior to the 
assessment or training in order to activate latent schemas is beneficial.
Regarding attentional bias in depression, most assessment and training studies have 
not explicitly activated depressive schemas either (Eizenman et al., 2003; Sanchez et al., 
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2013; Wells & Beevers, 2010). Interestingly, one of the few studies that did administer a 
mood induction in combination with an exogenous cueing task to assess maladaptive 
attentional processing in depressed individuals discovered a bias for negative material, 
irrespective of whether the mood induction was presented before or after the 
assessment (Clasen, Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2013). These results are surprising given the 
assumption of bias as a latent construct (Beck, 1967; Disner et al., 2011). However, it 
might also be argued that the testing situation in a laboratory environment is already 
a stressor itself, sufficient to activate schemas (Boettcher, Berger, & Renneberg, 2012; 
Carlbring et al., 2012; Kuckertz et al., 2014). 
It remains to be investigated whether more consistent results for training studies 
aiming at interpretation and attentional bias can be achieved by additionally making 
use of mood induction procedures to activate depressive schemas before assessing 
and attempting to alter them. A study by Haeffel, Rozek, Hames, and Technow (2012), 
already provides some promising results in this regard. In a single session ABM training 
program, the authors presented a short prime with a negative scenario before every trial. 
The results showed that this training was effective in reducing a negative attentional 
bias, and in turn in attenuating emotional vulnerability in response to a subsequent 
Anagram stress task. 
Recommendations for Future CBM Studies
In this dissertation four studies were presented that tested newly developed CBM 
training procedures, which aimed to modify maladaptive information processing in 
depression. Indeed, as a proof-of-principle, these paradigms have been shown to 
attenuate maladaptive biases to a certain degree. These promising results justify further 
research on the ET-ABM and the IMP-D to better understand their working mechanisms 
and to improve their efficacy. As discussed above, suitable stress tasks should be 
developed in order to more systematically assess the potential therapeutic effects of 
these interventions. 
 A logical next step would be to investigate individual predictors of successful training in 
order to tailor treatment programs to the individual needs of the patient. One possibility 
is to tailor the treatment to the (level of ) impairment of the patient. Baert et al. (2010) 
found in an attentional bias study that the training effects depended on the severity 
of depression scores. Interestingly, higher depression severity was related to reduced 
training effects. While these results could indicate that CBM training procedures 
might be especially effective as preventive instruments, they might also point to an 
interference of medication with the cognitive training procedures. 
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These results could also point to a relationship between level of cognitive impairment 
and training success. As shown in the meta-analysis of Mogoaşe and colleagues (2014), 
age predicted the success of attentional bias modification training, while younger 
participants in particular benefited most from the training procedures. It is conceivable 
that patients with severe depressive symptoms and greater cognitive impairment 
have more difficulties with training paradigms that heavily rely on quick reactions (i.e., 
attentional bias modification procedures). For this population, training paradigms that 
aim at slower cognitive processes (e.g., interpretation tendencies) might be better 
suited. Indeed, two meta-analyses showed that higher depression severity does not 
seem to limit the effects of interpretation training (Everaert et al., 2017), but might even 
be related to better training outcomes (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). If future studies 
provide support for this relationship, ABM training procedures could also be improved 
by adapting them to the individual level of cognitive impairment. With the ET-ABM 
training as discussed in this dissertation, we propose such a modification.
Summary of TMS Study
The study described in chapter 6 of this dissertation investigated the possibility of 
affecting the processing of negative material by regulating top-down control via 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). The hypothesis was that by 
stimulating the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) with high frequency rTMS in 
order to increase cortical activity, we could attenuate the impact of a subsequent negative 
mood induction. In contrast to our expectations, participants showed a stronger decline 
in positive mood in response to the negative mood induction procedure after receiving 
HF rTMS as compared to a sham stimulation protocol. That is, in contrast to attenuating 
the effects of the mood induction, the stimulation protocol enhanced its impact. 
Thus, the effects of this stimulation protocol, which received Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval for the treatment of depression in the USA in 2008 
(Lefaucheur et al., 2014), seems to crucially depend on the context of the stimulation. 
In other words, in addition to stimulation parameters such as frequency or the targeted 
brain region, factors such as the environment of stimulation, the mood state of the 
patient, or events that precede and follow the rTMS treatment might also be relevant 
in understanding the effects of rTMS. This interaction of stimulation procedure and 
context creates new treatment possibilities worth further investigation. However, in 
order to optimally use this effect, we first need to understand whether these effects are 
the result of a gating process, of homeostatic meta-plasticity (Ziemann & Siebner, 2008), 
or rather point to general perturbations of the neural system. 
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First, if the stronger decline in mood after the stimulation is the result of homeostatic 
meta-plasticity, different stimulation protocols might potentially be more effective in 
increasing stress resilience. In the current study, we tried to increase neural activity, 
which might have provoked a rebound effect, whereby after the stimulation the neural 
system might have tried to suppress activity in order to come back into its initial state. 
We might have presented the mood induction in the later stage, thus during the process 
of a homeostatic reaction, which might have been the reason for the stronger decline 
in positive mood. Along this line, a stimulation protocol that initially reduces neural 
activity (e.g., 1Hz rTMS over the left DLPFC) might employ the homeostatic rebound 
effect to suppress the impact of the negative mood induction procedure in the later 
stage. 
Another possible explanation relies on the principle of gating (Ziemann & Siebner, 2008). 
As explained in chapter 6, participants received the instruction to empathize with the 
main actor of the mood induction movie in order to fully perceive the sad mood. In light 
of this instruction, after receiving the stimulation participants showed an improvement 
in their performance as indicated by a stronger positive mood decline. The increase in 
neural activity as a result of the HF rTMS over the left DLPFC might have been gating 
the mood induction procedure. One the one hand, these results carry a warning for the 
current TMS treatment of depressed individuals, who might be more vulnerable for the 
induction of negative mood states directly after the stimulation. At the same time, an 
increased susceptibility to changes in mood state as a function of HF rTMS might also 
be used to induce states of positive affect.
Summarizing, rTMS can modulate the impact of a mood induction procedure and has 
thereby shown that the effects of such stimulation depends on the emotional context. 
However, more research is needed to investigate how far rTMS can be used to intervene 
with the vicious cycle of the processing of negative material (Figure 1.1; Disner et al., 
2011). Future studies should explore whether low frequency stimulation over the left 
DLPFC in combination with a negative mood induction is most effective in weakening 
depressive schemas, or whether high frequency rTMS combined with a positive mood 
induction is more beneficial.
Future Avenues of Neurostimulation
In addition to different combinations of rTMS stimulation frequency (i.e., high versus low 
frequency) and mood induction procedures, alternative neural locations for stimulation 
should be taken into consideration. So far, the left DLPFC has been in the center of 
attention for treatment studies with depressed patients (for reviews, see Lam et al., 
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2008; Schutter, 2009). The reason for this particular interest resulted from earlier studies 
that revealed higher prevalence rates for depression in stroke patients with a damage 
to the left but not to the right DLPFC (e.g., Robinson & Szetela, 1981). These findings 
were further supported by imaging studies that discovered a frontal imbalance, with 
a hypoactive left PFC in depressed individuals (e.g., Baxter et al., 1989; Drevets et al., 
1992).
While a large body of research supports the involvement of this brain region in depression 
and in the processing of emotional information more broadly (e.g., Browning et al., 2010; 
George et al., 1995; George, Ketter, & Post, 1994; Vanderhasselt et al., 2009), more recent 
studies are less conclusive regarding hypo-activity of the left DLPFC in depression. A 
meta-analysis of lesion studies found no difference in prevalence rates of depression 
between left and right sided PFC stroke patients (Carson et al., 2000), and a few rTMS 
studies have even found a reduction in depressive symptoms after low frequency 
stimulation over the left DLPFC, in contrast to high frequency stimulation (Padberg et 
al., 1999; Speer et al., 2009). Hence, alternative brain regions should be investigated as 
targets for rTMS treatment. 
In a review paper, Downar and Daskalakis (2013) proposed, amongst other regions, 
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex as a potential stimulation target to treat depression, 
as damage to this region has been more consistently linked to the development of 
depression (Koenigs et al., 2008), and as this area may serve as hub region (e.g., Downar 
et al., 2014; Price & Drevets, 2012; Sheline, Price, Yan, & Mintun, 2010), connecting 
several neural networks that are affected in depression; the cognitive control network, 
the affective network, and the resting-state network. As cortical activation resulting 
from magnetic stimulation over a distinct cortical area (e.g., DLPFC) spreads throughout 
neural connections (Komssi et al., 2002), stimulation of a single region likely always also 
affects other cortical and subcortical structures. Hence, the stimulation of a region that 
has been found to be connected to other depression-relevant neural networks might 
be more effective in (simultaneously) altering processes such as rumination, emotion 
regulation, or attentional control.
However, other target regions have been proposed as well, such as the parietal cortex, 
which has been linked to attentional control processing, and as brain asymmetry in this 
region has been related to depression (Stewart, Towers, Coan, & Allen, 2011; van Honk, 
Schutter, Putman, de Haan, & D’Alfonso, 2003). Due to new technological advances 
such as the Hesed-coil (i.e., H-coil), neural networks that are located deeper in the brain 
have also become the target of new TMS protocols (for review, see Blomstedt, Sjöberg, 
Hansson, Bodlund, & Hariz, 2011; Morishita, Fayad, Higuchi, Nestor, & Foote, 2014). In 
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addition to location, alternative stimulation frequencies such as theta-burst stimulation 
(for review, see Chung, Hoy, & Fitzgerald, 2015), as well as alternative stimulation 
techniques such as electric current stimulation (for review, see Nitsche, Boggio, Fregni, 
& Pascual-Leone, 2009) have been shown to be potentially beneficial for the treatment 
of depression and might be a possible alternative to the rTMS protocol applied in this 
dissertation.
Combine CBM and TMS
Another promising avenue worth highlighting here is in the interaction of both 
techniques previously discussed, that is the combination of CBM procedures with non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques. As outlined in the introduction, some studies 
have shown that CBM and rTMS share a common ground. For instance, Browning et al. 
(2010) showed in an attentional bias modification study that activity in the prefrontal 
cortex is related to performance on a dot-probe task, with neural activity highest on 
trials where participants had to inhibit an automatic response. On the other hand, 
repetitive TMS over the left DLPFC has also been shown to affect attentional processing 
of emotional faces (De Raedt et al., 2010) and has been shown to improve attentional 
control (Vanderhasselt et al., 2006, 2009).
Hence, combining non-invasive brain stimulation to alter prefrontal activity along 
with CBM training might reveal synergistic effects. Initial evidence comes from a 
study by Clarke, Browning, Hammond, Notebaert, and MacLeod (2014), who applied 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate lateral PFC activity during 
attentional training (ABM) in a sample of healthy individuals. TDCS is a non-invasive 
brain stimulation technique, whereby a weak electric current is administered by two 
electrodes (i.e., anodal and cathodal) attached to the scalp. Neural activity under the 
anode has been found to increase during stimulation, while activity under the cathode 
has been found to be reduced (for review of tDCS-treatment studies on depression, see 
Nitsche et al., 2009). Participants who received a stimulation protocol to increase neural 
activity of their left PFC were better able to learn the training contingencies during 
the ABM, compared to participants who received no stimulation. The same research 
group also demonstrated that this change in attentional bias during training moderates 
the effects of the neural stimulation on stress reactivity (N. T. M. Chen et al., 2017). In 
other words, by increasing neural excitability of the left DLPFC, the training effect of an 
ABM procedure could be strengthened and in turn more effectively reduce emotional 
vulnerability. 
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Relevance for Therapy
The ultimate goal of studies that develop and investigate novel treatment techniques 
for depression is to complement and improve current programs. Even though CBM 
paradigms and non-invasive brain stimulation are still in the developmental stage, 
they have shown some potential to become a valuable addition to current treatment 
approaches. Both techniques however have their own strengths and weaknesses and 
thus seem suited for different fields of application.
Non-invasive brain stimulation techniques might be a potential treatment option 
for patients who consider the more radical electro-convulsive therapy, and thereby 
supplement current stepped care models of depression, such as exist in the Netherlands. 
Repetitive TMS has been shown to be as effective as pharmacological interventions (e.g., 
Lam et al., 2008; Lefaucheur et al., 2014; Schutter, 2009), while the side-effects are rather 
mild. At the same time, the therapeutic effects are temporary, and the administration of 
this intervention is more complicated and requires trained medical staff. 
CBM paradigms, however, are easily administered on a large scale (e.g., as internet-
based training), with relatively little support from a therapist. Therefore, this technique 
could potentially be used to bridge the waiting-period for therapy, or be implemented 
as an additional treatment module into cognitive-behavioral interventions or 
pharmacological treatment. It is important to mention that even though a few studies 
have successfully administered a web-based CBM intervention (e.g., T. J. Lang et al., 2012; 
Williams et al., 2013), most of the studies that investigated online training applications 
have not succeeded in attenuating bias or symptoms (e.g., Carlbring et al., 2012; Enock 
et al., 2014). While it seems to be especially difficult to remotely implement attentional 
bias modification procedures (Grafton et al., 2017), a recent meta-analysis indicated that 
CBM training administered at home is less effective compared to training procedures 
in a laboratory setting (Cristea et al., 2015). Currently, these results show that the 
effects of CBM procedures do not meet the ambitious expectations, even though the 
initial studies were very promising. However, rather than acting as a discouragement, 
these findings should propel the field of CBM studies, as they point to the necessity of 
further improving current training programs before they can be administered as online 
interventions or as add-on therapy components to current treatment approaches. 
With the studies presented in this dissertation, I have tried to take some steps forward in 
this developmental process. As described above, both techniques are a potentially useful 
tool to intervene in the vicious cycle of negative information processing in depression. 
Importantly, the strengths of these interventions should not be judged in isolation, 
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but rather in interplay with the context (e.g., rTMS and mood induction), in interaction 
with other techniques (e.g., rTMS and CBM), and most importantly, customized to the 
individual needs and characteristics of the patient. Only when considering these aspects 
as a coherent whole can the full potential of these interventions be exploited. 
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Iedereen heeft wel eens slechte dagen, waarop men zich ‘down’ voelt, bedroefd is of een 
dip heeft, en al snel maken mensen gebruik van het woord ‘depressie’ om deze gevoelens 
vorm te geven. Misschien is het op grond van deze subjectieve beleving waarom 
depressie een welbekende, maar vaak fout begrepen ziekte is. Zo liet een survey studie 
van de stichting Deutsche Depressionshilfe in Duitsland zien, dat ongeveer de helft van 
de ondervraagden van mening was dat depressie het gevolg van een foute levensstijl 
is, en bijna één vijfde gaf aan, dat depressie met chocolade te verhelpen is (Sander, 
2017). Depressie is echter een zeer ingrijpende stoornis, waarbij depressieve stemming 
en het verlies van interesse in alledaagse bezigheden het meest centraal staan (5th ed.; 
DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Naast deze emotionele symptomen 
is depressie ook gekenmerkt door lichamelijke problemen zoals veranderingen in 
eet- en slaappatroon, en door cognitieve beperkingen zoals concentratieproblemen. 
Deze symptomen zijn vaak zo belastend, dat een groot deel van de patiënten wel eens 
over suïcide nadenkt en in 15 procent van de gevallen ook daadwerkelijk zelfmoord 
pleegt (Möller, 2003). Depressie is daarbij een veelvoorkomende stoornis. Eén op de vijf 
mensen wordt in de loop van het leven gediagnosticeerd met een depressie, waarvan 
vrouwen dubbel zo vaak als mannen (de Graaf et al., 2012; Kessler et al., 2005).
Er is al een reeks aan verschillende therapievormen beschikbaar voor de behandeling 
van depressie, zoals cognitieve-gedragstherapie of farmacotherapie. Maar bijna de 
helft van de patiënten lijkt niet voldoende te reageren op deze behandelingen (Cuijpers 
et al., 2014; Thase, 2001) en bij een groot deel van de patiënten zijn de symptomen 
recidiverend (bv., tot 40 procent zoals aangegeven in Steinert et al., 2014). Dit hoge 
terugvalpercentage is zorgwekkend, vooral omdat met iedere nieuwe depressieve 
episode het risico op een terugval toeneemt (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Solomon et al., 
2000) en de depressie uiteindelijk chronisch kan worden (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
Teasdale, 1988). Er is dus een grote behoefte aan studies die helpen dit ziektebeeld 
beter te begrijpen en die aan het verbeteren van de behandelmogelijkheden bijdragen.
Een mogelijke invalshoek hiervoor biedt de cognitieve schema theorie (Beck & Haigh, 
2014; Clark et al., 1999). Deze theorie stelt dat ervaringen van de mens in schemata 
(kernopvatting over de eigen persoon) opgeslagen worden, die de waarneming van de 
wereld om ons heen beïnvloeden. Bij depressie zijn deze schemata gekenmerkt door 
onderwerpen zoals mislukking, verlies en afwijzing (Beck & Haigh, 2014). Door stressvolle 
of negatieve gebeurtenissen worden deze schemata geactiveerd. De binnenkomende 
informatie wordt vervolgens op een schema-congruente manier verwerkt, dat wil 
zeggen dat er relatief meer negatieve dan positieve informatie binnenkomt. Deze 
disbalans wordt bij depressieve mensen bij verschillende processen teruggevonden, 
zoals bij aandachtsprocessen waarbij relatief meer aandacht op negatieve informatie 
146
Chapter 8
gericht wordt (Sanchez et al., 2013), of bij interpretaties waarbij ambigue informatie 
vaker negatief dan positief beoordeeld wordt (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017). 
Belangrijk hierbij is dat deze zogenoemde cognitieve biases geen bijverschijnsel van 
de stoornis zijn, maar als oorzaak voor het ontstaan en in stand houden van depressie 
worden gezien (Clark et al., 1999; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; 
Teasdale, 1988).
Om deze biases te veranderen zijn er cognitieve trainingen ontwikkeld, de zogenoemde 
Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) technieken (Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Het doel van deze 
trainingen is om een positieve bias te induceren en daardoor depressieve symptomen 
te verminderen. Hierbij bestaan er verschillende trainingsparadigma´s die zich op de 
verschillende vormen van biases richten. De eerste CBM studies hebben aangetoond 
dat depressieve symptomen door middel van deze technieken gereduceerd kunnen 
worden, zowel door trainingen gericht op aandachtsprocessen (Browning et al., 2012; 
Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang et al., 2015) als ook op interpretatiebias (Micco et al., 2014; 
Williams et al., 2013). Echter, een aantal studies heeft deze positieve effecten van CBM 
niet kunnen vinden (Baert et al., 2010; Beevers et al., 2015; Kruijt et al., 2013; Mastikhina 
& Dobson, 2017), en recente meta-analysen geven aan dat CBM voor depressie over het 
algeheel niet effectief blijkt te zijn (Cristea et al., 2015; Mogoaşe et al., 2014).  
Hierbij is het belangrijk te benoemen dat deze meta-analysen verschillende studies 
samenvatten om de effectiviteit te bepalen, maar niet voldoende uitspraak kunnen doen 
over de individuele effectiviteit van de verschillende technieken en de omstandigheden 
waaronder de trainingen wel of niet werken (Beard et al., 2012; Cristea et al., 2015; 
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). Echter, om een goede inschatting van 
de effectiviteit van CBM voor depressie te kunnen geven, moeten we factoren zoals 
het stoornisbeeld (d.w.z., angststoornis of depressie), de bias (d.w.z., aandacht- of 
interpretatiebias), de steekproef (d.w.z., gezonde populatie of patiënten) of de dosis 
(d.w.z., hoeveelheid trainingssessies) mee betrekken (Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Maken we 
bijvoorbeeld onderscheid tussen verschillende biases, dan blijkt dat in tegenstelling 
tot aandachts-trainingen, paradigma’s die proberen interpretatiebiases te veranderen 
voor depressie wel effectief zijn (Everaert et al., 2017; Jones & Sharpe, 2017; Menne-
Lothmann et al., 2014) en dat onderzoek naar deze technieken veelbelovend is. Met 
betrekking tot de aandachtsprocessen valt op te merken dat de meeste studies gebruik 
maakten van een taak die oorspronkelijk voor het veranderen van aandachtsprocessen 
bij angstige patiënten werd ontwikkeld (d.w.z., Dot-Probe taak; MacLeod et al., 1986). 
Dezelfde methode werd vervolgens bij depressieve patiënten toegepast. Het is echter 
niet duidelijk in hoeverre deze techniek even effectief kan zijn voor mensen met een 
depressie. Deze dissertatie probeert bij te dragen aan de discussie of CBM paradigma’s in 
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staat zijn de negatieve vertekening bij depressie te veranderen en daardoor symptomen 
te reduceren. Het doel hierbij was om nieuwe technieken te ontwikkelen en actuele 
paradigma’s te verbeteren om aandachts- en interpretatiebias te trainen.
In Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 staan twee studies beschreven waarbij een nieuwe methode werd 
ontwikkeld en getest, die specifiek was gericht op het veranderen van maladaptieve 
aandachtsprocessen bij depressie. Zoals eerder gezegd hebben de meeste CBM-studies 
tot nu toe gebruik gemaakt van de Dot-probe taak voor het meten en trainen van 
aandachtsprocessen (MacLeod et al., 1986). Oorspronkelijk werd deze taak ontwikkeld 
om vertekeningen in de aandachtsprocessen bij angststoornissen te trainen. Mensen 
met een angststoornis hebben een verhoogde staat van alertheid voor angst-
gerelateerd stimulusmateriaal (MacLeod et al., 2002). Mensen met een depressie kijken 
juist trager weg van negatieve stimulusmateriaal (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Om dit 
proces doelgericht te kunnen trainen hebben we een nieuw paradigma ontwikkeld 
(ET-ABM; Eye-Tracking based Attention Bias Modification) die ontworpen was om 
de proefpersonen impliciet te trainen van negatieve plaatjes weg richting positieve 
plaatjes te kijken. De oogbewegingen werden met behulp van een eye-tracker continu 
geregistreerd, en alleen bij fixatie van de positieve beelden ging de taak verder. In 
hoofdstuk 2 hebben we deze positieve training vergeleken met een tegenovergestelde 
training, waarbij de proefpersonen weg van positieve plaatjes richting negatieve plaatjes 
moesten kijken. Uit de resultaten bleek dat het ET-ABM paradigma effectief is voor het 
trainen van de voor depressie karakteristieke vertekening in de aandachtsprocessen. 
De proefpersonen die de positieve training kregen werden sneller in het wegkijken 
van negatieve plaatjes, in vergelijking met de proefpersonen die het negatieve 
training kregen. Verder vonden we ook een positieve aandachtsbias: er was een relatief 
verhoogde aandacht (d.w.z., langere fixatietijden) voor positieve plaatjes vergeleken 
met negatieve plaatjes. Deze verandering in aandachtsprocessen had echter geen 
effect op veranderingen in de stemming in reactie op een uitdagende stresstaak, die 
gebruikt werd om een mogelijke therapeutische effect van de training in te kunnen 
schatten. Proefpersonen die de positieve training kregen herstelden niet sneller van de 
stresstaak dan proefpersonen die de negatieve training kregen.
Concluderend laten deze resultaten zien dat we met behulp van de training 
aandachtsprocessen kunnen veranderen. Het is echter niet duidelijk of we met de 
training het adaptieve kijkpatroon in de positieve training versterkt of in de negatieve 
training verzwakt hebben. In studie 3 hebben we daarom de positieve training 
vergeleken met een placebo training, waarbij de proefpersonen oefenden met een 
valentie-onafhankelijke kijkpatroon (d.w.z., waar de training niet in verband stond 
met waardering van de afbeeldingen). Om verder te onderzoeken of de training ook 
148
Chapter 8
geschikt is om de aandachtsprocessen te veranderen bij mensen met depressieve 
klachten, hebben we deze studie tevens bij studenten met licht verhoogde scores op 
een depressievragenlijst uitgevoerd. De resultaten lieten eveneens zien dat we met 
behulp van deze taak proefpersonen kunnen trainen om sneller weg te kijken van 
negatieve stimuli en verder ook weer een positieve aandachtsbias konden induceren. 
In overeenstemming met de eerdere studie had de training geen voordelig effect op 
de emotionele reactie tijdens een stress-inducerende taak. Samenvattend laten deze 
studies zien dat we met behulp van de ET-ABM training specifiek het wegkijken van 
negatieve stimuli kunnen trainen, zowel in een gezonde steekproef als ook in een 
steekproef met een licht verhoogd niveau van depressieve symptomen. Hoewel de 
huidige studies geen ondersteuning bieden voor een therapeutisch effect is het 
voorbarig om de mogelijke positieve effecten uit te sluiten. Verder onderzoek wordt 
aanbevolen om te kijken of er bijvoorbeeld meerdere trainingssessies nodig zijn om 
depressieve symptomen te reduceren. 
Zoals eerder beschreven zijn vooral trainingsparadigma’s veelbelovend die de focus op 
het veranderen van interpretatiebiases leggen (Everaert et al., 2017; Jones & Sharpe, 
2017; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 worden  twee studies 
beschreven, waarbij we gekeken hebben of we een paradigma bij depressie kunnen 
toepassen (IMP-D; Interpretation Modification Paradigm for Depression), wat al bij 
angstige proefpersonen succesvol is gebleken (Beard & Amir, 2008). Daarvoor hebben 
we het Word-Sentence Association Paradigm aangepast, waarbij altijd een ambigue zin 
(bv., “Mensen lachen over wat je zei”) gevolgd wordt door een negatief (bv., “stom”) of 
positief woord (bv., “grappig”). De taak van de proefpersonen was om aan te geven of 
het gegeven woord en de zin bij elkaar passen. Door middel van feedback hebben we 
geprobeerd om het verwerpen van de negatieve woord-zin combinaties te versterken, 
net zoals het accepteren van de positieve woord-zin combinaties. Het doel was om te 
onderzoeken of we door middel van deze IMP-D een maladaptieve interpretatiebias 
kunnen reduceren en of dit leidt tot een verandering van depressieve symptomen. In 
hoofdstuk 4 hebben we de positieve training vergeleken met een tegenovergestelde 
training (negatieve tendenties werden bekrachtigd) en met een neutrale training waarbij 
de reacties van de proefpersonen helemaal niet bekrachtigd werden. De resultaten 
lieten zien dat we in een steekproef van gezonde studenten de interpretatiebias kunnen 
trainen. Proefpersonen hebben na afloop van de positieve training relatief meer negatieve 
interpretaties verworpen en niet-negatieve interpretaties geaccepteerd, vergeleken met 
proefpersonen in de andere twee condities. In de vervolgstudie (hoofdstuk 5) hebben 
we daarom de training herhaald in een risicogroep van studenten met verhoogde 
scores op een depressievragenlijst. Omdat depressieve patiënten gevoeliger zijn voor 
negatieve feedback (Eshel & Roiser, 2010), en om te exploreren of een minder expliciete 
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manier van feedback ook geschikt zou zijn, hebben we de manier van feedback geven 
aangepast. In plaats van expliciete feedback (d.w.z., het woord “juist” of “fout”) op iedere 
reactie te geven, hebben we een staafdiagram gepresenteerd die het aantal goede 
reacties weergaf. Na afloop van de training verschilde de positieve trainingsconditie 
niet van de controleconditie in hun interpretatiebias. Een derde conditie, waarbij we 
dezelfde risicogroep met de expliciete feedback-procedure hebben getraind, liet wel 
een toename in de positieve interpretatiebias zien. Deze resultaten doen vermoeden 
dat het mogelijk is om vertekeningen in de interpretatiebias te veranderen, maar dat 
expliciete feedback nodig lijkt te zijn om binnen één trainingssessie een verandering 
teweeg te kunnen brengen. De studies in beide hoofdstukken geven echter geen 
indicatie dat het veranderen van de interpretatiebias ook de stress-reactiviteit kan 
reduceren. Ook hier is systematisch vervolgonderzoek nodig om uit te zoeken of het 
IMP-D in andere situaties (bv., meerdere trainingssessies) wel een therapeutisch effect 
kan hebben en in hoeverre verschillende vormen van feedback geschikt zijn.
Zoals eerder uitgelegd wordt een negatieve bias in de informatieverwerking als oorzaak 
voor het ontstaan en in stand houden van depressie gezien (Clark et al., 1999; De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Teasdale, 
1988). Op een neuraal niveau kan de cognitieve bias worden gerelateerd aan een 
disbalans tussen hersengebieden die betrokken zijn bij het verwerken en reguleren van 
emotionele stimuli, zoals het limbisch systeem en de dorsolaterale prefrontale cortex 
(DLPFC). In depressie is de top-down regulatie van de responsen verstoord, waardoor 
reacties op negatieve informatie overmatig sterk zijn wat ertoe leidt dat depressieve 
schemata verder worden versterkt (Disner et al., 2011). In hoofdstuk 6 staat een studie 
beschreven, waarbij we geprobeerd hebben deze vicieuze cirkel te doorbreken door het 
hersengebied te stimuleren wat betrokken is bij de top-down controle van negatieve 
stimuli. Hiervoor ontving een groep van gezonde proefpersonen hoogfrequente (d.w.z., 
10 Hz) repetitieve Transcraniële Magneetstimulatie (rTMS) over de linker DLPFC. Deze 
vorm van hersenstimulatie kan neurale activiteit tijdelijk verhogen (P. B. Fitzgerald 
et al., 2006) en wordt met een soortgelijk protocol ingezet in de behandeling van 
depressie (Lam et al., 2008; Lefaucheur et al., 2014). Om het werkingsmechanisme van 
dit behandelinstrument beter in kaart te brengen, hebben we onderzocht of door het 
verhogen van neurale activiteit in de linker DLPFC de top-down controle versterkt werd, en 
of daardoor de impact van een negatieve stemmingsinductie gereduceerd kon worden. 
In tegenstelling tot onze verwachting waren mensen gevoeliger voor de negatieve 
stemming van de vertoonde film nadat ze de actieve stimulatie hebben ontvangen. 
Omdat deze effecten alleen op subjectief niveau (d.w.z., stemmingsvragenlijst) terug 
werden gevonden maar niet op neuraal niveau (d.w.z., EEG), en deze exploratieve studie 
in een kleine steekproef werd uitgevoerd, is het aanbevolen deze studie te repliceren. 
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Hierbij is het noodzakelijk om systematisch te onderzoeken in hoeverre de effecten 
van de rTMS stimulatie situatie-afhankelijk zijn. Interessant zou zijn om te kijken of 
mensen door de hersenstimulatie gevoeliger werden voor het induceren van negatieve 
stemming (d.w.z., minder weerstand tegen de stressor), of dat ze beter in staat waren 
zich in de film in te leven (d.w.z., betere regulatie van de stemming). 
Conclusie
De studies in deze dissertatie laten zien dat het mogelijk is om de voor depressie 
karakteristieke vertekeningen in de informatieverwerking te veranderen. De ET-ABM lijkt 
hierbij een geschikt instrument te zijn om specifiek het aandachtsproces te trainen dat 
aan depressie gelinkt wordt; het wegkijken van negatieve stimuli. Hierbij konden zowel 
gezonde proefpersonen als deelnemers met licht verhoogde niveaus van depressie 
getraind worden. Een relevante vervolgstap zou zijn om de training in een depressieve 
steekproef te testen. Wat betreft het veranderen van maladaptieve interpretatiebias 
geven de huidige studies een eerste aanwijzing voor een positief effect van het IMP-D. 
Een enkele trainingssessie was hierbij voldoende om in een gezonde steekproef 
positieve tendenties te induceren. De vorm van feedback (expliciet vs impliciet) lijkt 
hierbij een belangrijke rol te spelen. 
Dat de studies in dit proefschrift geen bewijs hebben gevonden voor een stress-
reducerend effect, roept twijfel op wat betreft de therapeutische waarde van deze 
trainingen. Toekomstig onderzoek zou gebruik kunnen maken van instrumenten die 
wellicht beter geschikt zijn om een therapeutisch effect van de trainingen te meten 
(bv., stresstaken die ambiguïteit veroorzaken). Een alternatieve verklaring voor 
de afwezigheid van een verandering in stress-reactiviteit zou kunnen zijn dat een 
enkele trainingssessie onvoldoende is om een betekenisvolle verandering teweeg te 
brengen. Echter, gezien het grote aantal studies dat duidt op een causale relatie tussen 
maladaptieve informatievertekening en symptomen, hebben we met het veranderen 
van de cognitieve biases een eerste belangrijke stap gemaakt richting het verminderen 
van depressieve symptomen. Met betrekking tot het toepassen van non-invasieve 
hersenstimulatie is het belangrijk de context mee te betrekken (bv., gebeurtenissen 
die onmiddellijk op de stimulatie volgen), zowel voor onderzoek als ook voor de 
behandeling. Vervolgonderzoek over het onderliggende interactiemechanisme tussen 
stimulatie en context zou daarbij nieuwe, veelbelovende mogelijkheden voor de 
behandeling van depressie kunnen creëren.
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